Evolution of Mixed Strategies on Cooperative Networks

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaowei Zhao ◽  
Zhenzhen Xu ◽  
Hong Yu ◽  
Linlin Tian ◽  
Xiujuan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Mixed Strategies

scholarly journals Radio & Backhaul Load Aware Multi-Objective Clustering in Multi-cell MIMO Cooperative Networks

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Selcuk Bassoy ◽  
Mona Jaber ◽  
Oluwakayode Onireti ◽  
Muhammad Ali Imran
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Multi Objective

scholarly journals Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Hippocratic Oath ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Berge Equilibrium ◽  
Do No Harm ◽  
Non Cooperative Games

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

scholarly journals Joint Mobility, Communication and Computation Optimization for UAVs in Air-Ground Cooperative Networks

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Jianshan Zhou ◽  
Daxin Tian ◽  
Zhengguo Sheng ◽  
Xuting Duan ◽  
Xuemin Shen
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Joint Mobility

Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199417
Author(s):  
Vesna Danilovic ◽  
Joe Clare
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Theoretical Rationale ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Tit For Tat

Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands.

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