Electronic Mail: An Issue of Privacy Versus Property Rights

Thomas Murray’s chapter draws on a critical social theory of law and a range of qualitatively rich primary sources to incorporate heretofore neglected social movement voices into a more complex account of constitutional development in Ireland. The chapter concentrates on the political practices and discourses at stake in a single moment of conflict when property rights were contested from below, specifically the squatting campaigns of the Dublin Housing Action Committee (D.H.A.C.) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Murray aims to open up a broader terrain of debate about constitutional development and judicial power in Ireland than conventional studies of case-law, legislation or parliamentary politics would suggest.

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Regulatory versus Property Rights Solutions for the Cable Television Problem

California Law Review ◽

10.2307/3480128 ◽

1981 ◽

Vol 69 (2) ◽

pp. 527

Author(s):

Gillis L. Heller

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Cable Television ◽

Versus Property

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Rights Based Fishing: Use Rights versus Property Rights to Fish

Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries ◽

10.1007/s11160-005-4870-3 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 15 (3) ◽

pp. 231-241 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

Rögnvaldur Hannesson

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Versus Property

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The Institutions of Privacy: Data Protection Versus Property Rights to Data

SATS ◽

10.1515/sats-2020-0004 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 22 (1) ◽

pp. 111-129

Author(s):

Henrique Schneider

Keyword(s):

Property Rights ◽

Data Protection ◽

Network Effects ◽

Private Property ◽

Low Cost ◽

Structured Data ◽

The Other ◽

Conceptual Possibility ◽

Versus Property ◽

Do So

Abstract This paper investigates the conceptual possibility for, and the institutions relating to a positive right of private property to data. To do so, it distinguishes between structured data, as a designator, and datapoints, which are data embedded in the timeline. The reasoning being explored here is: the agents generating datapoints – he source of the data – have a right to private property to the datapoints they generate. The agents, then, can choose to retain the datapoints or to sell them to data-users, aggregators, etc. Once these data-users render property of data themselves, they can further market it. There are, however, challenges to this view. One is the relative high cost of managing private property to data versus the relative low cost of misappropriating data and datapoints. The other is network effects: more precisely, data created or enriched in networks.

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