Managing an employee ownership model in an IPO world

Author(s):  
D.F. Shafer
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Bailey ◽  
Catherine Bush ◽  
Monica R. Filipkowski ◽  
Stephen H. Wagner

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Xianglong Chen ◽  
Edward Lee ◽  
Konstantinos Stathopoulos
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andrew Pendleton ◽  
Andrew Robinson

The chapter reviews the development of new forms of employee ownership in Britain since the 1980s. It compares trust-based and direct forms of ownership, as well as hybrids of the two, drawing attention to the perceived benefits of each. The chapter then considers the influences on the development of these forms of ownership. It highlights the role of political factors within a broader context of economic change. Finally, drawing on a research project currently under way, it discerns four main circumstances in which employee ownership is created, such as privatization and business succession. It is noted that those involved in ownership conversions varies by these circumstances. This in turn reflects on the forms of ownership and governance adopted.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Guy Major ◽  
Jonathan Preminger

Purpose Both the academic literature and practitioners have long noted the need for an equity investment mechanism for worker-controlled firms that alleviates investor anxieties without undermining internal workplace democracy. The purpose of this paper is to outline one such possible mechanism. Design/methodology/approach The proposal locks together the interests of workers and external investors, via non-voting shares with dividends set by a pre-agreed value-added sharing formula. Each worker is paid a base wage, with the average across the firm being a pre-defined multiple of the national minimum wage. Any additional surplus is split into a number of equal “slices”, with each share receiving one slice as its dividend, and the average worker receiving a pre-agreed number of slices as a bonus. Findings Workers have an incentive to maximise their own incomes, and in so doing, will also automatically maximise the dividends received by investors, obviating the need for the shares to have normal voting rights. Working on this principle of aligned interests, the authors also discuss reinvestment, worker ownership of non-voting shares and possibilities for a secondary share market. The authors show how this proposal will be a significant step in aligning the interests of investors with owner-workers in a democratic, negotiated way that shares both risk and returns, thus making worker-controlled firms more attractive to equity investment. Originality/value In light of the recognised problem of underinvestment in worker-controlled firms and the risk of their degeneration, this paper will interest both academics and practitioners in employee ownership, co-operatives and various forms of workplace democracy.


1997 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 344
Author(s):  
Donald Dennie ◽  
Jack Quarter

1995 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Corey Rosen ◽  
Margaret Blair
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Blasi ◽  
Douglas Kruse ◽  
Dan Weltmann

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to understand how majority employee-owned firms responded to the pandemic compared to firms that were not majority employee-owned. The Employee Ownership Foundation partnered with Rutgers University and the SSRS survey firm to survey ESOP and non-ESOP firms about their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. A key purpose of the survey was to estimate firm-level changes in employment from mid-January to August (current employment figures were adjusted to August 5 using BLS industry employment trends). The survey also looked at other forms of adjustment and responses to the pandemic as reviewed below. The focus in this study is on the differences between firms that are majority owned by ESOPs and those that are not.Design/methodology/approachThe survey included 247 executives from ESOP Association member companies and 500 executives from an SSRS business panel constructed to be representative of US companies with 50 or more employees. The survey started on August 5 and ended on September 23, 2020.Findings(1) Majority ESOP firms had employment declines from January to August that were on average only one-fourth as large as for other firms. The difference is maintained when controlling for industry membership. (2) Majority ESOP firms were more likely to be declared “essential,” but the lower employment cutbacks among majority ESOP firms remain among essential and non-essential businesses. As essential businesses, majority ESOP firms were more likely receive Paycheck Protection Program or other government pandemic assistance, but both assistance recipients and non-recipients had lower employment cutbacks among majority ESOP firms. (3) The extent of employment cutbacks was higher for non-managers than for managers, but the manager/non-manager gap was higher among other firms than among majority ESOP firms.Research limitations/implicationsThis study supports empirical findings done previously.Practical implicationsThis study suggests to non-EO firms what they can do.Social implicationsThis study suggests strengths of EO firms.Originality/valueA very original and one-of-a-kind dataset.


1986 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-128
Author(s):  
Will Mitchell ◽  
Judith Kenner Thompson
Keyword(s):  

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