Blowback may eventually restrain Gulf interventionism

Significance The wealthier Gulf states have become increasingly active in nearby countries over the past decade. They have intervened significantly across the Middle East and Horn of Africa, using a mixture of economic, diplomatic and military power, sometimes seeking to fill gaps left by Washington’s partial withdrawal from the region. Impacts Companies risk getting caught out if their operations span the Gulf and include a country that falls out of favour in regional politics. Bilateral relations bolstered by government interventions may encourage new investments. Regional interventions by Gulf states risk harming relationships with major global powers.

Significance In October, Netanyahu travelled to Oman -- the first visit there by an Israeli premier in decades. In the past few years, relations between Israel and most of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have warmed, but this has not been publicised. More recently, GCC states have become less concerned whether their relations with Israel become public knowledge. Meanwhile, the United States is encouraging rapprochement as one of the anchors of its Middle East policy. Impacts Netanyahu may soon visit Bahrain, the first public visit by an Israeli leader to the country. Relations with Qatar will follow a separate track to other Gulf states. A political opening would create economic opportunities.


Subject Future EU relations with Iran. Significance Iranian President Hassan Rouhani will make his first state visits to Europe during the autumn, to France and Italy. The EU and its member states see July's nuclear deal as opening a new chapter in relations. The EU3 -- France, Germany and the United Kingdom -- are using the subsequent political momentum to expand bilateral relations and explore new openings for engagement on Middle East security. Impacts Deeper political engagement with the EU widens Iran's partnership options beyond Russia and China. It would also allow Tehran to compete more effectively with the Gulf states for EU attention and resources. If the US Congress rejected the deal, EU sympathies would be with Iran; EU-Iran rapprochement would be hard to reverse. The success of the sanctions-plus-negotiations strategy with Iran could affect other EU sanctions policy discussions, notably on Russia.


Significance The kingdom was previously seen as withdrawn from and largely peripheral to the wider Middle East. However, two issues -- the Israel-Morocco normalisation agreement in late 2020 and the consequent revival of the Western Sahara issue, with US recognition of Morocco’s claims over the territory -- have brought Rabat further into the spotlight. Impacts Morocco will expand its diplomatic and economic partnerships to East Africa. Rabat may try again to position itself as a constructive international actor through offering mediation services. EU states will need to balance their commitment to the UN process in Western Sahara with maintaining strong tries to Rabat.


Significance The past year has seen the Russian military expand its exercises and other activities in the region. As well as creating a new joint command for the Arctic, the Kremlin is increasing the capacity of its military and paramilitary forces to operate there, including on search-and-rescue missions. This ramp-up reflects the broader modernisation of the entire armed forces, which Putin reiterated yesterday remained a key priority. Impacts Other countries engage in military activities in the region, but only Russia has taken major steps to militarise its Arctic frontier. Russian leaders profess peaceful motives but warn that Moscow will defend its Arctic interests with force if necessary. Russia will commission a fleet of highly versatile vessels that can serve as tugs, icebreakers or patrol ships.


Subject The Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran railway. Significance Russia has pledged funding to complete a rail link between Iran and Azerbaijan, the last segment of the North-South Trade Corridor (NSTC) connecting Russia to the Gulf and India. Azerbaijan hopes to benefit as the 'middle link', while Iran and Russia have greater economic and political aspirations. Impacts The route gives Russia another instrument with which to project financial and military power in the Middle East. Maritime routes via Suez will face competition for freight. The rail route will need high security given the risks of attack, for example in Dagestan, and of arms, drugs and terrorist travel.


Subject Civil society protest movements in Iraq and Lebanon. Significance Protest movements in the Middle East have been curtailed severely by retrenched autocratic governments and civil wars since the Arab uprisings in 2011. With their relatively open political systems, Lebanon and Iraq never participated in these protests fully. However, over the past year they have seen a resurgence in grassroots politics that could influence civil society across the region. Impacts Protest movements provide an outlet for popular frustration; their repression increases the risk of longer-term political instability. Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco have the most favourable conditions for a revival of civil society protest movements. Such movements could play a larger role in Yemen, Libya and Syria after conflicts have ended. In the longer run, these movements could benefit business in the region by driving efforts to fight corruption and improve transparency.


Significance Ten Saudi and five Bahraini soldiers were also reportedly killed. The loss is a major setback for the Saudi-led coalition that has helped local fighters push Huthi militants from large parts of southern Yemen in recent weeks. The coalition is now preparing for a push on the capital Sana'a, with Qatar sending an initial contingent of 1,000 soldiers across the Saudi border, Al-Jazeera reported today. Impacts The GCC will be a growing market for missile defence, naval, cybersecurity and land warfare systems. GCC states will invest more heavily in missile resources to provide Cold War-style deterrence against Iran. They may test their expeditionary capabilities in an environment such as Syria or Lebanon. They will invest in ostensibly peaceful nuclear research to signal their determination to match Iran's nuclear advances. Increased military activism will boost Gulf influence in the Levant, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in 2018-22. Significance Rooted in centuries of common history and cultural exchanges, links between the Gulf states and the Horn of Africa have intensified in the decade since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, creating new dynamics across the Gulf of Aden. In the years ahead, deepening trade and investment in agriculture, livestock and infrastructure -- in particular -- are likely to underpin an ever-more-complex web of political and military relationships, with fracturing lines of alliance and enmity shaped by security issues.


Significance Emirati trainers had already been withdrawn from the base amid an escalating row between Abu Dhabi and Mogadishu, which has intensified since the announcement on March 1 that Ethiopia would take a 19% stake in the UAE state-run DP World development of Berbera port in Somaliland. The port deal has brought the Emirati role in Somalia’s political economy into the spotlight, with important spillover for politics within the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as the federal member states (FMS). Impacts Although this is a setback in its approach to Somalia, the UAE will not dramatically alter its overall posture towards the Horn of Africa. Turkey may benefit most in terms of access and influence, as well as logistics and reconstruction contracts for Turkish companies. Other external actors may take note of the precarious nature of deals in Somalia, especially given corrupt tendering practices.


Headline MIDDLE EAST: Gulf states will drive regional policy


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