AIIB may not close ASEAN infrastucture gap

Subject ASEAN core countries and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) plans to begin lending in early 2016. Three ASEAN countries -- Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines -- have not signed the bank's articles of agreement, despite their infrastructure development needs. These needs will grow as ASEAN integrates, for instance via the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) free trade area from end-2015. Impacts Should Manila reject the AIIB, this will create an opening for further Japanese support of Philippines infrastructure. Early credibility among lenders could lead to the AIIB's rapid expansion in Asia. Until then, established development lenders will dominate -- the AIIB is untested.

Subject The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance Since July 2014, China has overseen the establishment of three development finance institutions: the New Development Bank ('BRICS bank'), the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As well as its geopolitical implications, this reshaping of the international financial architecture also represents a shift in the predominant model of development finance. The AIIB will grant Beijing greater influence over international finance, but it also compels China to develop a more financially sustainable, long-term foreign investment strategy through multilateral, transparent and rules-based mechanisms. Impacts China's domestic 'Go West' strategy and inter-provincial rebalancing will receive a significant boost. Regional bond market integration through the Asian Bond Markets Initiative will experience positive spill-over. The ADB will assume a role of providing technical expertise, and turn towards other priorities. China will simultaneously develop parallel development financing mechanisms to pursue more overtly political goals.


Significance Along with the stabbing of the US ambassador to Seoul by a South Korean activist earlier this month, sharp comments from a top US official about Seoul's 'Japan-bashing', and Seoul's potential membership of a new China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), this points to new tensions in key regional relationships. Impacts Seoul's foremost challenge, alongside Pyongyang and related, is navigating between its US ally and its neighbour and trade partner, China. Fear of Pyongyang, plus annoyance at Beijing's hectoring, mean that Seoul may agree to host a missile defence battery. Parlous Seoul-Tokyo relations seriously worry Washington, but Park's falling popularity makes it hard to reverse her unbending stance.


Subject Electronics and ICT investment outlook in ASEAN states. Significance South-east Asia is removing foreign investment barriers in most electronics industries, attempting to capitalise on closer economic ties with China and digitalisation of services. Changes in supply chains are drawing investment to cheaper production bases, including Vietnam and the Philippines, forcing established manufacturers Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand to compete with China for high-end markets. This trend will intensify ahead of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) free trade area, which will be implemented in late 2015. Impacts Investment markets will be liberalised under the ASEAN Economic Community. Trade liberalisation will require expanded South-east Asian supply chains, and boost electronics industry links with China. ASEAN governments will address skills gaps to provide electronics workers as the industry grows.


Subject The United Kingdom's decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Significance On March 12, UK finance minister George Osborne announced that the United Kingdom had applied to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) announced by China last year. It was the first large US ally to do so. An unnamed White House official told a journalist that Washington was frustrated about London's "constant accommodation" with Beijing. These developments have sparked fears in some quarters that China's rise could drive a wedge between Washington and its closest friends. Impacts Cooperating with China to reform international financial institutions -- in consultation with Washington -- is a longstanding UK objective. UK objectives vis-a-vis China reflect the sometimes-conflicting priorities of a diverse electorate; they go beyond trade. Boosting trade currently enjoys high-level political favour, but will not be the priority indefinitely or in every policy area.


Subject Prospects for global infrastructure in the fourth quarter. Significance Major agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) need to be accompanied by port and other logistics infrastructure expansions if they are to boost trade substantially in the developing world. New funding sources such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will help in the long term. Yet smaller trade volumes, linked to China's cooling growth, could lead to short-term overcapacity.


Subject ASEAN-China economic cooperation. Significance Trade between China and the ASEAN states has grown fast over the last few years, even amid sluggish growth of global trade overall. Investment in ASEAN countries is already a key part of the globalisation strategies of many Chinese companies. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area will probably increase its share of global trade as trade within it outpaces that within other major economic blocs, such as the EU and North America. Impacts Investment in ASEAN countries will help Chinese firms reduce production costs, tap local markets and avoid US tariffs. Chinese investment will help upgrade the infrastructure and domestic industrial sectors of ASEAN’s poorer economies. Competition between China and ASEAN countries will increase as the latter’s own manufacturing sectors develop.


2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Liang Fook LYE

Amidst growing protectionist and anti-globalisation sentiments, China has led the call for a free, open and inclusive multilateral order. It supports a multilateral trading regime, a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. It has launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank where it wields significant veto power. China is pushing for a new regional security architecture. While shaping the international order, China is upholding its sovereign claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110280
Author(s):  
Anita Sengupta

The renewed emphasis on Asia’s connectivity infrastructure has brought into focus the complex relationship between pursuing economic development through trans-state linkages and promoting political agendas. The formalizing of transit flows across the Asian space has involved financial, technical and regulatory relations bringing together the interests of actors at various levels. This article examines how these have been used by China to create new realms of influence through a study of the working of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Chinese markets across Central Asia, in order to demonstrate the complex role that these play in determining the contours of a relationship based on infrastructural financing and trade. The extent to which these globalized corridors and systems of governance might be impacted by the pandemic, however, remains to be seen.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Urdinez

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the motivations behind the accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a focus on the cases of Brazil and Chile.Design/methodology/approachThe author collected data using a case study methodology, primarily through semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and through official government documentation.FindingsThe findings identified that, overall, the Brazilian politicians who made the decision to join the bank had an unclear perception of its economic benefit and believed that the clearest benefit from accession is political (to support China's initiative). After years of domestic political turmoil and economic crisis, Brazil experienced delayed incorporation into the bank, slow ratification processes in the domestic arena and a reduction in its capital commitment. Chilean decision-makers, on the other hand, seemed to have a clearer idea of the benefits from accessing the bank, which explains that their ratification process has been faster and smoother. Yet, a surprising socio-political crisis delayed incorporation into the bank. Both countries have delayed their accession to the bank due to domestic crises.Practical implicationsThree policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, the entry of Latin American countries into the bank reflects the persuasiveness of Chinese diplomacy in this region. Second, the author finds that interviewees are not always able to differentiate the AIIB from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hold the misguided idea that the AIIB is subordinated to the BRI rather than complementary to it. This might set overly high expectations of the benefits of entering the AIIB. Third, the author foresees that the largest potential of the AIIB in Latin America lies in the possibility of participating in co-financed projects, in particular with the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America.Originality/valueResearch on the AIIB has boomed in recent years, yet there are few in-depth studies about Latin American prospective members. The value of this study lies in offering in-depth data for two of the eight prospective members from this region.


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