scholarly journals Trading Mental Effort for Confidence: The Metacognitive Control of Value-Based Decision-Making

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Lee ◽  
Jean Daunizeau
Keyword(s):  
Mental Effort ◽  
Subjective Feeling ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Preference Change ◽  
Metacognitive Control ◽  
Decision Systems ◽  
Effort Choice ◽  
Behavioral Paradigm ◽  
Prior Estimate ◽  
Decision Difficulty

ABSTRACTWhy do we sometimes opt for actions or items that we do not value the most? Under current neurocomputational theories, such preference reversals are typically interpreted in terms of errors that arise from the unreliable signaling of value to brain decision systems. But, an alternative explanation is that people may change their mind because they are reassessing the value of alternative options while pondering the decision. So, why do we carefully ponder some decisions, but not others? In this work, we derive a computational model of the metacognitive control of decisions or MCD. In brief, we assume that fast and automatic processes first provide an initial (and largely uncertain) representation of options’ values, yielding prior estimates of decision difficulty. This uncertain value representation is then refined by deploying cognitive (e.g., attentional, mnesic) resources, the allocation of which is controlled by an effort-confidence tradeoff. Importantly, the anticipated benefit of allocating resources varies in a decision-by-decision manner according to the prior estimate of decision difficulty. The ensuing MCD model predicts choices, response time, subjective feeling of effort, choice confidence, and choice-induced preference change. We test these predictions in a systematic manner, using a dedicated behavioral paradigm. Our results provide a quantitative link between mental effort, choice confidence, and preference reversals, which could inform interpretations of related neuroimaging findings.

scholarly journals Trading mental effort for confidence in the metacognitive control of value-based decision-making

eLife ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas G Lee ◽  
Jean Daunizeau
Keyword(s):  
Mental Effort ◽  
Subjective Feeling ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Preference Change ◽  
Metacognitive Control ◽  
Decision Systems ◽  
Effort Choice ◽  
Behavioral Paradigm ◽  
Prior Estimate ◽  
Decision Difficulty

Why do we sometimes opt for actions or items that we do not value the most? Under current neurocomputational theories, such preference reversals are typically interpreted in terms of errors that arise from the unreliable signaling of value to brain decision systems. But, an alternative explanation is that people may change their mind because they are reassessing the value of alternative options while pondering the decision. So, why do we carefully ponder some decisions, but not others? In this work, we derive a computational model of the metacognitive control of decisions or MCD. In brief, we assume that fast and automatic processes first provide initial (and largely uncertain) representations of options' values, yielding prior estimates of decision difficulty. These uncertain value representations are then refined by deploying cognitive (e.g., attentional, mnesic) resources, the allocation of which is controlled by an effort-confidence tradeoff. Importantly, the anticipated benefit of allocating resources varies in a decision-by-decision manner according to the prior estimate of decision difficulty. The ensuing MCD model predicts response time, subjective feeling of effort, choice confidence, changes of mind, and choice-induced preference change and certainty gain. We test these predictions in a systematic manner, using a dedicated behavioral paradigm. Our results provide a quantitative link between mental effort, choice confidence, and preference reversals, which could inform interpretations of related neuroimaging findings.

scholarly journals Do people avoid mental effort after facing a highly demanding task?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karolin Gieseler ◽  
Michael Inzlicht ◽  
Malte Friese
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Mental Effort ◽  
Ego Depletion ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Depletion Effect ◽  
Effort Choice

Ego depletion effects are usually examined in a sequential task paradigm in which exerting mental effort in a first task is thought to affect performance on a subsequent self-control task. A so-called ego depletion effect is observed if performance on the second task is impaired for the high demand relative to the low demand group. The present studies take a different approach. Instead of measuring performance in the second task that is equally difficult for all participants, the present studies investigated effects of effortful exertion on the choice to willingly exert effort on a subsequent task. Three pre-registered studies investigated if participants select less effort demanding math problems for upcoming tasks compared to a control group after exerting mental effort in an initial task. Results were mixed. Study 1 (N = 86) revealed no significant effect of mental effort exertion on mean choice difficulty. In Study 2 (N = 269), the expected effect emerged in an exploratory analysis when controlling for math self-assessment, which was robustly associated with the choice measure. Study 3 (N = 330) descriptively, albeit non-significantly replicated this result. An internal random-effects meta-analysis revealed a small overall effect of g = 0.18 when accounting for math self-assessment, albeit with large heterogeneity. Exploratory analyses point to the importance of the subjective experience of mental effort in effort-selection paradigms. We discuss the implications of the small overall effect size for future research and the possibility to examine effort choice in everyday life.

Interpersonal Stress and Poor Health

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mette M. Aanes ◽  
Maurice B. Mittelmark ◽  
Jørn Hetland
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Distress ◽  
Depressive Symptoms ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Indirect Effects ◽  
Social Connectedness ◽  
Somatic Symptoms ◽  
Total Effect ◽  
Subjective Feeling ◽  
Interpersonal Stress ◽  
The Relationship

This paper investigated whether the lack of social connectedness, as measured by the subjective feeling of loneliness, mediates the well-known relationship between interpersonal stress and psychological distress. Furthermore, a relationship between interpersonal stress and somatic symptoms was hypothesized. The study sample included 3,268 women and 3,220 men in Western Norway. The main findings were that interpersonal stress was significantly related to psychological distress as well as to somatic symptoms, both directly and indirectly via paths mediated by loneliness. The size of the indirect effects varied, suggesting that the importance of loneliness as a possible mediator differs for depressive symptoms, anxiety symptoms, and somatic symptoms. In the case of depressive symptoms, more than 75% of the total effect was mediated through loneliness, while in the case of somatic symptoms just over 40% of the total effect was mediated through loneliness. This study supports the hypotheses that social connectedness mediates a relationship between interpersonal stress and psychological distress. The study also provides the first link between interpersonal stress, as measured by the Bergen Social Relationships Scale, and somatic symptoms, extending earlier research on the relationship between interpersonal stress and psychological distress.

Mental effort and affective primes: Testing if effects arise due to induced affect

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruta Lasauskaite ◽  
Guido H. E. Gendolla ◽  
Nicolas Silvestrini
Keyword(s):  
Mental Effort
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