Dynamic Information Disclosure for Deception*

Author(s):  
Muhammed O. Sayin ◽  
Tamer Basar
2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepal Basak ◽  
Zhen Zhou

In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others’ previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates. (JEL C72, D82, G21)


Author(s):  
Farzaneh Farhadi ◽  
Demosthenis Teneketzis

AbstractWe study a dynamic information design problem in a finite-horizon setting consisting of two strategic and long-term optimizing agents, namely a principal (he) and a detector (she). The principal observes the evolution of a Markov chain that has two states, one “good” and one “bad” absorbing state, and has to decide how to sequentially disclose information to the detector. The detector’s only information consists of the messages she receives from the principal. The detector’s objective is to detect as accurately as possible the time of the jump from the good to the bad state. The principal’s objective is to delay the detector as much as possible from detecting the jump to the bad state. For this setting, we determine the optimal strategies of the principal and the detector. The detector’s optimal strategy is described by time-varying thresholds on her posterior belief of the good state. We prove that it is optimal for the principal to give no information to the detector before a time threshold, run a mixed strategy to confuse the detector at the threshold time, and reveal the true state afterward. We present an algorithm that determines both the optimal time threshold and the optimal mixed strategy that could be employed by the principal. We show, through numerical experiments, that this optimal sequential mechanism outperforms any other information disclosure strategy presented in the literature. We also show that our results can be extended to the infinite-horizon problem, to the problem where the matrix of transition probabilities of the Markov chain is time-varying, and to the case where the Markov chain has more than two states and one of the states is absorbing.


Author(s):  
Martin J. Dierker ◽  
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 601-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Dierker ◽  
Avanidhar Subrahmanyam

1992 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 892-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Allen Fox ◽  
Lida G. Wall ◽  
Jeanne Gokcen

This study examined age-related differences in the use of dynamic acoustic information (in the form of formant transitions) to identify vowel quality in CVCs. Two versions of 61 naturally produced, commonly occurring, monosyllabic English words were created: a control version (the unmodified whole word) and a silent-center version (in which approximately 62% of the medial vowel was replaced by silence). A group of normal-hearing young adults (19–25 years old) and older adults (61–75 years old) identified these tokens. The older subjects were found to be significantly worse than the younger subjects at identifying the medial vowel and the initial and final consonants in the silent-center condition. These results support the hypothesis of an age-related decrement in the ability to process dynamic perceptual cues in the perception of vowel quality.


1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Jenkins ◽  
Winifred Strange ◽  
Sonja A. Trent
Keyword(s):  

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andie F. Lueck ◽  
Mayia Corcoran ◽  
Maureen Casey ◽  
Sarah Wood ◽  
Ross Auna

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