Morocco's AU bid will reopen Western Sahara issue

Significance Morocco has been seeking re-admittance to the AU and has spent the past two years courting its African neighbours. King Mohammed VI toured West Africa in 2014 and concluded 2016 with a tour of East Africa and a crucial visit to one of the continent's powerhouses -- Nigeria. Impacts Morocco will aim for more economic cooperation with Nigeria regardless of the AU summit outcome. Tension with Algeria, the SADR's main backer, will intensify. If Morocco wins re-entry into the AU, this will help ensure greater diplomatic coverage with other international bodies such as the UN.

Subject Maghreb-SSA relations. Significance Links between countries in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been growing steadily over the past decade. In different ways, Morocco and Algeria have both established themselves as essential partners for West Africa. Impacts The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco will play out in African political and economic engagement, notably over Western Sahara. However, sub-Saharan governments will remain uninterested in taking sides and will seek to maintain good relations with both Maghreb powers. Morocco might like to rejoin the African Union (AU), but does not regard this as sufficient reason to climb down on Western Sahara. Trans-Saharan drugs and people trafficking will remain a major concern.


Significance The kingdom was previously seen as withdrawn from and largely peripheral to the wider Middle East. However, two issues -- the Israel-Morocco normalisation agreement in late 2020 and the consequent revival of the Western Sahara issue, with US recognition of Morocco’s claims over the territory -- have brought Rabat further into the spotlight. Impacts Morocco will expand its diplomatic and economic partnerships to East Africa. Rabat may try again to position itself as a constructive international actor through offering mediation services. EU states will need to balance their commitment to the UN process in Western Sahara with maintaining strong tries to Rabat.


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Subject Prospects for East Africa in 2022. Significance The past year produced considerable political turbulence across East Africa. The coming year threatens to be even more volatile. Indeed, the region faces a period of almost unprecedented uncertainty. It looks almost certain that 2022 will bring major changes -- and potentially major disruptions -- in some of the region’s largest countries.


Subject Regional infrastructure ambitions. Significance Plans for large-scale regional infrastructure projects have become vehicles for economic cooperation in East Africa over the past several years. However, behind the rhetoric of regional solidarity, such ventures have become a critical arena for power rivalries to play out. Impacts Infrastructure plans are exacerbating local conflicts in northern Kenya and driving new dynamics. Land grabbing is a trend across areas where new infrastructure is meant to be, tying political and business elites to original plans. Despite its ambitions to reduce reliance on Khartoum, South Sudan is not going to be a secure infrastructure partner for some time.


Subject Outlook for Islamist militancy in West Africa. Significance Over the past four months Islamist armed groups have carried out high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Mali. Such incidents are not new in the Sahel, but the methods and scale have changed. To some extent this mirrors changes seen in Nigeria, Kenya, the Middle East and Europe, where attackers explicitly target civilians in a bid to attract media attention. Impacts The risk of further attacks is unlikely to shift positive investor sentiment towards Ivory Coast, which is driven by strong GDP growth. Airport security will likely come under fresh scrutiny given recent bombings and hijackings in Somalia and Egypt respectively. Cameroon is vulnerable to further attacks given its involvement in the regional anti-Boko Haram force.


Significance The incident followed diplomatic frictions with Germany in March. Since the administration of former US President Donald Trump in late 2020 recognised Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara in exchange for Morocco re-establishing diplomatic ties with Israel, Morocco’s foreign policy posture has become more assertive. Impacts In the past, Morocco has punished firms for diplomatic disputes; Spanish and German companies could suffer business disruptions. Morocco will use illegal immigration as an effective foreign policy tool. Neighbour and antagonist Algeria is entangled in domestic crises and does not have the capacity to engage in diplomatic issues.


Subject AQIM assessment. Significance Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has garnered media attention over the past year with a string of 'spectacular' attacks against Westerners in West Africa: with attacks in Bamako, Mali in late 2015, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in January 2016, and Grand Bassam in the Ivory Coast in March. Its increasing range of operations raises questions about the group's organisational structure and its strategy. Impacts More terrorist attacks in North and West Africa will adversely affect tourism in those regions. This would particularly affect Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Egypt. The resurgence of AQIM could also mean that it increasingly entrenches itself in Libya too.


Subject Outlook for Moroccan phosphates exports. Significance Phosphate rock prices have slumped over the past year and have since stabilised at 72.50 dollars per tonne, down almost 30% since early 2019. Morocco, the second-largest producer of phosphates after China and home to the vast majority of global reserves, has felt the resulting squeeze. The national phosphates company Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP) Group has managed to offset some of this by accelerating its shift to downstream production of acid and fertilisers, but margins have likely been hit and the company may lack the scope to continue scaling up value-added production without further investment. Impacts OCP's ongoing work to consolidate its position in sub-Saharan Africa will also help support Moroccan export revenues. At current extraction rates, Morocco may be the only major producing country with phosphate reserves to last beyond 50 years. Rabat's drive to increase revenue from mining other minerals and metals is likely to yield only modest results. A diplomatic shift over the status of Western Sahara (and thus key OCP mining locations) is unlikely.


Subject Jihadist terrorism in the past year. Significance Developments in terrorist groups in the past year were marked by Islamic State (IS)’s military 'defeat' in Syria and, in parallel, expansion into South-east Asia and West Africa via the emergence of new ‘provinces’; al-Qaida (AQ)’s consolidation and growing capabilities via opportunistic local collaborations; and concerns over Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)’s resurgence in Indonesia. Impacts Targeting of places of worship in South-east Asia may become an entrenched trend. AQIM will keep trying to exploit socio-political grievances in the Maghreb region and Mali. Despite its losses, IS has more money, better media profile and more combat experience than AQ.


Author(s):  
Marina Sharpe

This introductory chapter begins by presenting the book’s structure in section A. Section B then delineates the book’s contours, outlining four aspects of refugee protection in Africa that are not addressed. Section C provides context, with a contemporary overview of the state of refugee protection in Africa. It also looks at the major aspects of the refugee situations in each of Africa’s principal geographic sub-regions: East Africa (including the Horn of Africa), Central Africa and the Great Lakes, West Africa, Southern Africa, and North Africa. Section D then concludes with an outline of the theoretical approach to regime relationships employed throughout the book.


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