Cartes may win re-election wrangle in Paraguay

Significance Efrain Alegre, president of the opposition Partido Liberal Radical Autentico (PLRA), did not attend the three-hour meeting, which agreed that the constitutional amendment allowing for presidential re-election would not be voted on in the Lower House until the negotiations conclude. It also agreed that the political dialogue would be reconvened on April 7, when former President Fernando Lugo was expected to attend. However, hours after the meeting ended, opposition politicians led by Senate President Roberto Acevedo said that they were withdrawing from the dialogue process until Cartes abandoned the planned amendment. Impacts Further protests are likely as Cartes presses ahead with the re-election amendment. The president will benefit from deep opposition divisions. Constitutional change would erode the intended brakes on presidential longevity and authoritarianism.

Significance In late March, Evariste Ndayishimiye, the secretary-general of the ruling National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party, further indicated that this commission would not only review extending the term limit but also possibly abolishing it. Such an amendment would allow Nkuruniza to run again in 2020 but would put the Burundian leader on a collision course with the international community. In late February, the UN Security Council (UNSC) indicated that any constitutional change would violate the Arusha Accords of 2000 -- the political framework that eventually brought Burundi out of its civil war. Impacts Calls for additional sanctions could find resonance if the security and political situation deteriorates. Previous economic gains, following extensive investment in the agricultural sector, may reverse. The political impasse is now set against the background of a major public health emergency: Burundi is in the grip of a malaria epidemic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (03) ◽  
pp. 677-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bui Son ◽  
Pip Nicholson

Based on Chinese constitutional analysis, political science, and law and society studies, we argue that work extending the application of popular constitutionalism to authoritarian states applies in Vietnam, as popular constitutionalism targets sites relevant to constitutional reform. We contend that popular constitutionalism located in authoritarian states requires three factors: a tradition of activism, space for reformist and pragmatic dialogue targeting constitutional change, and the political need for legitimacy. This article analyses activism in Vietnam, focusing on the lodging of Petition 72 with the Constitutional Amendment Drafting Commission in 2013, and the resulting responses. We conclude that this activism was pivotal in advocating for new constitutional norms, evidencing popular constitutionalism in Vietnam. The long history of Vietnamese scholar activism, the relative space for governance debates, and the political need for legitimacy made this possible. We also note that popular constitutionalism faces constraints in authoritarian states, which may shape its trajectory.


1986 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 16-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Dellinger

The first part of the seminar examined a mystery that reverberates through two centuries: how does a constitutional system of government, itself born of revolution, properly provide for its own revision — provide literally for its own reconstitution? We first considered the political and intellectual assumptions against which Article V of the United States Constitution — the amendment article — was drafted, and then looked briskly at the historical context in which the Constitution's twenty-six amendments have been adopted. With this as background, we addressed a range of issues concerning the law and policy of constitutional change that are currently the subject of lively dispute in America.


Subject The outlook for progress on combating corruption. Significance Accusations of corruption hound President Enrique Pena Nieto's government. To temper both national and international concerns, Mexico's Lower House has been working to pass a raft of anti-corruption measures. In February, it passed the National Anticorruption System, an attempt to coordinate federal, state, and local anti-corruption efforts, while in March the Senate ratified the General Law of Transparency, aimed at clarifying how public funds are spent. Impacts Mexico's (and particularly the PRI's) poor record on limiting corruption does not generate optimism over the measures' efficacy. Sitting politicians still appear to be lacking the political will to stop corruption. The administration's increasing control of the public sphere will constrain the exposure of corruption.


Significance Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya benefit from the security vacuum emanating from the political crisis. IS has been regrouping after losing its headquarters in Sirte in 2016, even as it faces serious setbacks in Iraq and Syria. Al-Qaida-affiliated groups also exploit the neglected south. Impacts A stalled political dialogue will give salafi-jihadi groups like IS the space to regroup, even amid airstrikes. Salafi-jihadi groups will engage in high-profile attacks, targeting government officials and foreigners. Persistent insecurity will inhibit Libyan efforts to reverse economic decline, especially if groups attack oil and gas sites. The spread of extremist groups raises business costs and compels neighbours to close borders, contributing to Libya’s economic isolation.


Significance The main opposition leader has refused to accept President Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in the repeat presidential election on October 26. Odinga's withdrawal from the race guaranteed that Kenyatta would win a landslide victory, but also that it would be tarnished by questions of legitimacy. Meanwhile, Odinga’s vow to launch a national resistance movement has considerably raised the political stakes. Impacts An opposition boycott of companies involved in the election may deter foreign direct investment. The electoral commission has lost most Kenyans' confidence and major reform will be required before another election can credibly be held. Other African leaders may become increasingly wary of judicial independence, and look to establish greater political control of the courts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 610-626 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Jones

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of political risk in real estate and to specifically examine the implications in Scotland of continuing uncertainty caused by political events. Design/methodology/approach The primary research links the political timeline around the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 to time series of a combination of individual investment transactions, measures of sentiment from investment agents and yields. The analysis distinguishes between UK and overseas investors. Findings The political risk over six years ebbed and flowed with the changing probability of constitutional change but ultimately it has been a cumulative dampener on investment in Scotland. An element of the political risk can be deemed to be specific risk linked to UK institutional fund mandates that stems from concerns about possible forced sales with independence. In addition political risk is in the eye of the beholder with overseas investors in Scotland unfazed by the prospects of independence. Practical implications The short-term impact on investment of the Scottish “neverendum” is very similar to that for independence. The consequences are depressed investment and development that seem set to continue at least until the constitutional hiatus begins to be resolved. Originality/value This is the first study to explicitly examine the impact of political uncertainty on the real estate sector.


Significance Of three recent dialogue attempts, this is the first that occurs in an environment that appears conducive to reconciliation. This follows more than a decade of acrimonious relations between major parties, underscored by a fraught 2020 election in which 85 people died as President Alassane Ouattara secured a controversial third presidential term. Impacts The political dialogue will see the return of more political exiles. Ouattara will likely agree to the release of more low-profile political prisoners. Next year’s municipal and regional elections will likely be relatively peaceful.


Author(s):  
Pelletier Benoît

In the past, Canadian constitutional reform has been marked by surprising successes and resounding failures. Indeed, the failures were such that constitutional amendment itself, along with the word “Constitution”, became taboo in the eyes of a large part of the Canadian population. This chapter will commence with a brief history of constitutional reform in Canada from the Constitution Act, 1867 to the patriation of 1982, followed by an analysis of the post-patriation constitutional amendment procedures. It will then discuss the political and legal frameworks which further complicate the already strict requirements of modern constitutional amendment in Canada, and will conclude with an overview of the phenomena favouring paraconstitutional adaptation of the Constitution. Finally, it will point out that the full restoration of the word “Constitution” is of utmost importance in ensuring that constitutional reform itself does not simply become a matter of wishful thinking.


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