scholarly journals Stochastic Differential Game Model Analysis of Emission-Reduction Technology Under Cost-Sharing Contracts in the Carbon Trading Market

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 167328-167340
Author(s):  
Qiang Hou ◽  
Yue Guan ◽  
Shan Yu
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Model Analysis ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Trading Market

scholarly journals Investment Game Model Analysis of Emission-Reduction Technology Based on Cost Sharing and Coordination under Cost Subsidy Policy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shan Yu ◽  
Qiang Hou ◽  
Jiayi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Investment Game ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

Climate change and greenhouse gas emission reduction have become common concerns. Carbon trading systems and low-carbon cost subsidies are important emission reduction measures. Impacts of a combination of the two policies on micro-supply chain emission-reduction technology investment have become a focal research area. This paper: (1) constructs an investment game model based on cost-sharing coordination under a cost subsidy between manufacturers and retailers; (2) examines the equilibrium strategy and optimal results according to the interests and game relationships of each stakeholder; and (3) explores the effectiveness of supply chain enterprise behavior based on cost-sharing coordination under the cost subsidy. This paper uses a numerical simulation method to compare the path evolution under different scenarios and to analyze the sensitivity of parameters, identifying the influence of various parameters on the general structure and pathways. The study finds that the cost subsidy policy has a regulatory effect on enterprise emission reduction investment and enterprise profit under a carbon trading system, and the difference caused by the regulation effect is enhanced over time. The study also shows that the dynamic path of each parameter strengthens over time.

The Opportunities and Challenges of Chinese Renewable Energy Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Trade

2014 ◽  
Vol 1010-1012 ◽  
pp. 2094-2101
Author(s):  
Long Xi Han ◽  
Jia Jia Zhai ◽  
Lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
Greenhouse Gas ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Greenhouse Gas Emission ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Ghg Emission ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Impact

The opportunities and challenges in the field of Chinese renewable energy were analyzed through the impact of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction trade, especially CDM on Chinese renewable energy, combined with the enhancement of awareness of voluntary emission reduction, relationship between emission reduction trade and renewable energy, changes in the international trade environment and the rise of the domestic trading system. It is suggested that the renewable energy industry integrates with GHG emission reduction trading system in China and explores the huge double benefit of emission reduction and income increase with market means, providing a reference for the smooth implementation of nationwide CN ETS including varies industries in the carbon trading market in the future, and striving for the speaking right for China to set the marketing price of international GHG emission reduction trading in the future.

scholarly journals Study of Chinese carbon emission trading market mechanism based on the game theory

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Trading ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Secondary Carbon

<p>In order to provide corresponding suggestions for the establishment and development of China's carbon trading market mechanism, the three-party game model of the competent government departments, carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution in the initial allocation of carbon emission rights and the rotation bargaining game model in the secondary carbon trading market are solved and analyzed in this paper. The results show that the competent government departments should improve the review efficiency effectively to reduce cost by outsourcing the review work to universities, research institutes and other scientific research units and increasing punishment for the collusion behavior between the carbon emission enterprises and third-party verification institution. At the same time, the competent government departments should adopt the regular regulatory policies to deal with collusion behavior and reduce the sampling proportion to cut cost of government review. The trading center should directly determine transaction price in combination with the forces of buyers and sellers, and make matchmaking trading directly by selecting the qualified buyers and sellers at the secondary carbon trading market in process of bilateral open bidding.</p>

scholarly journals Cost And Welfare: A Simulation of Establishing A Unified Carbon Market In China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinru Ji ◽  
Lei Su
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Abatement Cost ◽  
Directional Distance Function ◽  
Carbon Market ◽  
Shadow Prices ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Carbon Abatement ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Abstract BackgroundGlobal warming has aroused wide concern of international community, which has reached a consensus on the carbon abatement. In 2017, China should have established a unified market for carbon emission trading, while the government has postponed the establishment because the uncertainty of cost calculation and welfare. Therefore, the cost and welfare of carbon abatement in simulated scenarios could help the government in establishing a unified carbon market and setting suitable policy. In the national carbon trading market, the variations of different abatement cost are the precondition of carbon exchange. This paper set forth theories related to carbon market and used parametric directional distance function model to derive the shadow prices of 30 provinces from 2011 to 2017. Then the classic logarithmic model is used to simulate marginal abatement cost curves, which is further applied to empirically investigate the welfare of 30 provinces in two scenarios of carbon trading market in China. ResultsThe results indicate that marginal abatement cost would rise with the increasing of emission reduction and vary significantly among provinces, and undeveloped provinces have greater potential in emission reduction than developed regions. Moreover, all provinces could benefit from the establishment of the nationwide ETS.ConclusionsThis article combines the theoretical model of shadow prices with the analysis of China’s carbon trading market in an attempt to analyze the cost and welfare of Chinese provinces and cities on the unified carbon trading market, adding the time trend factor to the directional distance function, and then further combines the parameter method to estimate the shadow price of CO2. Finally, the paper gives some proposals regarding to China’s ETS and carbon reduction targets.

scholarly journals Stochastic Differential Game-Based Malware Propagation in Edge Computing-Based IoT

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Li Miao ◽  
Shuai Li
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Stochastic Fluctuations ◽  
Malware Propagation ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Solutions

Internet of Things (IoT) has played an important role in our daily life since its emergence. The applications of IoT cover from the traditional devices to intelligent equipment. With the great potential of IoT, there comes various kinds of security problems. In this paper, we study the malware propagation under the dynamic interaction between the attackers and defenders in edge computing-based IoT and propose an infinite-horizon stochastic differential game model to discuss the optimal strategies for the attackers and defenders. Considering the effect of stochastic fluctuations in the edge network on the malware propagation, we construct the Itô stochastic differential equations to describe the propagation of the malware in edge computing-based IoT. Subsequently, we analyze the feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for our proposed game model, which can be considered as the optimal strategies for the defenders and attackers. Finally, numerical simulations show the effectiveness of our proposed game model.

scholarly journals Mechanism Analysis of Applying Blockchain Technology to Forestry Carbon Sink Projects Based on the Differential Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (21) ◽  
pp. 11697
Author(s):  
Rui Sun ◽  
Dayi He ◽  
Jingjing Yan ◽  
Li Tao
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Sink ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mechanism Analysis ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
Carbon Prices

As an important way to reduce emission, forestry carbon sink (FCS) has not been implemented effectively. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness and mechanism of applying blockchain technology in FCS projects by utilizing the differential game model. A Stackelberg differential game model between forest farmers and emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs) is developed to analyze the optimal emission reduction efforts and the optimal trajectory of forest farmers and ECEs before and after introducing blockchain technology. It is found that: (1) At the initial stage of the utilization of blockchain technology, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stabilizing carbon prices, the ECEs prefer to purchase FCS instead of reducing emissions by their own technology. On the contrary, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stimulating the vitality of the carbon trading market, ECEs tend to use emission abatement technology to meet the carbon quote requirements. (2) In the later stage, the incentive and stabilizing effects of blockchain technology on carbon prices tend to be balanced, and the emission reduction efforts of ECEs are lower than the efforts before applying blockchain technology. (3) The application of blockchain technology increases forest farmers’ willingness to reduce emissions because of its effection of cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, blockchain technology reduces abatement costs by influencing carbon prices. Therefore, blockchain technology improves forest farmers’ emission reduction efforts on the whole.

scholarly journals Optimal Network Defense Strategy Selection Method: A Stochastic Differential Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Yan Mi ◽  
Hengwei Zhang ◽  
Hao Hu ◽  
Jinglei Tan ◽  
Jindong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Network Security ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Random Effects ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Random Disturbances ◽  
Attack And Defense

In a real-world network confrontation process, attack and defense actions change rapidly and continuously. The network environment is complex and dynamically random. Therefore, attack and defense strategies are inevitably subject to random disturbances during their execution, and the transition of the network security state is affected accordingly. In this paper, we construct a network security state transition model by referring to the epidemic evolution process, use Gaussian noise to describe random effects during the strategy execution, and introduce a random disturbance intensity factor to describe the degree of random effects. On this basis, we establish an attack-defense stochastic differential game model, propose a saddle point equilibrium solution method, and provide an algorithm to select the optimal defense strategy. Our method achieves real-time defense decision-making in network attack-defense scenarios with random disturbances and has better real-time performance and practicality than current methods. Results of a simulation experiment show that our model and algorithm are effective and feasible.

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