Modeling Decisions in Collective Risk Social Dilemma Games for Climate Change Using Reinforcement Learning

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Medha Kumar ◽  
Kapil Agrawal ◽  
Varun Dutt
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

scholarly journals Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases significantly in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While the increase is only marginally significant without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. When sanctions are available, individuals are willing to cooperate above the level that would maximize expected payoffs. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results.

scholarly journals Sanctions and international interaction improve cooperation to avert climate change

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Grimalda ◽  
Alexis Belianin ◽  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Till Requate ◽  
Marina Ryzhkova
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Experimental Test ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Climate Agreements ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Interaction ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Imposing sanctions on noncompliant parties to international agreements is often advocated as a remedy for international cooperation failure, notably in climate agreements. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture in a collective-risk social dilemma simulating the effort to avoid catastrophic climate change. We involve groups of participants from two cultural areas that were shown to achieve different levels of cooperation nationally when peer-level sanctions were available. Here we show that, while this result still holds nationally, international interaction backed by sanctions is overall beneficial. Cooperation by low cooperator groups increases in comparison with national cooperation and converges to the cooperation levels of high cooperation groups. While such an increase is small without sanctions, it becomes sizable when sanctions are imposed. Revealing or hiding counterparts’ nationality does not affect results. Our study supports the proposal to use sanctions to support international cooperation to avert collective risk such as climate change.

scholarly journals The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change

2008 ◽  
Vol 105 (7) ◽  
pp. 2291-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Milinski ◽  
R. D. Sommerfeld ◽  
H.-J. Krambeck ◽  
F. A. Reed ◽  
J. Marotzke
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
Dangerous Climate Change

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games

1994 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Akimov ◽  
Michail Soutchanski
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games

scholarly journals Autocratic strategies for infinitely iterated multiplayer social dilemma games

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 2838-2843
Author(s):  
E. Martirosyan ◽  
A. Govaert ◽  
M. Cao
Keyword(s):  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma Games
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