Divisions will hamper Saudi regional security alliance

Subject Saudi Arabia's Sunni Arab alliance. Significance King Salman bin Abd-al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia held talks in Riyadh with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi on March 1. It was the latest in a series of meetings the king has had with the leaders of the kingdom's main Arab allies -- the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), plus Jordan. Since coming to power in January King Salman has prioritised efforts to resolve differences among some of those allies and strengthen coordination in the face of perceived security challenges emanating from the conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and from Iranian influence in the region. The new king appears to be seeking to put his stamp on the monarchy by restoring Saudi Arabia's traditional leadership of regional policy and security. Impacts The fragile truce between Cairo and Doha is likely to break down. Prospects have improved for greater regional cooperation to help the mainstream Syrian opposition. Saudi proxy intervention in Yemen is likely to escalate, complicating efforts to resolve the stand-off with the Huthis. The UAE and Egypt will step up intervention via proxies in Libya.

Subject The Gulf 's cybersecurity agenda. Significance Offensive cyber capabilities are technological tools for intruding into external digital networks to delete, steal or manipulate data. All six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar -- are developing these capabilities in the face of multiple threats. Impacts There is currently no indication that the GCC states are preparing cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. GCC states will continue relying on Western and Israel private firms for advanced surveillance tools. Efforts to nationalise the cybersecurity sector will advance slowly. Cyber espionage is almost certainly a fourth, covert GCC goal.


Subject Outlook for Pakistan-Gulf relations. Significance Pakistan's parliament last month voted against joining the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen. Since then Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff Raheel Sharif have visited Riyadh to clarify the decision, reassuring Saudi Arabia of Pakistan's support in case of any external aggression against the kingdom. The Yemen intervention has exposed some faultlines in the relationship between the two allies, as well as in Pakistan's ties with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), some of whom -- most notably the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- described Pakistan's decision as "dangerous and unexpected". Impacts Pakistan will lose leverage in GCC states as the latter opt to provide aid via multilateral, international mechanisms. Islamabad will be reluctant to share nuclear technology with GCC states -- primarily for fear of provoking Washington. China will increasingly become Pakistan's preferred diplomatic and economic partner, despite a degree of mutual suspicion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126
Author(s):  
Xuesong Fan ◽  

Central Asia is extremely important for the security of Russia, China and the Eurasian region, both historically and at present. Unconventional security challenges, led by terrorism, extremism and separatism, which in the official Chinese rhetoric and official documents of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are designated as the ‘three forces of evil,’ pose a serious challenge to the security of China, Russia, the countries of Central Asia and Eurasia in general. Over the 20 years of the SCO’s history, proceeding from their ‘Shanghai spirit,’ the participating countries have created unique legislative and organizational mechanisms for a joint strike against the ‘three forces of evil,’ as well as mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral antiterrorist exercises. The most important of these is the Peace Mission joint exercise, which has been regularly held since 2005. These mechanisms of cooperation within the SCO embody the spirit of solidarity, mutual trust and cooperation, reflect the ability of the members of the organization to jointly counter the ‘three forces of evil’ and respond to related problems, and also symbolize the SCO’s determination to protect stability in the region and peace in the world. The organization has made a significant contribution to ensuring security in the region. Nevertheless, in the face of existing problems and new challenges such as potential competition and disagreements within the organization, problems with new members after the expansion of the membership, and also the ineffective functioning of some of the SCO’s security instruments, all SCO members need to strengthen their cooperation and open new ways for organizing the SCO to fulfil well its unique role to ensure security in the territory of SCO states and in Eurasia as a whole. The new model of relations—‘Russian-Chinese relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction entering a new era’—that underlies the SCO gives the organization greater stability. The SCO is a unique organization on the territory of Eurasia and has both implemented an important innovation in the theory and practice of international relations and opened a new model of regional cooperation. Therefore, it can be stated with a high degree of confidence that multilateral cooperation in the field of security will gradually deepen.


Significance Obama will seek to gain their support for a final deal on Iran's nuclear programme and reassure them that the United States remains committed to regional security. This is likely to fall short of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders' expectations that the summit will formalise and deepen US security commitments in the Gulf. Moreover, Gulf rulers remain convinced that Iran has continued to spread its influence across the region, and they will resist any US attempt to narrow the focus of the summit onto the benefits of a nuclear agreement alone. Impacts GCC distrust of Iranian objectives and US policies in the region means they will develop more assertive approaches to regional security. Any normalisation of international policy on Iran following a final nuclear agreement will test GCC cohesion. United States faces inking Iran deal without support of any of its regional allies, Israel and the Gulf. Oman, Qatar and Dubai will move swiftly to build closer economic and commercial ties with Iran.


Significance The authorities are following up the swift defeat of the amateurish attempt to seize power by a group of junior officers on July 15-16. The would-be coup was violent: at least 290 died, and there were ugly clashes nationwide before the uprising collapsed in the face of rejection by the civilian population and televised appeals by most of the senior military. Impacts The balance of power in Turkey has shifted radically in Erdogan's favour, which may deter Western investors. Turkey's alignment with Saudi Arabia will grow more explicit. Mass trials and possibly even executions will alienate it further from international opinion.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states in 2016 Significance Oil prices are biting into government revenues and increasing pressure for economic reform. However, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments are prioritising regional policy following the international nuclear deal with Iran.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states to end-2017. Significance Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries agree on the need to check Iran’s regional aspirations, but differ radically on how to achieve this goal -- pushing Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to open confrontation with Qatar and leaving Kuwait and Oman caught uncomfortably in the middle. At the same time, they face the major challenge of adjusting their economies to long-term expectations of lower oil revenue.


Subject India's foreign policy in South and South-east Asia. Significance Prime Minister Narendra Modi last month visited the Maldives and Sri Lanka, shortly after his election victory and reinauguration. Leaders of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) had been invited to his swearing-in ceremony. When Modi came to power in 2014, invitations to his inauguration were sent to leaders of all countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Impacts India will try to improve infrastructure in its north-eastern states to facilitate integration with mainland South-east Asia. Delhi will seek support from Tokyo and Washington to execute development projects in the region. Pakistan in its diplomacy will turn more pronouncedly towards China and Saudi Arabia.


Subject Prospects for the Gulf states in 2022. Significance The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia, are enjoying the windfall from a tight global energy market that has pushed up oil and natural gas prices. They have also coped effectively with the healthcare challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, laying the groundwork for positive economic prospects in 2022.


Significance However, an Islamist-inspired insurgency in Mozambique, uncertainty surrounding Chad’s future as a regional security partner and Nigeria’s recent unexpected call for US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to move to the continent better to combat worsening Sahelian insecurity all threaten to keep counterterrorism the focus of US-Africa policy. Impacts Growing security challenges and the threat of jihadi militants mean Washington may expand military and counterterrorism efforts in Africa. US-Nigeria relations may become more strained over the short-to-medium term amid rising authoritarianism in Nigeria before its 2023 polls. US efforts to counter China's diplomatic and economic footprint in Africa will increase, but eroding Beijing's influence will prove elusive.


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