scholarly journals Efficient Rate-Constrained Nash Equilibrium in Collision Channels with State Information

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Menache ◽  
N. Shimkin
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
State Information ◽  
Constrained Nash Equilibrium

scholarly journals Near-Nash equilibrium strategies for LQ differential games with inaccurate state information

2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Jimenez-Lizarraga ◽  
Alex Poznyak
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Control Strategies ◽  
Perfect State ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
State Information ◽  
Standard Solution ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Cost Game

ε-Nash equilibrium or “near equilibrium” for a linear quadratic cost game is considered. Due to inaccurate state information, the standard solution for feedback Nash equilibrium cannot be applied. Instead, an estimation of the players' states is substituted into the optimal control strategies equation obtained for perfect state information. The magnitude of theεin theε-Nash equilibrium will depend on the quality of the estimation process. To illustrate this approach, a Luenberger-type observer is used in the numerical example to generate the players' state estimates in a two-player non-zero-sum LQ differential game.

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

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