A Novel Spectrum Allocation Mechanism Based on Graph Coloring and Bidding Theory

Author(s):  
Yutao Liu ◽  
Guisen Xu ◽  
Xuezhi Tan
Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 602
Author(s):  
Monisha Devi ◽  
Nityananda Sarma ◽  
Sanjib K. Deka

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing the spectrum to identify the idle frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need to be designed to provide an effectual use of the radio resource. In this paper, we propose a single-sided sealed-bid sequential-bidding-based auction framework that extends the channel-reuse property in a spectrum-allocation mechanism to efficiently redistribute the unused channels. Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models. We address two such constraints, viz. the dynamics in spectrum opportunities and varying availability time of vacant channels, and formulate an allocation problem that maximizes the utilization of the radio spectrum. The auctioneer strategises winner determination based on bids collected from SUs and sequentially leases the unused channels, while restricting the channel assignment to a single-channel-multi-user allocation. To model the spectrum-sharing mechanism, we initially developed a group-formation algorithm that enables the members of a group to access a common channel. Furthermore, the spectrum-allocation and pricing algorithms are operated under constrained circumstances, which guarantees truthfulness in the model. An analysis of the simulation results and comparison with existing auction models revealed the effectiveness of the proposed approach in assigning the unexploited spectrum.


Author(s):  
Hailing Zhu ◽  
Andre Nel ◽  
Hendrik Ferreira

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) has been viewed as a promising approach to improving spectrum efficiency. With DSA, Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) that operate in fixed spectrum bands allocated through static allocation can solve their short-term spectrum shortage problems resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic. Such DSA mechanisms should be coupled with dynamic pricing schemes to achieve the most efficient allocation. This chapter models the DSA problem where a centralized spectrum broker manages “white space” in the spectrum of TV broadcasters and sells the vacant spectrum bands to multiple WSPs, as a multi-stage non-cooperative dynamic game. Furthermore, an economic framework for DSA is presented and a centralized spectrum allocation mechanism is proposed. The simulation results show that the centralized spectrum allocation mechanism with dynamic pricing achieves a DSA implementation that is responsive to market conditions as well as enabling efficient utilization of the available spectrum.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 589-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duzhong Zhang ◽  
Quan Liu ◽  
Lin Chen ◽  
Wenjun Xu ◽  
Kehao Wang

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