scholarly journals A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie Zhu ◽  
Anthony Joseph ◽  
Shankar Sastry
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Scada Systems

scholarly journals Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

2016 ◽  
pp. 448-465
Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Infrastructure Systems ◽  
Cyber Threats ◽  
Scada Systems ◽  
Insight Into

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.

Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

2015 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Infrastructure Systems ◽  
Cyber Threats ◽  
Scada Systems ◽  
Insight Into

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.

SCADA Systems Cyber Security for Critical Infrastructures

2020 ◽  
pp. 446-464
Author(s):  
Suhaila Ismail ◽  
Elena Sitnikova ◽  
Jill Slay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Data Acquisition ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Critical Infrastructures ◽  
Physical Injury ◽  
The Public ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Scada Systems

Past cyber-attacks on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems for Critical infrastructures have left these systems compromised and caused financial and economic problems. Deliberate attacks have resulted in denial of services and physical injury to the public in certain cases. This study explores the past attacks on SCADA Systems by examining nine case studies across multiple utility sectors including transport, energy and water and sewage sector. These case studies will be further analysed according to the cyber-terrorist decision-making theories including strategic, organisational and psychological theories based on McCormick (2000). Next, this study will look into cyber-terrorist capabilities in conducting attacks according to Nelson's (1999) approach that includes simple-unstructured, advance-structured and complex-coordinated capabilities. The results of this study will form the basis of a guideline that organisations can use so that they are better prepared in identifying potential future cybersecurity attacks on their SCADA systems.

scholarly journals Cyber Resilience Analysis of SCADA Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan Galiardi ◽  
Amanda Gonzales ◽  
Jamie Thorpe ◽  
Eric Vugrin ◽  
Raymond Fasano ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Use Case ◽  
Design Features ◽  
Scada Systems

Abstract Aging plants, efficiency goals, and safety needs are driving increased digitalization in nuclear power plants (NPP). Security has always been a key design consideration for NPP architectures, but increased digitalization and the emergence of malware such as Stuxnet, CRASHOVERRIDE, and TRITON that specifically target industrial control systems have heightened concerns about the susceptibility of NPPs to cyber attacks. The cyber security community has come to realize the impossibility of guaranteeing the security of these plants with 100% certainty, so demand for including resilience in NPP architectures is increasing. Whereas cyber security design features often focus on preventing access by cyber threats and ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of control systems, cyber resilience design features complement security features by limiting damage, enabling continued operations, and facilitating a rapid recovery from the attack in the event control systems are compromised. This paper introduces the REsilience VeRification UNit (RevRun) toolset, a software platform that was prototyped to support cyber resilience analysis of NPP architectures. Researchers at Sandia National Laboratories have recently developed models of NPP control and SCADA systems using the SCEPTRE platform. SCEPTRE integrates simulation, virtual hardware, software, and actual hardware to model the operation of cyber-physical systems. RevRun can be used to extract data from SCEPTRE experiments and to process that data to produce quantitative resilience metrics of the NPP architecture modeled in SCEPTRE. This paper details how RevRun calculates these metrics in a customizable, repeatable, and automated fashion that limits the burden placed upon the analyst. This paper describes RevRun’s application and use in the context of a hypothetical attack on an NPP control system. The use case specifies the control system and a series of attacks and explores the resilience of the system to the attacks. The use case further shows how to configure RevRun to run experiments, how resilience metrics are calculated, and how the resilience metrics and RevRun tool can be used to conduct the related resilience analysis.

Securing SCADA Systems against Cyber-Attacks using Artificial Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Abdulaziz Aldossary ◽  
Mazen Ali ◽  
Abdulla Alasaadi
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Scada Systems

Infrequent Pattern Identification in SCADA Systems Using Unsupervised Learning

2016 ◽  
pp. 215-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohiuddin Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Pattern Identification ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Pattern Detection ◽  
Detection Technique ◽  
Computationally Efficient ◽  
Cyber Terrorism ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Research Priority ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Scada Systems

In recent years, it has been revealed that these critical infrastructures such as SCADA systems have been the target of cyber-terrorism. In general cyber-attacks are infrequent in nature and hence infrequent pattern identification in SCADA systems is an important research issue. Therefore, design and development of an efficient infrequent pattern detection technique is a research priority. In this chapter, the effectiveness of co-clustering which is advantageous over regular clustering for creating more fine-grained representation of the data and computationally efficient is explored for infrequent pattern identification in SCADA systems. A multi-stage co-clustering based infrequent pattern detection technique is proposed and applied on seven benchmark SCADA datasets which includes practical industrial datasets. The proposed method shows its superiority over existing clustering based techniques in terms of computational complexity which is essential for practical deployment in a SCADA framework.

Detecting Cyber Attacks on SCADA and Other Critical Infrastructures

2013 ◽  
pp. 17-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurilio Pereira Coutinho ◽  
Germano Lambert-Torres ◽  
Luiz Eduardo Borges da Silva ◽  
Horst Lazarek ◽  
Elke Franz
Keyword(s):  
Anomaly Detection ◽  
Electric Power ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Secure Communication ◽  
Rough Set Theory ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Transportation Services ◽  
Scada Systems

Nowadays, critical infrastructure plays a fundamental role in our modern society. Telecommunication and transportation services, water and electricity supply, and banking and financial services are examples of such infrastructures. They expose society to security threats. To safeguard against these threats, providers of critical infrastructure services also need to maintain the security objectives of their interdependent data networks. As an important part of the electric power system critical infrastructure, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems require protection from a variety of threats, and their network infrastructures are potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks because security has not been part of their design. The diversity and lack of interoperability in the communication protocols also create obstacles for anyone attempting to establish secure communication. In order to improve the security of SCADA systems, anomaly detection can be used to identify corrupted values caused by malicious attacks and injection faults. The aim of this chapter is to present an alternative technique for implementing anomaly detection to monitor electric power electric systems. The problem is addressed here by the use of rough set theory.

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