scholarly journals L1 - An Intermediate Language for Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Schropfer ◽  
Florian Kerschbaum ◽  
Gunter Muller
Keyword(s):  
Secure Computation ◽  
Intermediate Language

Unconditionally Secure Computation with Reduced Interaction

2016 ◽  
pp. 420-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Damgård ◽  
Jesper Buus Nielsen ◽  
Rafail Ostrovsky ◽  
Adi Rosén
Keyword(s):  
Secure Computation

scholarly journals Sequent calculus as a compiler intermediate language

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (9) ◽  
pp. 74-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Downen ◽  
Luke Maurer ◽  
Zena M. Ariola ◽  
Simon Peyton Jones
Keyword(s):  
Sequent Calculus ◽  
Intermediate Language

scholarly journals Actively revealing card attack on card-based protocols

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Takashima ◽  
Daiki Miyahara ◽  
Takaaki Mizuki ◽  
Hideaki Sone
Keyword(s):  
Secure Computation ◽  
Malicious Attack ◽  
Formal Framework ◽  
Almost All ◽  
And Function

AbstractIn 1989, den Boer presented the first card-based protocol, called the “five-card trick,” that securely computes the AND function using a deck of physical cards via a series of actions such as shuffling and turning over cards. This protocol enables a couple to confirm their mutual love without revealing their individual feelings. During such a secure computation protocol, it is important to keep any information about the inputs secret. Almost all existing card-based protocols are secure under the assumption that all players participating in a protocol are semi-honest or covert, i.e., they do not deviate from the protocol if there is a chance that they will be caught when cheating. In this paper, we consider a more malicious attack in which a player as an active adversary can reveal cards illegally without any hesitation. Against such an actively revealing card attack, we define the t-secureness, meaning that no information about the inputs leaks even if at most t cards are revealed illegally. We then actually design t-secure AND protocols. Thus, our contribution is the construction of the first formal framework to handle actively revealing card attacks as well as their countermeasures.

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