Wireless incentive engineering

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 1764-1779 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.R.-F. Liao ◽  
R.H. Wouhaybi ◽  
A.T. Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Engineering

scholarly journals Characterising the Manipulability of Boolean Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Paolo Turrini ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Lexicographic Preferences ◽  
Incentive Engineering ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Boolean Games ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Complete Characterisation

The existence of (Nash) equilibria with undesirable properties is a well-known problem in game theory, which has motivated much research directed at the possibility of mechanisms for modifying games in order to eliminate undesirable equilibria, or induce desirable ones. Taxation schemes are a well-known mechanism for modifying games in this way. In the multi-agent systems community, taxation mechanisms for incentive engineering have been studied in the context of Boolean games with costs. These are games in which each player assigns truth-values to a set of propositional variables she uniquely controls in pursuit of satisfying an individual propositional goal formula; different choices for the player are also associated with different costs. In such a game, each player prefers primarily to see the satisfaction of their goal, and secondarily, to minimise the cost of their choice, thereby giving rise to lexicographic preferences over goal-satisfaction and costs. Within this setting, where taxes operate on costs only, however, it may well happen that the elimination or introduction of equilibria can only be achieved at the cost of simultaneously introducing less desirable equilibria or eliminating more attractive ones. Although this framework has been studied extensively, the problem of precisely characterising the equilibria that may be induced or eliminated has remained open. In this paper we close this problem, giving a complete characterisation of those mechanisms that can induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly the set of Nash Equilibrium outcomes.

A survey of incentive engineering for crowdsourcing

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conor Muldoon ◽  
Michael J. O’Grady ◽  
Gregory M. P. O’Hare
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
System Designer ◽  
Incentive Theory ◽  
Incentive Engineering ◽  
Incentive Structures ◽  
Game Theoretic

AbstractWith the growth of the Internet, crowdsourcing has become a popular way to perform intelligence tasks that hitherto would be either performed internally within an organization or not undertaken due to prohibitive costs and the lack of an appropriate communications infrastructure. In crowdsourcing systems, whereby multiple agents are not under the direct control of a system designer, it cannot be assumed that agents will act in a manner that is consistent with the objectives of the system designer or principal agent. In situations whereby agents’ goals are to maximize their return in crowdsourcing systems that offer financial or other rewards, strategies will be adopted by agents to game the system if appropriate mitigating measures are not put in place. The motivational and incentivization research space is quite large; it incorporates diverse techniques from a variety of different disciplines including behavioural economics, incentive theory, and game theory. This paper specifically focusses on game theoretic approaches to the problem in the crowdsourcing domain and places it in the context of the wider research landscape. It provides a survey of incentive engineering techniques that enable the creation of apt incentive structures in a range of different scenarios.

scholarly journals Incentive engineering for Boolean games

2013 ◽  
Vol 195 ◽  
pp. 418-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Wooldridge ◽  
Ulle Endriss ◽  
Sarit Kraus ◽  
Jérôme Lang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Engineering ◽  
Boolean Games
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