scholarly journals Distributed computation of generalized Nash equilibria in quadratic aggregative games with affine coupling constraints

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Paccagnan ◽  
Basilio Gentile ◽  
Francesca Parise ◽  
Maryam Kamgarpour ◽  
John Lygeros
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Distributed Computation ◽  
Coupling Constraints ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
Generalized Nash Equilibria

On Structure and Computation of Generalized Nash Equilibria

2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 452-474 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Dorsch ◽  
H. Th. Jongen ◽  
V. Shikhman
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Generalized Nash Equilibria

scholarly journals Learning Generalized Nash Equilibria in a Class of Convex Games

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 1426-1439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Tatarenko ◽  
Maryam Kamgarpour
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Convex Games ◽  
Generalized Nash Equilibria

Distributed convergence to Nash equilibria in network and average aggregative games

Automatica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 117 ◽  
pp. 108959 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Parise ◽  
Sergio Grammatico ◽  
Basilio Gentile ◽  
John Lygeros
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Aggregative Games

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 253-261
Author(s):  
RYUSUKE SHINOHARA
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Coalition Proof

The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

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