scholarly journals Exploring and supporting student reasoning in physics by leveraging dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Caleb Speirs ◽  
MacKenzie R. Stetzer ◽  
Beth A. Lindsey ◽  
Mila Kryjevskaia
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Student Reasoning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Gambling and decision-making: A dual process perspective

2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 444-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenny R. Coventry
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Problem Gambling ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Gambling Addiction ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Process Perspective

AbstractThe consideration of gambling as a decision-making disorder may fail to explain why the majority of people gamble, yet only a small percentage of people lose control of their behaviour to the point where their gambling becomes problematic. The application of dual process theories to gambling addiction offers a means of explaining the differences between “normal” and “problem” gambling, augmenting the multiple vulnerabilities proposed by Redish et al.

scholarly journals The Fair Decision-making of Children and Adolescents with High-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder from the Perspective of Dual-process Theories

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiying Jin ◽  
Yao Wang ◽  
Yun LI ◽  
Yunhua Xiao ◽  
Chunyan Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Autism Spectrum Disorder ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
High Functioning Autism ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Acceptance Rate ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
High Functioning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories

Abstract Background: Fairness, as a core component of moral society, has received much attention. At present, there are inconsistencies in the findings regarding the fair decision-making of high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HF-ASD). Previous studies have shown that the fair decision-making of typically developing children is influenced by theory of mind(ToM) and executive function(EF).Dual-process theories propose that both intuitive processes and reasoning processes participate in fair decision-making. As those with HF-ASD have defects in both domains, this study aims to explore the differences in fair decision-making between children and adolescents with HF-ASD and those with typical development (TD). Methods: We used a mini ultimatum game (mini-UG) to explore 31 children and adolescents with HF-ASD and 38 children and adolescents with TD. Ttests and chi-square tests are used to compare group differences, Pearson correlation analysis and stepwise regression analysis was used to analyse the influencing mechanism of the two groups' unfair acceptance rates. Results: The results showed that children with HF-ASD were more likely to accept unfair offers, but when it came to adolescents, the difference was no longer significant. Regression analysis showed that the interaction between the Behavioral Regulation Index(BRI) and age could negatively predict the unfair acceptance rate of children and adolescents with HF-ASD. Working memory and ToM can negatively predict the unfair acceptance rate of those with TD. Conclusion: This study concluded that the development of fair decision-making by children and adolescents with HF-ASD fell far behind that of those with TD. Intuition processes play a dominant role in the fair decision-making processes of children and adolescents with HF-ASD, and we believe that comorbidity, age, experience and emotional management are important factors influencing the fair decision-making of individuals with HF-ASD.

Judgment as the Imagination of Futures: Practical Rationality in Decisions on Complex Issues

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Mazarr
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Naturalistic Decision Making ◽  
Actual Mechanism ◽  
Conflicting Objectives ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Classical Decision

The field of judgment and decision making has seen an explosion of research and analyses since the 1990s, notably in five closely related fields: Rational choice and its variants, the concept of intuition, “dual process” theories, the “heuristics and biases” literature, and the concept of “naturalistic” decision making. Yet none of these theories captures—by design or because of the limits of the approach—the actual mechanism by which emergent judgment occurs on complex decisions. Such decisions are non-optimizable and guided by multiple and often conflicting objectives and values; their outcomes will flow from the nonlinear interaction of many variables whose causal relationships are poorly understood. As a result, critical assumptions of many classical decision making models cannot be met in such situations, and the default approach relies not so much on calculative decision making as on instinctive judgment. This term implies a mechanism that is less calculative and consequentialist that it is imaginative, creative, and unconscious. Emergent, largely intuitive judgment is the only mechanism appropriate to such complex, nonlinear situations in which both an objective maximization of utilities and an accurate assessment of likely consequences are impossible. The concept of judgment broadly defined, as a form of unconscious, emergent, and imaginative interpretation of facts and events, offers the best model for how decision makers approach non-optimizable situations.

A Dynamic Dual Process Model of Intertemporal Choice

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adele Diederich ◽  
Wenjia Joyce Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Process Model ◽  
Intertemporal Choice ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Dual Process Model ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
System 1

Abstract Dual process theories of decision making describe choice as the result of an automatic System 1, which is quick to activate but behaves impulsively, and a deliberative System 2, which is slower to activate but makes decisions in a rational and controlled manner. However, most existent dual process theories are verbal descriptions and do not generate testable qualitative and quantitative predictions. In this paper, we describe a formalized dynamic dual process model framework of intertemporal choice that allows for precise, experimentally testable predictions regarding choice probability and response time distributions. The framework is based on two-stage stochastic process models to account for the two postulated systems and to capture the dynamics and uncertainty involved in decision making. Using quasi closed form solutions, we illustrate how different factors (timing of System 1, time constraint, and preferences in both systems), which are reflected in the model parameters, influence qualitative and quantitative model predictions. Furthermore, we show how an existing static-deterministic model on intertemporal choice can be implemented in the framework allowing for testable predictions. The proposed framework can bring novel insights into the processes underlying intertemporal choices.

The presumption of consciousness

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Unconscious Processing ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Conscious Process ◽  
Dual Process Theories

AbstractThroughout this article the authors presume – without justification – that decision making must be a conscious process unless proved otherwise, and they place an unreasonably strict burden of proof on anyone wishing to claim a role for unconscious processing. In addition, I show that their arguments do not, as implied here, impact upon contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making.

scholarly journals Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

2015 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Godden
Keyword(s):  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Common ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
The Relationship

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.

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