A denial-of-service resistant public-key authentication and key establishment protocol

Author(s):  
Chun-Kan Fung ◽  
M.C. Lee
Author(s):  
Dulal C. Kar ◽  
Hung L. Ngo ◽  
Clifton J. Mulkey

It is challenging to secure a wireless sensor network (WSN) because of its use of inexpensive sensor nodes of very limited processing capability, memory capacity, and battery life that preclude using traditional security solutions. Due to perceived excessive computational and architectural overhead, public key algorithms are altogether avoided for WSNs. Currently security in WSNs is provided using only symmetric key cryptography, but it requires keys to be embedded in sensor nodes before deployment and the entire network has to go through a key establishment phase after deployment. Accordingly, in this chapter, we summarize, discuss, and evaluate recent results reported in literature on sensor network security protocols such as for key establishment, random key pre-distribution, data confidentiality, and broadcast authentication. In addition, we discuss promising research results in public key cryptography for WSNs, particularly related to elliptic curve cryptography and its application for identity based encryption.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Smith ◽  
Suratose Tritilanunt ◽  
Colin Boyd ◽  
Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto ◽  
Ernest Foo

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiye Kim ◽  
Jongho Moon ◽  
Jaewook Jung ◽  
Donghoon Lee ◽  
Youngsook Lee ◽  
...  

2013 ◽  
pp. 471-492
Author(s):  
Dulal C. Kar ◽  
Hung L. Ngo ◽  
Clifton J. Mulkey

It is challenging to secure a wireless sensor network (WSN) because of its use of inexpensive sensor nodes of very limited processing capability, memory capacity, and battery life that preclude using traditional security solutions. Due to perceived excessive computational and architectural overhead, public key algorithms are altogether avoided for WSNs. Currently security in WSNs is provided using only symmetric key cryptography, but it requires keys to be embedded in sensor nodes before deployment and the entire network has to go through a key establishment phase after deployment. Accordingly, in this chapter, we summarize, discuss, and evaluate recent results reported in literature on sensor network security protocols such as for key establishment, random key pre-distribution, data confidentiality, and broadcast authentication. In addition, we discuss promising research results in public key cryptography for WSNs, particularly related to elliptic curve cryptography and its application for identity based encryption.


Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian ◽  
Mala K.

This chapter focusses on Secure Key Exchange protocols executed among a group of parties, called group key exchange (GKE) protocols. Authentication and Key Establishment are very important in any secure communication. Authentication is generally based on long-term keys which can be associated with identities. To associate identities with long-term keys, we can assume the existence of a public-key infrastructure (PKI) which provides parties with some mechanisms for secure key registration and secure access to long-term keys of prospective peers. In most cases, there is also a need for some temporary keys. The Group Key Exchange protocols can be classified as Centralized, Distributed or Contributory. A few toolkits such as Spread and Cliques for the implementation of Group Key Exchange Protocols are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Joo Yeon Cho ◽  
Andrew Sergeev

The demand on MACsec in Ethernet is increasing substantially since MACsec fits well for industrial applications which require strong security as well as efficiency. To provide a long-term security, the MACsec protocol should be resistant to future attacks including quantum attacks. In this paper, MACsec is analysed under a quantum attack scenario. To achieve 128-bit quantum security, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithms defined in MACsec should mandate to use 256-bit keys. On the other hand, classical public-key cryptosystems in MKA are not secure at all against quantum attacks so that they need to be replaced by post-quantum crypto schemes in a quantum world. We propose an authenticated post-quantum key establishment protocol which is suitable for long-term secure MACsec. The proposed protocol is used in the hybrid mode, an ephemeral key exchange, and an end-to-end encryption. We verified by experiments that the proposed protocol can be deployed in existing a MACsec-enabled Ethernet network.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-30
Author(s):  
Oleg Taraskin ◽  
Vladimir Soukharev ◽  
David Jao ◽  
Jason T. LeGrow

AbstractPassword authenticated key establishment (PAKE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows two parties who share a low-entropy secret (a password) to securely establish cryptographic keys in the absence of public key infrastructure. We propose the first quantum-resistant password-authenticated key exchange scheme based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. The scheme is built upon supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman [15], and uses the password to generate permutations which obscure the auxiliary points. We include elements of a security proof, and discuss roadblocks to obtaining a proof in the BPR model [1]. We also include some performance results.


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