Georgia seeks defence help in lieu of NATO accession

Subject Georgia's long wait for NATO accession. Significance The promise of NATO membership made to Georgia in 2008 was again deferred when the alliance held a summit in Warsaw on July 8-9. Georgia has made great efforts to meet the requirements for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), but no substantive progress on adopting one was achieved at the summit. Instead, NATO, while inviting Montenegro to join, offered Georgia expanded assistance to boost its defence capacity. US Secretary of State John Kerry underlined the offer of military assistance on a July 6 visit intended to reinforce Washington's political commitment to Tbilisi. Impacts Georgia will purchase a range of armaments from the United States and Europe. Russia will exploit growing public disillusionment to weaken pro-Western parties in the October elections. Moscow will maintain a firm grip on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, maintaining substantial military forces there.

Subject US relations with Central Asia. Significance US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Central Asia in early November, in an effort to boost Washington's influence in a region that is increasingly dominated by Russia and also China. Central Asian states worry that the region has declined in importance for the United States, owing to Washington's overall drawdown of forces in Afghanistan. Impacts Over-reliance on remittances will pose major risk to Central Asian economies. Central Asian states will continue to try and extract concessions from United States, Russia and China. Washington will diminish its public criticism of human rights abuses in Central Asia but maintain pressure in private.


Significance The Kenyatta-Odinga meeting was related to a visit by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. However, it appears to have been driven more by domestic politics and a desire to outflank any potential alliance between Deputy President William Ruto and Odinga’s NASA allies. NASA is fragmenting, bringing more fluidity to political alliances and underscoring the inherent uncertainty of electoral politics in Kenya. Impacts Effective pressure by Western envoys (especially the United States) improves the prospects for continued de-escalation. Tillerson’s early end to his unremarkable tour underscores a lack of interest in key African partners and will further dilute US influence. US calls for strong democratic institutions may ring hollow against African perceptions of the US president’s dismissal of these at home.


1958 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 548-549 ◽  

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered “just as good” as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.


Significance Billed by US and UK officials as the largest-ever mass expulsion of Russian diplomatic personnel, this is an unexpected show of common will. The United States alone is expelling 60 Russian diplomats, as Moscow finds itself having to condemn a broad swathe of countries, not just the United Kingdom. Impacts Western governments will beef up defences against possible asymmetric cyberattacks. The appointment of a hawkish US national security advisor and secretary of state may harden Trump's stand on Russia. President Vladimir Putin will return to the 'Russia besieged' narrative of 2014.


Significance Russia, Turkey and Iran on May 4 agreed the plan to establish four de-escalation zones in areas with a significant rebel presence. This is the latest stage in a long-term debate about potential ‘safe zones’ culminating in a March 22 statement by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that the United States would work to establish ‘interim zones of stability’ through ceasefires, to allow refugees to return home. However, Washington objects to Iran’s guarantor role in the Russian plan, while Damascus has not explicitly signed up. Impacts The Syrian case could entrench a developing trend of establishing safe zones outside the framework of international law. The prospect of safe zones could be used by neighbouring countries to justify border closures and deny refugee claims. Any effort to create effective safe zones would tend to increase foreign states’ military involvement in Syria.


Subject Influence of Asian powers in Africa. Significance Before embarking on his ongoing visit to Africa, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned African nations to be wary of Chinese investments in the continent, which he alleged created dangerous "dependency". The United States is not alone in this concern. Over recent years, India and Japan have massively increased their development engagement with Africa, trying to keep up with China’s expanding programmes -- and offset its growing influence. Impacts While concessionary loans are affordable at current interest rates, debt problems could emerge if rates return to historic norms. Competition may also draw in Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Turkey, all of which are deepening their engagements in Africa. East Africa’s salience in ‘Indo-Pacific’ rivalries risks alienating Australia, which lacks the capacity to project power so far afield.


Author(s):  
Bipin K. Tiwary ◽  
Anubhav Roy

Having fought its third war and staring at food shortages, independent India needed to get its act together both militarily and economically by the mid-1960s. With the United States revoking its military assistance and delaying its food aid despite New Delhi’s devaluation of the rupee, India’s newly elected Indira Gandhi government turned to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union in 1966 with the aim of balancing the United States internally through a rearmament campaign and externally through a formal alliance with Moscow. The US formation of a triumvirate with Pakistan and China in India’s neighbourhood only bolstered its intent. Yet India consciously limited the extent of both its balancing strategies and allowed adequate space to simultaneously adopt the contradictory sustenance of its complex interdependence with the United States economically. Did this contrasting choice of strategies constitute India’s recourse to hedging after 1966 until 1971, when it liberated Bangladesh by militarily defeating a US-aligned Pakistan? Utilising a historical-evaluative study of archival data and the contents of a few Bollywood films from the period, this paper seeks to address the question by empirically establishing the extents of India’s balancing of, and complex interdependence with, the United States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-126
Author(s):  
Takisha Durm

PurposeThe Girl Who Buried Her Dreams in a Can, written by Dr Tererai, profiles a cultural, yet global experience of the power of believing in one's dream. Through this study of the similarities and differences of how children in the United States and abroad live and dream of a better life, this lesson seeks to enhance students' understandings of the power and authority they possess to effect change not only within their own lives but also in the lives of countless others in world. After reading the text, students will work to create vision boards illustrating their plans to effect change within their homes, schools, communities, states or countries. They will present their plans to their peers. To culminate the lesson, the students will bury their dreams in can and collectively decide on a future date to revisit the can to determine how far they have progressed in accomplishing their goals.Design/methodology/approachThis is an elementary grades 3–6 lesson plan. There was no research design/methodology/approach included.FindingsAs this is a lesson plan and no actual research was represented, there are no findings.Originality/valueThis is an original lesson plan completed by the first author Takisha Durm.


1972 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-440
Author(s):  
Randolph Campbell

It is well known that the initial task of interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as a functional policy in international relations fell largely on John Quincy Adams. Somewhat ironically, the noncolonization principle in Monroe's famed Annual Message of 1823 for which Adams, then Secretary of State, was most responsible, received relatively little attention in the 1820's. Leaders in the United States and Spanish America alike were more concerned with the meaning of the other main principle involved in the Message—nonintervention. What were the practical implications of Monroe's warning that the United States would consider intervention by a European power in the affairs of any independent American nation “ as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States ” ? John Quincy Adams laid the groundwork for an answer to this question in July, 1824, when Colombia, alarmed by rumors of French interference in the wars for independence, sought a treaty of alliance. The President and Congress, Adams replied, would take the necessary action to support nonintervention if a crisis arose, but there would be no alliance. In fact, he added, it would be necessary for the United States to have an understanding with certain European powers whose principles and interests also supported nonintervention before any action could be taken or any alliance completed to uphold it. The position taken by the Secretary of State cooled enthusiasm for the Monroe Doctrine, but Spanish American leaders did not accept this rebuff in 1824 as final.


Significance Follow-on action from Washington and responses from foreign actors will shape the US government’s adversarial policy towards China in semiconductors and other strategic technologies. Impacts The Biden administration will likely conclude that broad-based diversion of the semiconductor supply chain away from China is not feasible. The United States will rely on export controls and political pressure to prevent diffusion to China of cutting-edge chip technologies. The United States will focus on persuading foreign semiconductor leaders to help develop US capabilities, thereby staying ahead of China. Washington will focus on less direct approaches to strategic technology competition with China, notably technical standards-setting. Industry leaders in the semiconductor supply chain worldwide will continue expanding business in China in less politically sensitive areas.


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