A predictive coding model of representational drawing in human children and chimpanzees

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Philippsen ◽  
Yukie Nagai
Keyword(s):  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Representational Drawing

A challenge for predictive coding: Representational or experiential diversity?

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina G. Vilas ◽  
Lucia Melloni
Keyword(s):  
Brain Function ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Process Theory

Abstract To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing (PP) must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.

Representation, abstraction, and simple-minded sophisticates

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dayan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Bayesian Decision Theory ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Model Free

Abstract Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.

Temporal Prediction Errors Affect Short-Term Memory Scanning Response Time

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
pp. 333-342
Author(s):  
Roberto Limongi ◽  
Angélica M. Silva
Keyword(s):  
Response Time ◽  
Short Term Memory ◽  
Estimation Error ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Time Estimation ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Memory Scanning ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Term Memory ◽  
Temporal Prediction

Abstract. The Sternberg short-term memory scanning task has been used to unveil cognitive operations involved in time perception. Participants produce time intervals during the task, and the researcher explores how task performance affects interval production – where time estimation error is the dependent variable of interest. The perspective of predictive behavior regards time estimation error as a temporal prediction error (PE), an independent variable that controls cognition, behavior, and learning. Based on this perspective, we investigated whether temporal PEs affect short-term memory scanning. Participants performed temporal predictions while they maintained information in memory. Model inference revealed that PEs affected memory scanning response time independently of the memory-set size effect. We discuss the results within the context of formal and mechanistic models of short-term memory scanning and predictive coding, a Bayes-based theory of brain function. We state the hypothesis that our finding could be associated with weak frontostriatal connections and weak striatal activity.

Adaptive and Maladaptive Neural Plasticity Due to Facial Nerve Palsy

2016 ◽  
Vol 224 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten M. Klingner ◽  
Stefan Brodoehl ◽  
Gerd F. Volk ◽  
Orlando Guntinas-Lichius ◽  
Otto W. Witte
Keyword(s):  
Facial Nerve ◽  
Neural Plasticity ◽  
Cortical Plasticity ◽  
Brain Plasticity ◽  
Motor Nerve ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Cortical Reorganization ◽  
Nerve Lesion ◽  
Peripheral Facial Palsy

Abstract. This paper reviews adaptive and maladaptive mechanisms of cortical plasticity in patients suffering from peripheral facial palsy. As the peripheral facial nerve is a pure motor nerve, a facial nerve lesion is causing an exclusive deefferentation without deafferentation. We focus on the question of how the investigation of pure deefferentation adds to our current understanding of brain plasticity which derives from studies on learning and studies on brain lesions. The importance of efference and afference as drivers for cortical plasticity is discussed in addition to the crossmodal influence of different competitive sensory inputs. We make the attempt to integrate the experimental findings of the effects of pure deefferentation within the theoretical framework of cortical responses and predictive coding. We show that the available experimental data can be explained within this theoretical framework which also clarifies the necessity for maladaptive plasticity. Finally, we propose rehabilitation approaches for directing cortical reorganization in the appropriate direction and highlight some challenging questions that are yet unexplored in the field.

Evaluating emergent naming relations through representational drawing in individuals with developmental disabilities using the PEAK-E curriculum.

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R. Dixon ◽  
Jordan Belisle ◽  
Kyle E. Rowsey ◽  
Ryan C. Speelman ◽  
Caleb R. Stanley ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Developmental Disabilities ◽  
Representational Drawing

Mental time travel? A neurocognitive model of event simulation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donna Rose Addis
Keyword(s):  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Time Travel ◽  
Simulation System ◽  
Mental Time Travel ◽  
Event Representation ◽  
Conceptual Information ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
General Capacity

Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of ‘MTT’, suggesting that ‘time’ and ‘travel’ may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the ‘mental’ rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this simulation system, enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.

How to grow a self: development of the self in a Bayesian brain

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mateusz Wozniak
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Development ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Body Representation ◽  
Developmental Trajectory ◽  
The Self ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
Bayesian Brain ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Complex Forms

The last two decades have brought several attempts to explain the self as a part of the Bayesian brain, typically within the framework of predictive coding. However, none of these attempts have looked comprehensively at the developmental aspect of self-representation. The goal of this paper is to argue that looking at the developmental trajectory is crucial for understanding the structure of an adult self-representation. The paper argues that the emergence of the self should be understood as an instance of conceptual development, which in the context of a Bayesian brain can be understood as a process of acquisition of new internal models of hidden causes of sensory input. The paper proposes how such models might emerge and develop over the course of human life by looking at different stages of development of bodily and extra-bodily self-representations. It argues that the self arises gradually in a series of discrete steps: from first-person multisensory representations of one’s body to third-person multisensory body representation, and from basic forms of the extended and social selves to progressively more complex forms of abstract self-representation. It discusses how each of them might emerge based on domain-general learning mechanisms, while also taking into account the potential role of innate representations. Finally it suggests how the conceptual structure of self-representation might inform the debate about the structure of self-consciousness.

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