Building an Optimal Service Environment for ASBS Based on Pareto Dominance

Author(s):  
Hang Song ◽  
Jun Na ◽  
Bin Zhang ◽  
Jun Guo ◽  
Zhi-Liang Zhu
2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 2520-2530
Author(s):  
Ling-Wei CHU ◽  
Shi-Hong ZOU ◽  
Shi-Duan CHENG ◽  
Chun-Qi TIAN ◽  
Wen-Dong WANG

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Guedes ◽  
Vasco Furtado ◽  
Tarcísio Pequeno ◽  
Joel Rodrigues

UNSTRUCTURED The article investigates policies for helping emergency-centre authorities for dispatching resources aimed at reducing goals such as response time, the number of unattended calls, the attending of priority calls, and the cost of displacement of vehicles. Pareto Set is shown to be the appropriated way to support the representation of policies of dispatch since it naturally fits the challenges of multi-objective optimization. By means of the concept of Pareto dominance a set with objectives may be ordered in a way that guides the dispatch of resources. Instead of manually trying to identify the best dispatching strategy, a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm coupled with an Emergency Call Simulator uncovers automatically the best approximation of the optimal Pareto Set that would be the responsible for indicating the importance of each objective and consequently the order of attendance of the calls. The scenario of validation is a big metropolis in Brazil using one-year of real data from 911 calls. Comparisons with traditional policies proposed in the literature are done as well as other innovative policies inspired from different domains as computer science and operational research. The results show that strategy of ranking the calls from a Pareto Set discovered by the evolutionary method is a good option because it has the second best (lowest) waiting time, serves almost 100% of priority calls, is the second most economical, and is the second in attendance of calls. That is to say, it is a strategy in which the four dimensions are considered without major impairment to any of them.


Author(s):  
Edoardo Fadda ◽  
Daniele Manerba ◽  
Gianpiero Cabodi ◽  
Paolo Enrico Camurati ◽  
Roberto Tadei

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 04001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen-guo Zhang ◽  
Hui-xing Feng ◽  
Wei-hua Zhao

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-176
Author(s):  
Ismail Saglam

Baron and Myerson (BM; 1982, Econometrica, 50(4), 911–930) propose an incentive-compatible, individually rational and ex ante socially optimal direct-revelation mechanism to regulate a monopolistic firm with unknown costs. Their mechanism is not ex post Pareto dominated by any other feasible direct-revelation mechanism. However, there also exist an uncountable number of feasible direct-revelation mechanisms that are not ex post Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism. To investigate whether the BM mechanism remains in the set of ex post undominated mechanisms when the Pareto axiom is slightly weakened, we introduce the ∈-Pareto dominance. This concept requires the relevant dominance relationships to hold in the support of the regulator’s beliefs everywhere except for a set of points of measure ∈, which can be arbitrarily small. We show that a modification of the BM mechanism which always equates the price to the marginal cost can ∈-Pareto dominate the BM mechanism at uncountably many regulatory environments, while it is never ∈-Pareto dominated by the BM mechanism at any regulatory environment.


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