Information-Flow Security for Interactive Programs

End-to-end verification of information-flow security for C and assembly programs

Proceedings of the 37th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation - PLDI 2016 ◽

10.1145/2908080.2908100 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

David Costanzo ◽

Zhong Shao ◽

Ronghui Gu

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Information Flow Security ◽

End To End

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An Information Flow Security Model to Trusted Computing System

The First International Symposium on Data, Privacy, and E-Commerce (ISDPE 2007) ◽

10.1109/isdpe.2007.114 ◽

2007 ◽

Author(s):

Hu Jun ◽

Shen Changxiang

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Trusted Computing ◽

Computing System ◽

Security Model ◽

Information Flow Security

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Crafting a usable microkernel, processor, and I/O system with strict and provable information flow security

ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News ◽

10.1145/2024723.2000087 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 39 (3) ◽

pp. 189-200 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Mohit Tiwari ◽

Jason K. Oberg ◽

Xun Li ◽

Jonathan Valamehr ◽

Timothy Levin ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Information Flow Security

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A bottom-up approach to verifiable embedded system information flow security

IET Information Security ◽

10.1049/iet-ifs.2012.0342 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 12-17 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Dejun Mu ◽

Bo Ma ◽

Baolei Mao ◽

Wei Hu

Keyword(s):

Embedded System ◽

Information Flow ◽

Bottom Up ◽

Information Flow Security ◽

System Information

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A Type System for Quantified Information-Flow Security in Java-Like Languages

2016 11th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) ◽

10.1109/ares.2016.30 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Gohar Shakoori ◽

Mehran S. Fallah ◽

Zeinab Iranmanesh

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Type System ◽

Information Flow Security

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Specification of Information Flow Security Policies in Model-Based Systems Engineering

Software Technologies: Applications and Foundations - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-04771-9_47 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 617-632

Author(s):

Christopher Gerking

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Systems Engineering ◽

Security Policies ◽

Information Flow Security ◽

Model Based ◽

Model Based Systems Engineering

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Information-flow security for JavaScript and its APIs

Journal of Computer Security ◽

10.3233/jcs-160544 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 24 (2) ◽

pp. 181-234 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

Daniel Hedin ◽

Luciano Bello ◽

Andrei Sabelfeld

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Information Flow Security

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A Uniform Information-Flow Security Benchmark Suite for Source Code and Bytecode

Secure IT Systems - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_27 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 437-453 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Tobias Hamann ◽

Mihai Herda ◽

Heiko Mantel ◽

Martin Mohr ◽

David Schneider ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Source Code ◽

Information Flow Security ◽

Benchmark Suite

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Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security on Weak Memory Models

Lecture Notes in Computer Science - Formal Methods – The Next 30 Years ◽

10.1007/978-3-030-30942-8_32 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 539-555 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Graeme Smith ◽

Nicholas Coughlin ◽

Toby Murray

Keyword(s):

Information Flow ◽

Memory Models ◽

Information Flow Security

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A Method for Model-Driven Information Flow Security

Dependability and Computer Engineering - Advances in Computer and Electrical Engineering ◽

10.4018/978-1-60960-747-0.ch010 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 199-229 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Fredrik Seehusen ◽

Ketil Stølen

Keyword(s):

Software Development ◽

Information Flow ◽

System Architecture ◽

Security Requirements ◽

State Machines ◽

Flow Properties ◽

Information Flow Security ◽

Software Developer ◽

Model Driven ◽

Secure Information

We present a method for software development in which information flow security is taken into consideration from start to finish. Initially, the user of the method (i.e., a software developer) specifies the system architecture and selects a set of security requirements (in the form of secure information flow properties) that the system must adhere to. The user then specifies each component of the system architecture using UML inspired state machines, and refines/transforms these (abstract) state machines into concrete state machines. It is shown that if the abstract specification adheres to the security requirements, then so does the concrete one provided that certain conditions are satisfied.

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