A Tale of Two Hedge Funds: Magnetar and Peloton

Author(s):  
David P. Stowell ◽  
Stephen Carlson

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1227-1257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Dudley ◽  
Mahendrarajah Nimalendran

AbstractFunding risk measures the extent to which a fund can borrow money by posting collateral. Using a novel measure of funding risk based on futures margins, we are able to empirically identify the mechanism by which changes in funding risk affect the likelihood of contagion. An increase in margins of the order of magnitude observed during the subprime crisis increases the probability of contagion among certain types of funds by up to 34%. Our analysis shows that some types of hedge funds are more vulnerable to contagion than others. Our results also suggest that policies that limit the magnitude of changes in margins over short periods of time may reduce the likelihood of contagion among hedge funds.


2013 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-181
Author(s):  
Theodosios Palaskas ◽  
Chrysostomos Stoforos ◽  
Costantinos Drakatos

Abstract The rapid development of hedge funds and their emanating critical role in the financial markets and the financial system globally, combined with the increased frequency of economic crises during the last 25 years, brought them to the centre of discussions concerning the following issue: «To what extent the operation of hedge funds can affect the birth, peak and even geographic expansion of economic crises?». In this context, the present paper aims to contribute to the limited and sporadic discussion of whether the hedge funds could be held responsible for economic crises. To this extend the growth and the impact of hedge funds on financial crises is analysed and evaluated using the HFR database -in their birth, aggravation or even geographic expansion- both from a historical perspective and in relation to the 2007-today crisis. Based on the evidence presented in this paper, hedge funds cannot be blamed for the birth of the crises of the last 25 years. Comparing the data across the different crises, it becomes obvious that, with the exception of the 2007 subprime crisis, where almost all hedge fund strategies suffered considerable losses, in all other crises studied in the present paper, the hedge fund strategies with a negative return were the ones that had an exposure to the specific sector and/or region that was in the centre of the crisis i.e. Emerging market strategy presented substantial negative monthly performance over the Asian crisis, Convertible arbitrage strategy was affected by the dot-com crisis, etc.


Author(s):  
V. Milovidov

Reagan's financial sector deregulation became a starting point for the financial engineering, derivatives, combinatory financial operations industry. Due to it hedge funds developed, and a range of risk financial transactions expanded among the banks that found both new forms of financial risk hedging and new sources of income: arbitrage and hedging, credit default swaps, operations with "second-rate” credits. It was them that exploded the market in 2007–2008. The reaction of states realized in a string of regulation initiatives, including creation of supranational coordination bodies (in particular, Financial Stability Board); reformatting of mega regulators and on their base – the shaping of state prudential supervision and financial services consumer rights protection bodies with different tasks; restrictions on hedge funds activities; toughening of derivative instruments regulation and implementing of a central counterparty institute on derivatives market.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingling Zheng ◽  
Xuemin (Sterling) Yan

Affiliation with a financial conglomerate may provide hedge funds with superior information about the conglomerate’s lending, investment banking, and brokerage clients; such affiliation can also lead to potential conflicts with the other units of the conglomerate and exacerbate the conflict between hedge fund companies and hedge fund investors. We find that affiliated funds significantly underperform unaffiliated funds. A difference-in-difference analysis confirms the negative relation between financial industry affiliation and hedge fund performance. Affiliated funds pursue asset-gathering strategies, overweight their conducted initial public offerings/seasoned equity offerings clients’ stocks, are more likely to commit legal and regulatory violations, and tend to exhibit a greater number of internal conflicts. Our results are consistent with conflict of interest exerting a negative impact on the performance of affiliated hedge funds. However, it is possible that lack of skill also contributes to the underperformance of affiliated funds. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 488-504
Author(s):  
Francois-Serge Lhabitant

This chapter discusses the major legal structures available for hedge fund investing, and how different categories of investors— taxable US investors, tax-exempt US investors, and non-US investors—may use these to reduce the risk of double or triple taxation. Although sometimes complex, these structures allow investors to enjoy the benefits of characteristics inherent in hedge fund investments while being taxed as if they owned the same assets directly.


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