A Venture Investment Principal-agent Model Base on Game Theory

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang Xu-bo ◽  
Zhang Zi-gang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Model Base ◽  
Venture Investment ◽  
Principal Agent Model

scholarly journals The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 2171-2195
Author(s):  
Dongsheng Xu ◽  
◽  
Qingqing Liu ◽  
Xin Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Venture Investment ◽  
Principal Agent Model

scholarly journals Venture Investment Incentive Mechanisms and Simulation with Venture Entrepreneurs Having Multistage Efforts Based on Fairness Preference Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaihong Wang ◽  
Chuan Ding ◽  
Jiacheng Chen ◽  
Aimin Li
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Dynamic Variable ◽  
Theoretical Derivation ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Preference Theory ◽  
Venture Investment ◽  
Principal Agent Model

When venture capital has been invested into venture companies, venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs form a principal-agent relationship. Take into account the fact that the venture entrepreneur’s effort is a long process, because the effort is not the same at different stage. Therefore, efforts variables are seen as the multistage dynamic variable, and venture investment principal-agent model with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts is constructed on the basis of the classic principal-agent theory in the paper. Further, in the later stage effort of venture entrepreneurs is affected by the size of prestage benefit with venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs; thus the fairness preference model is improved, and venture investment principal-agent model with venture entrepreneurs having multistage efforts is constructed on the basis of fairness preference theory. Both theoretical derivation and simulation have demonstrated that, under the condition of information asymmetry, if the fairness preference of venture entrepreneurs holds, then(1)venture capitalists provide venture entrepreneurs with level higher than that without fairness preference,(2)in every single stage venture entrepreneurs make efforts higher than those without fairness preference, and(3)in two periods both venture investors and venture entrepreneurs gain total real gains higher than those in two periods without fair preference.

Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model

1990 ◽  
Vol 100 (403) ◽  
pp. 1109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Principal Agent Model
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document