Uniform price versus discriminatory auctions in bond markets: A experimental analysis based on multi-agents system

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Liu ◽  
Hua Cao
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Bond Markets ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Discriminatory Auctions ◽  
Multi Agents

scholarly journals An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 162-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Shobe ◽  
Karen Palmer ◽  
Erica Myers ◽  
Charles Holt ◽  
Jacob Goeree ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
The Other ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Auction Formats ◽  
Discriminatory Auctions

The direct sale of emission allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study is motivated by the observation that all of the major implementations of cap-and-trade regulations for the control of air pollution have started with a generous allocation of allowances relative to recent emissions history, a situation we refer to as a “loose cap.” Typically more stringent reductions are achieved in subsequent years of a program. We use an experimental setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find that all auction formats studied are efficient in allocating emission allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive benchmarks when the cap is loose. Regardless of whether the cap is tight or loose, the different auction formats tend to yield comparable revenues toward the end of a series of auctions. However, aggressive bidding behavior in initial discriminatory auctions yields higher revenues than in the other auction formats, a difference that disappears as bidders learn to adjust their bids closer to the cut-off that separates winning and losing bids.

Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1271-1300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Morales-Camargo ◽  
Orly Sade ◽  
Charles Schnitzlein ◽  
Jaime F. Zender
Keyword(s):  
Uniform Price Auction ◽  
Bidding Behavior ◽  
Uniform Price ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Symmetric Information ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Divisible Good Auctions ◽  
Average Revenue ◽  
Auction Formats ◽  
Discriminatory Auctions

AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Students' Perceptions of a Student-Centered Syllabus: An Experimental Analysis

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron S. Richmond ◽  
Jared Becknell ◽  
Jeanne M. Slattery ◽  
Robin Morgan ◽  
Nathanael Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Student Centered

Experimental analysis of team performance

1984 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry H. Emurian ◽  
Joseph V. Brady ◽  
Ronald L. Ray ◽  
James L. Meyerhoff ◽  
Edward H. Mougey
Keyword(s):  
Team Performance ◽  
Experimental Analysis
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