scholarly journals Joint Channel and Power Allocation Based on Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution in Device-to-Device Communication

IEEE Access ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 172571-172583
Author(s):  
Gang Wang ◽  
Tanhui Liu ◽  
Chenguang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Device To Device ◽  
Device To Device Communication ◽  
Joint Channel

Dynamic Subcarrier and Power Allocation Based on Nash Bargaining Solution in Symmetric Cooperative OFDMA Networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 187 ◽  
pp. 510-515
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Jing Min Tang
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Subcarrier Allocation ◽  
Allocation Scheme ◽  
Allocation Algorithm ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
Joint Resource Allocation ◽  
Adaptive Power

In this paper, subcarrier and power allocation are jointly considered in a three-node symmetric cooperation orthogonal frequency-division multiple access uplink system. With the help of Nash bargaining solution, the dynamic subcarrier allocation scheme and the adaptive power allocation scheme are proposed for joint optimization. The joint resource allocation is decomposed and solved by dynamic subcarrier allocation algorithm and adaptive power allocation algorithm. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative scheme.

scholarly journals Joint channel and Power Allocation for Device-to-Device Communication on Licensed and Unlicensed Band

IEEE Access ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 22196-22205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gebremariam Gebrelibanos Girmay ◽  
Quoc-Viet Pham ◽  
Won-Joo Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Power Allocation ◽  
Device To Device ◽  
Device To Device Communication ◽  
Joint Channel ◽  
Unlicensed Band

The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power

It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.

scholarly journals Joint power allocation and subcarrier assignment for device to device in 5G time division duplex networks

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (11) ◽  
pp. 155014771881109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Zhao ◽  
Lei Feng ◽  
Peng Yu ◽  
Wenjing Li ◽  
Xuesong Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Power Allocation ◽  
Base Station ◽  
Joint Power ◽  
Time Division Duplex ◽  
Device To Device ◽  
Minlp Problem ◽  
Device To Device Communication ◽  
Time Division

The explosive demands for mobile broadband service bring a major challenge to 5G wireless networks. Device-to-device communication, adopting side links for user-direct communication, is regarded as a main technical source for offloading large volume of mobile traffic from cellular base station. This article investigates the joint power and subcarrier allocation scheme for device-to-device communication in 5G time division duplex systems. In time division duplex system, instead of utilizing an exclusive portion of the precious cellular spectrum, device-to-device pairs reuse the subcarriers occupied by cellular users, thus producing harmful interference to cellular users in both uplink and downlink communication, and strongly limiting the spectrum efficiency of the system. To this end, we focus on the maximization of device-to-device throughput while guaranteeing both uplink and downlink channel quality of service of cellular users as well as device-to-device pairs. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problem. To make it tractable, we separate the original MINLP problem into two sub problems: power allocation and sub-carrier reusing. The former is to develop optimal power allocation for each device-to-device pair and each cellular user, with the constraints of maximum power and quality of service. It is solved by geometric programming technique in convex optimization method. The latter is derived as a one-to-many matching problem for scheduling multiple subcarriers occupied by cellulars to device-to-device pairs. It is solved by Hungarian method. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme significantly improves system capacity of the device-to-device underlay network, with quality of service of both device-to-device users and cellular users guaranteed.

scholarly journals Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Contracts in Electricity Markets

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 2397
Author(s):  
Reinaldo Crispiniano Garcia ◽  
Javier Contreras ◽  
Matheus de Lima Barbosa ◽  
Felipe Silva Toledo ◽  
Paulo Vinicius Aires da Cunha
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Price Volatility ◽  
Spot Market ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Market Pricing ◽  
Bilateral Contracts ◽  
Generation Company

In electricity markets, bilateral contracts (BC) are used to hedge against price volatility in the spot market. Pricing these contracts requires scheduling from either the buyer or the seller aiming to achieve the highest profit possible. Since this problem includes different players, a Generation Company (GC) and an Electricity Supplier Company (ESC) are considered. The approaches to solve this problem include the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) equilibrium and the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (RKS) bargaining solution. The innovation of this work is the implementation of an algorithm based on the RKS equilibrium to find a compromise strategy when determining the concessions to be made by the parties. The results are promising and show that the RKS approach can obtain better results compared to the Nash equilibrium method applied to a case study.

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