A confirmation bias in perceptual decision-making due to hierarchical approximate inference
AbstractHuman decisions are known to be systematically biased. A prominent example of such a bias occurs when integrating a sequence of sensory evidence over time. Previous empirical studies differ in the nature of the bias they observe, ranging from favoring early evidence (primacy), to favoring late evidence (recency). Here, we present a unifying framework that explains these biases and makes novel psychophysical and neurophysiological predictions. By explicitly modeling both the approximate and the hierarchical nature of inference in the brain, we show that temporal biases depend on the balance between “sensory information” and “category information” in the stimulus. Finally, we present new data from a human psychophysics task that confirms a critical prediction of our framework showing that effective temporal integration strategies can be robustly changed within each subject, and that allows us to exclude alternate explanations through quantitative model comparison.