Multi-stage discrete time dynamic average consensus

Author(s):  
Mauro Franceschelli ◽  
Andrea Gasparri
Automatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
pp. 69-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Franceschelli ◽  
Andrea Gasparri

Author(s):  
Eduardo Montijano ◽  
Juan I. Montijano ◽  
Carlos Sagues ◽  
Sonia Martinez

Automatica ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minghui Zhu ◽  
Sonia Martínez

Automatica ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (12) ◽  
pp. 3131-3138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Montijano ◽  
Juan Ignacio Montijano ◽  
Carlos Sagüés ◽  
Sonia Martínez

Author(s):  
Benoit Duvocelle ◽  
János Flesch ◽  
Hui Min Shi ◽  
Dries Vermeulen

AbstractWe consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.


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