Reconfigurable Radios: A Possible Solution to Reduce Entry Costs in Wireless Phones

2015 ◽  
Vol 103 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mina Rais-Zadeh ◽  
Jeremy T. Fox ◽  
David D. Wentzloff ◽  
Yogesh B. Gianchandani
Keyword(s):  
Entry Costs ◽  
Reconfigurable Radios ◽  
Wireless Phones

Selection by Publication in Economics

2005 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Simonovits
Keyword(s):  
Selection Process ◽  
Professional Standards ◽  
Publication Process ◽  
Entry Costs ◽  
Scientific Papers ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Source Of Information

According to the dominant view, the quality of individual scientific papers can be evaluated by the standard of the journal in which they are published. This paper attempts to demonstrate the limits of this view in the field of economics. According to our main findings, a publication frequently serves as a signal of high professional standards rather than as a source of information; referees and editors frequently reject good papers and accept bad ones; citation indices only partially balance the distortions deriving from the selection process; there are essential “entry costs” to the publication process. Moreover, financial interests of publishers may contradict scientific interests. As long as leading economists do not give voice to their dissatisfaction, there is no hope for any reform of the selection process.

Entry Costs and Aggregate Dynamics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Germán Gutiérrez ◽  
Callum Jones ◽  
Thomas Philippon
Keyword(s):  
Entry Costs ◽  
Aggregate Dynamics

Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) Costs

2000 ◽  
pp. 265-285
Author(s):  
Don Coursey ◽  
R. Mark Isaac ◽  
Margaret Luke ◽  
Vernon L. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Entry Costs

Too Popular, Too Fast: Optimal Advertising and Entry Timing in Markets with Peer Influence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gila E. Fruchter ◽  
Ashutosh Prasad ◽  
Christophe Van den Bulte
Keyword(s):  
Peer Influence ◽  
Boundary Value ◽  
Unknown Boundary ◽  
Entry Costs ◽  
Optimal Advertising ◽  
Fast Solution ◽  
Time Optimal ◽  
Speed Up ◽  
Entry Timing ◽  
Solution Methodology

We study optimal advertising and entry timing decisions for a new product being sold in two-segment markets in which followers are positively influenced by elites, whereas elites are either unaffected or repulsed by product popularity among followers. Key decisions in such markets are not only how much to advertise in each segment over time but also when to enter the follower segment. We develop a continuous-time optimal control model to examine these issues. Analysis yields two sets of two-point boundary value problems where one set has an unknown boundary value condition that satisfies an algebraic equation. A fast solution methodology is proposed. Two main insights emerge. First, the optimal advertising strategy can be U-shaped, that is, decreasing at first to free-ride peer influence but increasing later on to thwart the repulsion influence of overpopularity causing disadoption. Second, in markets where cross-segment repulsion triggers disadoption, advertising is only moderately effective, and entry costs are high, managing both advertising and entry timing can result in significantly higher profits than managing only one of these levers. In markets without disadoption, with high advertising effectiveness or with low entry costs, in contrast, delaying entry may add little value if one already manages advertising optimally. This implies that purveyors of prestige or cool products need not deny followers access to their products in order to protect their profits, and can use advertising to speed up the democratization of consumption profitably. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

Browser-Less Surfing and Mobile Internet Access

2007 ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
G. Fleet ◽  
J. Reid
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Mobile Internet ◽  
Personal Digital Assistants ◽  
Web Content ◽  
Television Shows ◽  
Web Access ◽  
Wireless Phones ◽  
Audio Files ◽  
And Control

Lately, we have seen the use of a number of new technologies (such as Javascript, XML, and RSS) used to show how Web content can be delivered to users without a traditional browser application (e.g., Microsoft Explorer). In parallel, a growing number of PC applications, whose main job previously was to manage local resources, now are adding Internet connectivity to enhance their role and use (e.g., while iTunes started as a media player for playing and managing compressed audio files, it now includes Web access to download and purchase music, video, podcasts, television shows, and movies).While most attempts at providing Internet access on mobile devices (whether wireless phones or personal digital assistants) have sought to bring the traditional browser, or a mobile version of the browser, to these smaller devices, they have been far from successful (and a far cry from the richer experience provided by browsers on the PC using standard input and control devices of keyboards and a mouse). Next, we will highlight a number of recent trends to show how these physical and use-case constraints can be significantly diminished.

Selective Enforcement of Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Ben-Shahar ◽  
Assaf Jacob
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Software Industry ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Copyright Infringement ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
Legal Intervention ◽  
Entry Costs ◽  
Economic Considerations

Abstract We present a perfect Nash equilibrium in which the creator of a work, motivated by economic considerations, selectively enforces her own copyright. In fact, the creator may not only permit, but may strategically promote infringement of the copyright, thereby participating indirectly in predatory pricing, and so raising barriers to entry. Our model is highly applicable to the software industry, where relatively high entry costs and the relatively low cost of copyright infringement make this phenomenon likely. We further show the conditions under which exogenous intervention, through intensive enforcement of copyrights, increases social welfare. Finally, we explore some potential strategies for such legal intervention.

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