Two stages power allocation for band aggregated single carrier-FDMA with Zeroforcing-FDE

Author(s):  
Kiyeon Kim ◽  
Hyunsoo Cha ◽  
Hyukjin Chae ◽  
Dongku Kim ◽  
Janghoon Yang
2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2294-2305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyeong Jin Kim ◽  
Theodoros A. Tsiftsis ◽  
H. Vincent Poor

Author(s):  
Javier González Bayón ◽  
Carlos Carreras Vaquer ◽  
Angel Fernández Herrero

Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) has been the focus of many studies in wireless communications because of its high transmission capability and its robustness to the effects of frequency-selective multipath channels. However, it is well known that OFDM systems are much more sensitive to a carrier frequency offset (CFO) than single carrier schemes with the same bit rate. Therefore, a frequency synchronization process is necessary to overcome this sensitivity to frequency offset. Synchronization is performed in two stages: acquisition and tracking. After a first estimation and correction of the CFO performed in the acquisition stage, there still remains a residual frequency offset (RFO) due to real system conditions. Therefore, the RFO tracking has to be performed for all the receiving data. Frequency synchronization is even more complicated for uplink communications in OFDMA (orthogonal frequency division multiple access) systems because the base station (BS) has to deal with signals from different users in the same bandwidth. Each user’s data is affected by a different CFO. Because of this, estimation and correction of the CFOs cannot be accomplished by the same methods as in OFDM systems.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 2002-2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifei Yang ◽  
Shuowen Zhang ◽  
Joni Polili Lie ◽  
Rui Zhang

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Yudan Pang ◽  
Xuefeng Wang ◽  
Hang Wu ◽  
Fanfan Zhang

This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism.


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