Notice of Retraction: Decision-making of Risk Aversion for Power Enterprises by Hedging during the Building of Smart Grid

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
Cunbin Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Smart Grid ◽  
Risk Aversion

The security of being grateful: Gratitude promotes risk aversion in decision-making

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yufeng Zhang ◽  
Zhuo Job Chen ◽  
Shiguang Ni
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals A Computational Model of Non-optimal Suspiciousness in the Minnesota Trust Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kazinka ◽  
Iris Vilares ◽  
Angus MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Computational Model ◽  
Inequity Aversion ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Social Decision ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Highly Correlated ◽  
Social Decision Making

This study modeled spite sensitivity (the worry that others are willing to incur a loss to hurt you), which is thought to undergird suspiciousness and persecutory ideation. Two samples performed a parametric, non-iterative trust game known as the Minnesota Trust Game (MTG). The MTG is designed to distinguish suspicious decision-making from otherwise rational mistrust by incentivizing the player to trust in certain situations. Individuals who do not trust even under these circumstances are particularly suspicious of their potential partner’s intentions. In Sample 1, 243 undergraduates who completed the MTG showed less trust as the amount of money they could lose increased. However, for choices where partners had a financial disincentive to betray the player, variation in the willingness to trust the partner was associated with suspicious beliefs. To further examine spite sensitivity, we modified the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion model, which compares unequal outcomes in social decision-making tasks, to include the possibility for spite sensitivity. In this case, an anticipated partner’s dislike of advantageous inequity (i.e., guilt) parameter could take on negative values, with negative guilt indicating spite. We hypothesized that the anticipated guilt parameter would be strongly related to suspicious beliefs. Our modification of the Fehr-Schmidt model improved estimation of MTG behavior. We isolated the estimation of partner’s spite-guilt, which was highly correlated with choices most associated with persecutory ideation. We replicated our findings in a second sample, where the estimated spite-guilt parameter correlated with self-reported suspiciousness. The “Suspiciousness” condition, unique to the MTG, can be modeled to isolate spite sensitivity, suggesting that spite sensitivity is separate from inequity aversion or risk aversion, and may provide a means to quantify persecution. The MTG offers promise for future studies to quantify persecutory beliefs in clinical populations.

Decision Making for Energy Management in Smart Grid

2019 ◽  
pp. 264-297
Author(s):  
Vira Shendryk ◽  
Olha Boiko ◽  
Yuliia Parfenenko ◽  
Sergii Shendryk ◽  
Sergii Tymchuk
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Information System ◽  
Smart Grid ◽  
Energy Management ◽  
Management Information System ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
Information Flows ◽  
Management Information ◽  
Microgrid Energy Management ◽  
Planning And Operation

The chapter discusses the problem of energy management in Smart MicroGrid. The strategies of Smart MicroGrid energy management and objectives of Smart MicroGrid operation have been analyzed. The chapter emphasizes the potential of information technologies implementation to achieve energy management goals and provide a description of energy management information system which is used for MicroGrid planning and operation. The information flows which are used for making decision on Smart MicroGrid energy management have been analyzed.

Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Legal Rules

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.

scholarly journals Copyright Policy and Practice in Electronic Reserves among ARL Libraries

2013 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Hansen ◽  
William M. Cross ◽  
Phillip M. Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
Copyright Policy

This paper presents the results of a survey of 110 ARL institutions regarding their copyright policies for providing electronic reserves. It compiles descriptive statistics on library practice as well as coding responses to reveal trends and shared practices. Finally, it presents conclusions about policy making, decision making and risk aversion in ARL institutions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document