DCFI-Checker: Checking kernel dynamic control flow integrity with performance monitoring counter

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 31-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenchang Shi ◽  
Hongwei Zhou ◽  
Jinhui Yuan ◽  
Bin Liang
Keyword(s):  
Performance Monitoring ◽  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Control Flow ◽  
Control Flow Integrity

Lightweight Fault Localization using Weighted Dynamic Control Flow Subgraph

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 214
Author(s):  
Wang Yong ◽  
Liu SanMing ◽  
Li Jun ◽  
Cheng Xiangyu ◽  
Zhou Wan
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Control ◽  
Fault Localization ◽  
Control Flow

Control Flow Integrity Based on Lightweight Encryption Architecture

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (7) ◽  
pp. 1358-1369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pengfei Qiu ◽  
Yongqiang Lyu ◽  
Jiliang Zhang ◽  
Dongsheng Wang ◽  
Gang Qu
Keyword(s):  
Control Flow ◽  
Control Flow Integrity ◽  
Lightweight Encryption

scholarly journals Analyzing control flow integrity with LLVM-CFI

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Muntean ◽  
Matthias Neumayer ◽  
Zhiqiang Lin ◽  
Gang Tan ◽  
Jens Grossklags ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control Flow ◽  
Control Flow Integrity

scholarly journals Reconciling optimization with secure compilation

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (OOPSLA) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Son Tuan Vu ◽  
Albert Cohen ◽  
Arnaud De Grandmaison ◽  
Christophe Guillon ◽  
Karine Heydemann
Keyword(s):  
Side Effects ◽  
Control Flow ◽  
Partial Ordering ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Machine Code ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Control Flow Integrity ◽  
Correct Execution ◽  
Source Level ◽  
And Performance

Software protections against side-channel and physical attacks are essential to the development of secure applications. Such protections are meaningful at machine code or micro-architectural level, but they typically do not carry observable semantics at source level. This renders them susceptible to miscompilation, and security engineers embed input/output side-effects to prevent optimizing compilers from altering them. Yet these side-effects are error-prone and compiler-dependent. The current practice involves analyzing the generated machine code to make sure security or privacy properties are still enforced. These side-effects may also be too expensive in fine-grained protections such as control-flow integrity. We introduce observations of the program state that are intrinsic to the correct execution of security protections, along with means to specify and preserve observations across the compilation flow. Such observations complement the input/output semantics-preservation contract of compilers. We introduce an opacification mechanism to preserve and enforce a partial ordering of observations. This approach is compatible with a production compiler and does not incur any modification to its optimization passes. We validate the effectiveness and performance of our approach on a range of benchmarks, expressing the secure compilation of these applications in terms of observations to be made at specific program points.

$$\tau $$ CFI: Type-Assisted Control Flow Integrity for x86-64 Binaries

2018 ◽  
pp. 423-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Muntean ◽  
Matthias Fischer ◽  
Gang Tan ◽  
Zhiqiang Lin ◽  
Jens Grossklags ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control Flow ◽  
Control Flow Integrity

Research on Control Flow Integrity Scheme for Android Platform

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiesheng Zheng ◽  
Wuqiang Shen ◽  
Yanwei Shang ◽  
Aohui Wang ◽  
Ruigang Liang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Control Flow ◽  
Android Platform ◽  
Control Flow Integrity
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