scholarly journals Lexicographic Maximum Solution of Min-Product Fuzzy Relation Inequalities for Modeling the Optimal Pricing With Fixed Priority Grade in Supply Chain

IEEE Access ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 71306-71316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuegang Zhou ◽  
Xingyi Zhong ◽  
Haitao Lin ◽  
Zejian Qin ◽  
Xiaopeng Yang
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan-Kuen Wu ◽  
Ching-Feng Wen ◽  
Yuan-Teng Hsu ◽  
Ming-Xian Wang

Abstract Fuzzy relational inequalities composed by the min-product operation are established to model the optimal pricing with fixed priority in a single product supply chain system. The solution algorithm has been proposed for solving such an optimization problem and finding the optimal solution (is called lexicographic maximum solution). In this study, a novel approach is proposed to finding the optimal pricing with fixed priority in a single product supply chain system. This approach is based on new properties of solution set in a min-product fuzzy relational inequality. These new properties allow us directly determine the optimal value of variable without many duplicate checks in the solution procedure. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the procedure.


Author(s):  
Gulay Samatli-Pac ◽  
Wenjing Shen ◽  
Xinxin Hu

Product return is a common after-sale service. Existing literature has assumed loss neutral consumers, while in practice consumers are often more sensitive to utility losses than gains, i.e., customers are often loss averse. In this paper, we study the impact of such loss aversion on the retailer's optimal pricing and returns policies. We analyze three scenarios where the seller offers no refund, full refund and partial refund for the returned products. Under each scenario, the seller determines the optimal price, quantity, and refund amount (under partial refund case) in order to maximize the expected profit. Our results demonstrate that consumer loss aversion leads a no-refund retailer to charge lower price and order smaller quantity, has no impact on a full-refund retailer, and results in a more lenient returns policy for a partial-refund retailer. We also find contracts that coordinate supply chains selling to loss averse consumers. Therefore, this article sheds some lights on how the management of returns policies should be adapted when consumers are loss averse.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Du Zhao ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Tinghai Ren ◽  
Hongyong Fu

This paper examines optimal pricing in a two-tier product and service supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in the context of vertical competition in extended warranty in two cases: one considering the retailer’s fairness concerns and one without considering the retailer’s fairness concerns. A manufacturer-dominated product and service supply chain game-theoretic model on the Stackelberg model is developed to analyse how the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service and the intensity of a retailer’s fairness concerns influence the optimal pricing of products and extended warranties for the manufacturer and retailer. This study finds the following: (i) Two parties of the supply chain employ differential pricing strategies for extended warranties when the retailer has fairness concerns. (ii) Compared to the same pricing strategies for extended warranty service when the retailer has no fairness concerns, the increase of competition intensity of vertical extended warranty service will enlarge the price difference of extended warranty service. Meanwhile, it is the intensity of fairness concerns that determines the influences of retailer’s fairness concerns on the price difference of extended warranties. (iii) If no fairness concerns are raised, an increase in the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service would benefit both supply chain parties, rather than hurting their profit. If the retailer is fair-minded, its fairness utility increases when the intensity of the fairness concerns rises in a reasonable range and decreases when the intensity exceeds the reasonable range, but for the manufacturer, its profits will be damaged as long as the retailer raises fairness concerns.


2020 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 120281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenjie Liu ◽  
Dingzhi Qin ◽  
Ningning Shen ◽  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Mingzhou Jin ◽  
...  

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.


Author(s):  
Lijo John ◽  
Anand Gurumurthy ◽  
Arqum Mateen ◽  
Gopalakrishnan Narayanamurthy

Abstract The uncertainty associated with the location, severity and timing of disaster makes it difficult for the humanitarian organization (HO) to predict demand for the aid material and thereby making the relief material procurement even more challenging. This research explores whether options contract can be used as a mechanism to aid the HO in making procurement of relief material less challenging by addressing two main issues: inventory risk for buyers and over-production risk for suppliers. Furthermore, a contracting mechanism is designed to achieve coordination between the HO and aid material suppliers in the humanitarian supply chain through optimal pricing. The options contract is modelled as a stylized version of the newsvendor problem that allows the HO to adjust their order quantity after placing the initial order at the beginning of the planning horizon. This flexibility helps to mitigate the risk of both overstocking and understocking for the HO as well as the risk of overproduction for the supplier. Our results indicate that the optimal values for decision parameters are not “point estimates” but a range of prices, which can facilitate negotiation between the two parties for appropriate selection of contract parameters under an options contract. The results imply that options contract can aid in the decentralized approach of fixing the prices between the HO and the supplier, which in turn would help in achieving systemic coordination.


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