Prospects for the Gulf states in 2018

Subject Prospects for the Gulf states in 2018. Significance The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) saw dramatic political changes in 2017. Mohammed bin Salman advanced to become Saudi crown prince. The GCC also split in a way not seen since its foundation in 1981, after three members -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain -- launched a boycott of Qatar in June.

Subject Prospects for the Gulf states to end-2017. Significance Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries agree on the need to check Iran’s regional aspirations, but differ radically on how to achieve this goal -- pushing Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to open confrontation with Qatar and leaving Kuwait and Oman caught uncomfortably in the middle. At the same time, they face the major challenge of adjusting their economies to long-term expectations of lower oil revenue.


Subject The Gulf 's cybersecurity agenda. Significance Offensive cyber capabilities are technological tools for intruding into external digital networks to delete, steal or manipulate data. All six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar -- are developing these capabilities in the face of multiple threats. Impacts There is currently no indication that the GCC states are preparing cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. GCC states will continue relying on Western and Israel private firms for advanced surveillance tools. Efforts to nationalise the cybersecurity sector will advance slowly. Cyber espionage is almost certainly a fourth, covert GCC goal.


Significance This comes as Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states begin serious reforms to adapt to a new period of low oil prices. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) led the way in August 2015 by ending fuel subsidies, and Saudi Arabia has just reduced its own. Spending plans are being re-examined and new revenue-raising measures are being discussed seriously for the first time. Impacts Growth will stall in most sectors, particularly those that depend on government spending. Commercial opportunities may arise for companies that can help make efficiency savings or fill capacity gaps. Pressure will grow to end the Yemen war which is a drain on Saudi and UAE finances.


Subject Outlook for Pakistan-Gulf relations. Significance Pakistan's parliament last month voted against joining the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. Since then Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif have visited Riyadh to clarify the decision, reassuring Saudi Arabia of Pakistan's support in case of any external aggression against the kingdom. The Yemen intervention has exposed some faultlines in the relationship between the two allies, as well as in Pakistan's ties with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), some of whom -- most notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- described Pakistan's decision as "dangerous and unexpected". Impacts Pakistan will lose leverage in GCC states as the latter opt to provide aid via multilateral, international mechanisms. Islamabad will be reluctant to share nuclear technology with GCC states -- primarily for fear of provoking Washington. China will increasingly become Pakistan's preferred diplomatic and economic partner, despite a degree of mutual suspicion.


Significance The bombing represents the latest setback to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s efforts to stabilise southern Yemen and reinstall the government of President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. ISG is just one of a number of sub-state actors that have been empowered by the conflict and that will seek to challenge central government authority. Impacts Insecurity in Aden will deal a blow to the legitimacy of the Saudi-backed Hadi government. A major setback in the south will reflect badly on the reputation of Saudi Defence Minister Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Reconstruction efforts in southern Yemen will place increased long-term strain on the Saudi budget in particular. Southern Yemen could emerge as a key battleground in the rivalry between al-Qaida and ISG for leadership of the global jihad.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

This article assesses the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) in the framework of South-South Cooperation. It charts the different phases of engagement between the Gulf States and other developing countries, and the shifting dynamics that underpinned them. These phrases demonstrated profound changes that reflected policymaking calibrations in response to  domestic, regional and international catalysts. When read together, the internal and external forces that press upon the GCC States shape the analytical perspective of this article. Further, these internal and external pressures  shaped the Gulf States’ contributions to South-South Cooperation, and framed the intra-regional and international  realignments within which GCC  engagements took place.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states in 2022. Significance The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia, are enjoying the windfall from a tight global energy market that has pushed up oil and natural gas prices. They have also coped effectively with the healthcare challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, laying the groundwork for positive economic prospects in 2022.


Significance The sultan this month paid his first foreign visit to Saudi Arabia, establishing institutions for ongoing cooperation. Under the previous ruler, Muscat was wary of Riyadh’s dominant influence in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, both the regional environment and Oman’s economic situation are now in a state of flux. Impacts New Saudi investment in Oman would likely focus on the tourism and industrial sectors. Higher oil prices will provide only a temporary reprieve for Muscat’s structural economic problems. Omani interactions with the United Arab Emirates could become more fraught.


Significance As a key ally of Saudi Arabia and the owner of the Arab world's largest armed forces, Egypt is a core member of the coalition campaign fighting the Huthi rebels and loyalists to former Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh. Egyptian planes and naval vessels have already played a key role in the aerial campaign and naval blockade. However, the conflict appears likely to drag on, raising the risk of deeper -- and higher-risk -- Egyptian involvement. Impacts Ground involvement in Yemen would stir popular sensitivities about Egypt being regarded as a client of Gulf states. Egypt's foreign policy will become increasingly aligned with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Intervention in Libya would be more acceptable to the Egyptian public, who view the conflict there as a more immediate threat. Extended deployment would degrade the capabilities of the Egyptian military. Egyptian participation provides vital pan-Arab legitimacy to the Saudi intervention in Yemen.


Significance Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are pursuing ambitious natural gas plans that depend on relatively high-cost non-associated gas developments. Impacts The cost of gas in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE will rise, creating further pressure to reform domestic markets. Hoped-for LNG export opportunities are unlikely to be realised in the short-to-medium term. Initial phases of assessment will determine whether the targeted prospects are genuinely commercial. Gas production will be intimately linked with refinery and petrochemical expansion plans.


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