Analysis on Information Leakage of Computer Displays via Conducted Emission on Power Line

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiqing Huang ◽  
Shanjing Yang ◽  
Jianlin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Information Leakage ◽  
Power Line ◽  
Conducted Emission

scholarly journals Specifying Power Filter Insertion Loss Values in Terms of Electromagnetic Safety of IT Equipment

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 2041
Author(s):  
Leszek Nowosielski ◽  
Bartosz Dudziński ◽  
Rafał Przesmycki ◽  
Marek Bugaj
Keyword(s):  
Insertion Loss ◽  
Noise Level ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Environmental Noise ◽  
Analytical Relation ◽  
Power Filter ◽  
Conducted Emission ◽  
System Input ◽  
Filter Insertion

At present, one of the main methods of minimizing risk resulting from electromagnetic information leakage is to attenuate the undesired levels of radiated and conducted disturbances generated by IT equipment, as these disturbances can carry information processed by said equipment. Attenuation of conducted compromising emissions is most commonly handled with filters with a sufficiently high insertion loss. This article defines an original analytical relation specifying insertion loss value requirements for mains filters and estimates values of parameters included in the defined relation. Furthermore, this defined relation was used to define requirements for insertion loss provided by the mains filters, above which the ratio value of potentially compromising conducted emission levels to the environmental noise level at the infiltrating system input S/N < 0 dB. As a consequence, electromagnetic infiltration is significantly impeded.

Information leakage through electromagnetic radiation of PS/2 Keyboard

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-60
Author(s):  
Chinh Duc Bui ◽  
Minh The Ngo ◽  
Hao Ngoc Vinh Nguyen ◽  
Tuan Manh Pham
Keyword(s):  
Electromagnetic Radiation ◽  
Computer System ◽  
Near Field ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Power Line ◽  
Side Channel ◽  
Electronic Components ◽  
Confidential Information ◽  
System Data ◽  
Electromagnetic Radiations

Abstract—   Computer keyboards are often used to enter data for a computer system, data could be normal information or confidential information such as password, key. Keyboards use electronic components so they will generate electromagnetic radiation that can reveal information. This article presents the acquisition of electromagnetic emanating from the PS/2 keyboards through different paths (in space, through power line or via LAN cable). After acquisition we develop a program on MATLAB to recover the keystroke signal from data which is obtained in the near field of PS/2 keyboard. The result of this side channel attack is recovered an average of more than 70% of the keystrokes in near field of PS/2 keyboards.  Our best attack can recover up to more than 90% of the keystrokes. From this result, we conclude that PS/2 keyboards generate electromagnetic radiations which can cause the loss of information and they are not safe to use when entering confidential information. Tóm tắt—   Bàn phím máy tính thường được sử dụng để nhập dữ liệu đầu vào cho một hệ thống máy tính, các dữ liệu có thể là văn bản thông thường hoặc thông tin cần được bảo mật như mật khẩu hay khóa. Bàn phím sử dụng các linh kiện điện tử, vì thế chúng sẽ gây ra bức xạ điện từ dẫn đến lộ lọt các thông tin khi gõ phím. Bài báo này trình bày về việc thu các tín hiệu bức xạ điện từ phát ra từ bàn phím PS/2 khi gõ phím qua các con đường khác nhau (nhiễu bức xạ trong không gian, nhiễu dẫn trên đường nguồn, qua mạng LAN). Từ đó, nghiên cứu xây dựng một module chương trình trên MATLAB để khôi phục lại tín hiệu gõ phím từ các dữ liệu thu được trong trường gần của bàn phím. Kết quả của cách tần công trên kênh kề này là khôi phục trung bình được hơn 70% ký tự được gõ trong trường gần của bàn phím PS/2. Trường hợp tốt nhất kết quả có thể lên đến hơn 90% ký tự được gõ. Từ kết quả nghiên cứu trên, nhóm nghiên cứu rút ra kết luận, các loại bàn phím[1]  PS/2 đều phát ra các bức xạ điện từ gây mất mát thông tin và không an toàn để sử dụng khi nhập các thông tin cần được bảo mật. 

scholarly journals Analysis and Rectification of Power Line Conducted Emission Test Exceeding Standards

2020 ◽  
Vol 1550 ◽  
pp. 052024
Author(s):  
Guo Shichao ◽  
Guo Dandan ◽  
Zhang Qiongyu ◽  
Wu Nankai ◽  
Deng Jiaxin
Keyword(s):  
Power Line ◽  
Conducted Emission

scholarly journals Analysis of Compromising Video Disturbances through Power Line

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 267
Author(s):  
Bogdan Trip ◽  
Vlad Butnariu ◽  
Mădălin Vizitiu ◽  
Alexandru Boitan ◽  
Simona Halunga
Keyword(s):  
Signal To Noise Ratio ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Power Line ◽  
Electronic Equipment ◽  
Sensitive Information ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
The Tempest ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Electromagnetic Disturbances

In this article, we present results on research performed in the TEMPEST domain, which studies the electromagnetic disturbances generated unintentionally by electronic equipment as well as the methods to protect the information processed by this equipment against these electromagnetic phenomena. The highest vulnerability of information leakage is attributed to the display video signal from the TEMPEST domain perspective. Examples of far-range propagation on a power line of this type of disturbance will be illustrated for the first time. Thus, the examples will highlight the possibility of recovering processed information at distances of 1, 10 and 50 m. There are published articles studying electromagnetic disturbances generated by electronic equipment propagating on power cables of such equipment but no studies on their long-distance propagation. Our research aims to raise awareness in the scientific community and the general public of the existence of such vulnerabilities that can compromise confidential or sensitive information that can make the difference between success or failure in the business sector, for example, or can harm personal privacy, which is also important for us all. Countermeasures to reduce or even eliminate these threats will also be presented based on the analysis of the signal-to noise-ratio recorded during our research.

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