An Empirical Study of Control Parameters for The Third Version of Generalized Differential Evolution (GDE3)

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Kukkonen ◽  
J. Lampinen
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Differential Evolution ◽  
Control Parameters ◽  
The Third ◽  
Generalized Differential

GDE4: The Generalized Differential Evolution with Ordered Mutation

2019 ◽  
pp. 101-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Azam Asilian Bidgoli ◽  
Sedigheh Mahdavi ◽  
Shahryar Rahnamayan ◽  
Hessein Ebrahimpour-Komleh
Keyword(s):  
Differential Evolution ◽  
Generalized Differential

scholarly journals Differential Evolution: A Survey and Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarik Eltaeib ◽  
Ausif Mahmood
Keyword(s):  
Global Optimization ◽  
Differential Evolution ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Population Based ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Fine Tuning ◽  
Control Parameters ◽  
Hybrid Techniques ◽  
Global Optimizer

Differential evolution (DE) has been extensively used in optimization studies since its development in 1995 because of its reputation as an effective global optimizer. DE is a population-based metaheuristic technique that develops numerical vectors to solve optimization problems. DE strategies have a significant impact on DE performance and play a vital role in achieving stochastic global optimization. However, DE is highly dependent on the control parameters involved. In practice, the fine-tuning of these parameters is not always easy. Here, we discuss the improvements and developments that have been made to DE algorithms. In particular, we present a state-of-the-art survey of the literature on DE and its recent advances, such as the development of adaptive, self-adaptive and hybrid techniques.

Il buono, il brutto e il cattivo. Disambiguare il naturalismo di Quine

2009 ◽  
pp. 75-97
Author(s):  
Susan Haack
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Investigation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Epistemological Naturalism

- Quine's ‘epistemology naturalised' has been profoundly influential, but it is also highly ambiguous. Quine seems at times to claim only that epistemology is not a purely a priori enterprise but an empirical study, continuous with the sciences of cognition; at others, that epistemological questions can be turned over to the sciences to resolve; and on other occasions, that epistemological questions are misconceived and should be replaced by scientific investigation into cognition. What is argued here is that the first and most modest version of Quine's epistemological naturalism is potentially fruitful, the second and more ambitious indefensible, and the third and most ambitious not only false but disastrous.

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