A Sequential Posted Price Mechanism for D2D Content Sharing Communications

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiwei Huang ◽  
Changyan Yi ◽  
Jun Cai
Keyword(s):  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Content Sharing ◽  
Posted Price

scholarly journals Optimal Posted-Price Mechanism in Microtask Crowdsourcing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zehong Hu ◽  
Jie Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Upper Bound ◽  
Optimal Algorithm ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Bandit Problem ◽  
Price Data ◽  
Real Price ◽  
Price Range ◽  
Posted Price

Posted-price mechanisms are widely-adopted to decide the price of tasks in popular microtask crowdsourcing. In this paper, we propose a novel posted-price mechanism which not only outperforms existing mechanisms on performance but also avoids their need of a finite price range. The advantages are achieved by converting the pricing problem into a multi-armed bandit problem and designing an optimal algorithm to exploit the unique features of microtask crowdsourcing. We theoretically show the optimality of our algorithm and prove that the performance upper bound can be achieved without the need of a prior price range. We also conduct extensive experiments using real price data to verify the advantages and practicability of our mechanism.

scholarly journals Auction Versus Posted Price Mechanisms in Online Sales: The Roles of Impatience and Dissuasion

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-88
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Debabrata Datta ◽  
Souvik Dhar
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Previous Experience ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Online Sales ◽  
Auction Price ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Waiting Cost ◽  
Posted Price

If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted price mechanism. However, it is documented that in online sales sellers prefer posted price mechanism to auction. We aim to explain this empirical contradiction in terms of partial participation of the buyers in auction, prompted by impatience and dissuasion. Auction on Internet often requires waiting, and hence, many impatient participants may not join the auction process. Furthermore, a previous experience of failure in auction may also prompt buyers’ non-participation. We show, theoretically, that in the case of partial participation, the price in auction may be lower; posted price turns out to be payoff dominant for both the buyers and the sellers. We then run a laboratory experiment and verify the presence of impatience (through waiting cost) and dissuasion factor (through previous failure) among the subjects.

scholarly journals Bidding behavior in auctions versus posted prices: comparisons of mean and marginal effects

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Shang Wu ◽  
Jacob R. Fooks ◽  
Tongzhe Li ◽  
Kent D. Messer ◽  
Deborah A. Delaney
Keyword(s):  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Field Experiment ◽  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Preference Change ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Marginal Effects ◽  
Posted Prices ◽  
Posted Price

Abstract Economic experiments have been widely used to elicit individuals' evaluation for various commodities. Common elicitation methods include auction and posted price mechanisms. A field experiment is designed to compare willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates between these two mechanisms. Despite both of these formats being theoretically incentive compatible and demand revealing, results from 115 adult consumers indicate that WTP estimates obtained from an auction are 32–39 percent smaller than those from a posted price mechanism. A comparison in statistical significance shows that auctions require a smaller sample size than posted price mechanisms in order to detect the same preference change. Nevertheless, the signs of marginal effects for different product characteristics are consistent in both mechanisms.

scholarly journals Online Revenue Maximization for Server Pricing

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shant Boodaghians ◽  
Federico Fusco ◽  
Stefano Leonardi ◽  
Yishay Mansour ◽  
Ruta Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Maximization ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Time Step ◽  
Underlying Distribution ◽  
Pricing Mechanism ◽  
Additive Error ◽  
Pricing Scheme ◽  
Unit Capacity ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Posted Price

Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price time on remote servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers online revenue maximization for a unit capacity server, when jobs are non preemptive, in the Bayesian setting: at each time step, one job arrives, with parameters drawn from an underlying distribution. We design an efficiently computable truthful posted price mechanism, which maximizes revenue in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent's type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic. We also show the pricing mechanism is robust to learning the job distribution from samples, where polynomially many samples suffice to obtain near optimal prices.

scholarly journals Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Correa ◽  
Patricio Foncea ◽  
Ruben Hoeksma ◽  
Tim Oosterwijk ◽  
Tjark Vredeveld
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Random Order ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Finite Sequence ◽  
Optimal Threshold ◽  
Independent Random Variables ◽  
Price Mechanism ◽  
Posted Price ◽  
Independent And Identically Distributed

The classic prophet inequality states that, when faced with a finite sequence of nonnegative independent random variables, a gambler who knows the distribution and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, can obtain, in expectation, at least half as much reward as a prophet who knows the values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. In this work, we consider the situation in which the sequence comes in random order. We look at both a nonadaptive and an adaptive version of the problem. In the former case, the gambler sets a threshold for every random variable a priori, whereas, in the latter case, the thresholds are set when a random variable arrives. For the nonadaptive case, we obtain an algorithm achieving an expected reward within at least a 0.632 fraction of the expected maximum and prove that this constant is optimal. For the adaptive case with independent and identically distributed random variables, we obtain a tight 0.745-approximation, solving a problem posed by Hill and Kertz in 1982. We also apply these prophet inequalities to posted price mechanisms, and we prove the same tight bounds for both a nonadaptive and an adaptive posted price mechanism when buyers arrive in random order.

Conflict Detection Techniques for Preserving Privacy in Social Media

2018 ◽  
pp. 78-85
Author(s):  
Fulpagare Priya K. ◽  
Nitin N. Patil
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Privacy Management ◽  
Crucial Importance ◽  
Network Integration ◽  
Critical Problem ◽  
Detection Techniques ◽  
Privacy Preferences ◽  
Content Sharing ◽  
Privacy Settings ◽  
Relationship Network

Social Network is an emerging e-service for Content Sharing Sites (CSS). It is an emerging service which provides reliable communication. Some users over CSS affect user’s privacy on their personal contents, where some users keep on sending annoying comments and messages by taking advantage of the user’s inherent trust in their relationship network. Integration of multiple user’s privacy preferences is very difficult task, because privacy preferences may create conflict. The techniques to resolve conflicts are essentially required. Moreover, these methods need to consider how users would actually reach an agreement about a solution to the conflict in order to offer solutions acceptable by all of the concerned users. The first mechanism to resolve conflicts for multi-party privacy management in social media that is able to adapt to different situations by displaying the enterprises that users make to reach a result to the conflicts. Billions of items that are uploaded to social media are co-owned by multiple users. Only the user that uploads the item is allowed to set its privacy settings (i.e. who can access the item). This is a critical problem as users’ privacy preferences for co-owned items can conflict. Multi-party privacy management is therefore of crucial importance for users to appropriately reserve their privacy in social media.

PRICE MECHANISM MANAGEMENT IN AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

2019 ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
V. Trukhachev ◽  
Yu. Binatov ◽  
A. Gerasimov
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Complex ◽  
Price Mechanism
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