scholarly journals The blind choreographer: evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Erol Akçay
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Environmental Events ◽  
Natural Classes

AbstractSocial norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviours, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms therefore has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here we present a new model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioural prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviours of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These pre-scriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/- superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Though a norm's prescriptions and descriptions are dependent upon one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Further, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability is dependent upon the correlation structure of the environment, and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated.

scholarly journals Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (18) ◽  
pp. 8834-8839 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Morsky ◽  
Erol Akçay
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Environmental Events ◽  
Natural Classes

Social norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here, we present a model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioral prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviors of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These prescriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Although a norm’s prescriptions and descriptions are dependent on one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Furthermore, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability are dependent on the correlation structure of the environment and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated.

Measuring Performance of a Three-Stage Network Structure Using Data Envelopment Analysis and Nash Bargaining Game: A Supply Chain Application

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (05) ◽  
pp. 1429-1467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Amirkhan ◽  
Hosein Didehkhani ◽  
Kaveh Khalili-Damghani ◽  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Data Envelopment Analysis ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Data Envelopment ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Dea Models ◽  
Overall Efficiency

The issue of efficiency analysis of network and multi-stage systems, as one of the most interesting fields in data envelopment analysis (DEA), has attracted much attention in recent years. A pure serial three-stage (PSTS) process is a specific kind of network in which all the outputs of the first stage are used as the only inputs in the second stage and in addition, all the outputs of the second stage are applied as the only inputs in the third stage. In this paper, a new three-stage DEA model is developed using the concept of three-player Nash bargaining game for PSTS processes. In this model, all of the stages cooperate together to improve the overall efficiency of main decision-making unit (DMU). In contrast to the centralized DEA models, the proposed model of this study provides a unique and fair decomposition of the overall efficiency among all three stages and eliminates probable confusion of centralized models for decomposing the overall efficiency score. Some theoretical aspects of proposed model, including convexity and compactness of feasible region, are discussed. Since the proposed bargaining model is a nonlinear mathematical programming, a heuristic linearization approach is also provided. A numerical example and a real-life case study in supply chain are provided to check the efficacy and applicability of the proposed model. The results of proposed model on both numerical example and real case study are compared with those of existing centralized DEA models in the literature. The comparison reveals the efficacy and suitability of proposed model while the pitfalls of centralized DEA model are also resolved. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is also conducted on the breakdown point associated with each stage.

scholarly journals Mapping the Production and Mobilization Functions of Collective Action

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 237802312097772
Author(s):  
Blaine G. Robbins ◽  
Ross L. Matsueda ◽  
Steven J. Pfaff
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Latent Class ◽  
Critical Mass ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Average Production ◽  
Intentions To Participate

Collective action is a fundamental feature of human social life. If public goods are to materialize, social norms are to emerge, and social protests are to succeed, individuals must act jointly to achieve their collective ends. But how can collective action evolve when individuals receive the benefits of a common good without contributing to its production? According to theories of the critical mass, the success of collective action hinges on the type of production function required for the provision of a common good. Production functions and mobilization functions, however, have proven difficult to observe empirically in large groups. Here, the authors report results from a factorial survey experiment administered to a disproportionate stratified random sample of undergraduate students ( n = 880) that required respondents to rate their perceptions of and intentions to participate in a hypothetical student protest. Results show that the population-average production and mobilization functions are decelerating, but individual heterogeneity is observed around the population averages. Moreover, the experiment demonstrates that latent class trajectories of production and mobilization functions, rather than population-level consensus or complete individual heterogeneity, exist in the population. The authors show that the majority of latent class trajectories are decelerating, while a minority are linear or relatively constant. The authors find that subjective interest in the common good and attitudes toward protest predict membership in latent class trajectories. Importantly, the authors provide evidence for the predictive validity of their estimates. The authors discuss the implications of these results for theories of the critical mass and for promoting collective action.

scholarly journals Perspectives from animal demography on incorporating evolutionary mechanism into plant population dynamics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Paniw
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Change ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Natural Populations ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Plant Population ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Phenotypic Traits ◽  
Plant Population Dynamics ◽  
Future Research Agenda ◽  
Powerful Approach

AbstractWith a growing number of long-term, individual-based data on natural populations available, it has become increasingly evident that environmental change affects populations through complex, simultaneously occurring demographic and evolutionary processes. Analyses of population-level responses to environmental change must therefore integrate demography and evolution into one coherent framework. Integral projection models (IPMs), which can relate genetic and phenotypic traits to demographic and population-level processes, offer a powerful approach for such integration. However, a rather artificial divide exists in how plant and animal population ecologists use IPMs. Here, I argue for the integration of the two sub-disciplines, particularly focusing on how plant ecologists can diversify their toolset to investigate selection pressures and eco-evolutionary dynamics in plant population models. I provide an overview of approaches that have applied IPMs for eco-evolutionary studies and discuss a potential future research agenda for plant population ecologists. Given an impending extinction crisis, a holistic look at the interacting processes mediating population persistence under environmental change is urgently needed.

scholarly journals A Unified Approach to Efficiency Decomposition for a Two-Stage Network DEA Model with Application of Performance Evaluation in Banks and Sustainable Product Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haitao Li ◽  
Jie Xiong ◽  
Jianhui Xie ◽  
Zhongbao Zhou ◽  
Jinlong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Sustainable Product Design ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Network Dea ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Efficiency Decomposition ◽  
Sustainable Product

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a data-driven tool for performance evaluation, benchmarking and multiple-criteria decision-making. This article investigates efficiency decomposition in a two-stage network DEA model. Three major methods for efficiency decomposition have been proposed: uniform efficiency decomposition, Nash bargaining game decomposition, and priority decomposition. These models were developed on the basis of different assumptions that led to different efficiency decompositions and thus confusion among researchers. The current paper attempts to reconcile these differences by redefining the fairness of efficiency decomposition based on efficiency rank, and develops a rank-based model with two parameters. In our new rank-based model, these three efficiency decomposition methods can be treated as special cases where these parameters take special values. By showing the continuity of the Pareto front, we simplify the uniform efficiency decomposition, and indicate that the uniform efficiency decomposition and Nash bargaining game decomposition can converge to the same efficiency decomposition. To demonstrate the merits of our model, we use data from the literature to evaluate the performance of 10 Chinese banks, and compare the different efficiency decompositions created by different methods. Last, we apply the proposed model to the performance evaluation of sustainable product design in the automobile industry.

scholarly journals Evolution of Equity Norms in Small-World Networks

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
José I. Santos ◽  
David J. Poza ◽  
José M. Galán ◽  
Adolfo López-Paredes
Keyword(s):  
Regular Ring ◽  
Finite Population ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Small World ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Random Networks ◽  
Small World Networks ◽  
Nash Bargaining Game ◽  
Regular Networks ◽  
Topology Of Interactions

The topology of interactions has been proved very influential in the results of models based on learning and evolutionary game theory. This paper is aimed at investigating the effect of structures ranging from regular ring lattices to random networks, including small-world networks, in a model focused on property distribution norms. The model considers a fixed and finite population of agents who play the Nash bargaining game repeatedly. Our results show that regular networks promote the emergence of the equity norm, while less-structured networks make possible the appearance of fractious regimes. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the speed of adoption can also be affected by the network structure.

scholarly journals Synthesizing within-host and population-level selective pressures on viral populations: the impact of adaptive immunity on viral immune escape

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (50) ◽  
pp. 1311-1318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Volkov ◽  
Kim M. Pepin ◽  
James O. Lloyd-Smith ◽  
Jayanth R. Banavar ◽  
Bryan T. Grenfell
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Immune Escape ◽  
Adaptive Immune Response ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Host Population ◽  
Host Immunity ◽  
Host Cells ◽  
Susceptible Host ◽  
The Impact

The evolution of viruses to escape prevailing host immunity involves selection at multiple integrative scales, from within-host viral and immune kinetics to the host population level. In order to understand how viral immune escape occurs, we develop an analytical framework that links the dynamical nature of immunity and viral variation across these scales. Our epidemiological model incorporates within-host viral evolutionary dynamics for a virus that causes acute infections (e.g. influenza and norovirus) with changes in host immunity in response to genetic changes in the virus population. We use a deterministic description of the within-host replication dynamics of the virus, the pool of susceptible host cells and the host adaptive immune response. We find that viral immune escape is most effective at intermediate values of immune strength. At very low levels of immunity, selection is too weak to drive immune escape in recovered hosts, while very high levels of immunity impose such strong selection that viral subpopulations go extinct before acquiring enough genetic diversity to escape host immunity. This result echoes the predictions of simpler models, but our formulation allows us to dissect the combination of within-host and transmission-level processes that drive immune escape.

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