scholarly journals The role of equilibrium cost in the evolution of honest signalling: waste or optimal investment?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Dustin J. Penn

AbstractThe relationship between signal cost and honesty is a controversial and unresolved issue. The handicap principle assumes that signals must be costly at equilibrium to be honest, and the greater the cost, the more reliable the signal. However, theoretical models and simulations question the necessity of equilibrium cost for the evolution of honest signalling. Honest signals can evolve without costs, and they can evolve through differential benefits with no need for differential costs. Here we investigate the role of equilibrium signal cost in the evolution of honest signals in both differential benefit and differential cost models using an agent-based simulation. We found that there is an optimal investment paid by honest individual that allows for the highest level of honesty when there is correlation between signal cost paid by low and high-quality individuals. This holds for both differential benefit and differential cost models as long there is a correlation between signal cost paid by low and high quality individuals. However, increasing equilibrium signal cost poses an obstacle and hinders the evolution of honest signalling when there is no correlation between the cost paid by low and high-quality individuals. Last but not least, we found that the potential cost of cheating is a much better predictor of honesty than the equilibrium cost paid by honest signallers.

Behaviour ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 148 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Smith

AbstractTerritorial animals sometimes use conspicuous natural landmarks as boundaries to their territories. The utilization of territory-demarcating landmarks may have evolved to limit the costs of territorial defence, since the adoption of clearly defined boundaries by opponents in adjacent territories can reduce the overall rate of aggressive encounters, which can be energetically expensive or might result in injury. Here the role of artificial landmarks as boundaries was tested in territorial male rose bitterling (Rhodeus ocellatus), a fish with a resourcebased mating system. Pairs of size-matched territorial males were permitted to interact for short periods in an otherwise featureless aquarium with an obvious landmark at the shared boundary of their territory either present or absent. The presence of the territory-demarcating landmark significantly reduced both the frequency of territorial incursions by males into adjacent territories and the rate of territorial displays. Males showed individual differences in their propensity to enter the territory of a rival, irrespective of the presence of a territorydemarcating landmark. These results suggest that the cost of defence of a territory may be reduced by utilizing territory-demarcating landmarks, in accordance with the predictions of theoretical models.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szabolcs Számadó

AbstractHow and why animals communicate honestly is a key issue in biology. The role of signal cost is strongly entrenched in the maintenance in honest signalling. The handicap principle claims that honest signals have to be costly at the equilibrium and this cost is a theoretical necessity. The handicap principle further claims that signalling is fundamentally different from any other adaptation because honest signalling would collapse in the absence of cost. Here I investigate this claim in simple action-response game where signals do not have any cost, instead they have benefits. I show that such beneficial signals can be honest and evolutionarily stable. These signals can be beneficial to both high and low-quality signallers independently of the receiver’s response, yet they can maintain honest signalling just as much as costly signals. Signal cost-at or out of equilibrium-is not a necessary condition of honesty. Benefit functions can maintain honest signalling as long as the marginal cost-loss of benefit-is high enough for potential cheaters.


Author(s):  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Rebecca Bliege Bird ◽  
Gilbert Roberts ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. p1
Author(s):  
Sergey Komissarov ◽  
Andreas Eklund ◽  
Mehmet Kocakulah

In the accounting realm, quality is an increasingly important element in planning, production, distribution and branding of goods and services because of global competition and other external factors in many industries. However, the cost of quality must also be considered as not to add unwanted or unwarranted costs to pass along to the end-customer. Marketing professionals are trained to strategically build and protect their own brand, which may consist of products or services. To achieve high-quality, it is imperative that the accounting and marketing departments work together. The four categories of Quality Costs (Prevention, Appraisal, Internal Failure and External Failure) encompass many different quality activities at different stages in producing goods or services. The research and experiences in the marketing industry based on branding will help to show that most quality initiatives are in fact preventative when the end goal is maintaining a solid consumer base and satisfied consumers. As this study shows, treating the brand as an experiential entity serves as a quality facet. This alludes that quality is a facet linking accounting and branding.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szabolcs Számadó ◽  
Flóra Samu ◽  
Károly Takács

AbstractHow and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences. For many years the dominant paradigm in biology was the Handicap Principle. It claims a causal relationship between honesty and signal cost and thus predicts that honest signals have to be costly to produce. However, contrary to the Handicap Principle, game theoretical models predict that honest signaling is maintained by condition dependent signaling trade-offs and honest signals need not be costly at the equilibrium. Due to the difficulties of manipulating signal cost and signal trade-offs there is surprisingly little evidence to test these predictions either from biology or from social sciences. Here we conduct a human laboratory experiment with a two-factorial design to test the role of equilibrium signal cost vs. signalling trade-offs in the maintenance of honest communication. We have found that the trade-off condition has much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the equilibrium cost condition. The highest level of honesty was observed in the condition dependent trade-off condition as predicted by recent models. Negative production cost, i.e. fix benefit-contrary to the prediction of the Handicap Principle-promoted even higher level of honesty than the other type of costs under this condition.


Author(s):  
V. D. Polin ◽  
◽  
A.A. Ananyev

In conditions of saturation of the structure of crop rotations with winter wheat by more than 50%, the question of selecting high-quality precursors for its cultivation is acute. A properly selected precursor allows you to get higher crop yields while reducing the cost by reducing the pesticide load on the field.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey H. Kahn ◽  
Daniel W. Cox ◽  
A. Myfanwy Bakker ◽  
Julia I. O’Loughlin ◽  
Agnieszka M. Kotlarczyk

Abstract. The benefits of talking with others about unpleasant emotions have been thoroughly investigated, but individual differences in distress disclosure tendencies have not been adequately integrated within theoretical models of emotion. The purpose of this laboratory research was to determine whether distress disclosure tendencies stem from differences in emotional reactivity or differences in emotion regulation. After completing measures of distress disclosure tendencies, social desirability, and positive and negative affect, 84 participants (74% women) were video recorded while viewing a sadness-inducing film clip. Participants completed post-film measures of affect and were then interviewed about their reactions to the film; these interviews were audio recorded for later coding and computerized text analysis. Distress disclosure tendencies were not predictive of the subjective experience of emotion, but they were positively related to facial expressions of sadness and happiness. Distress disclosure tendencies also predicted judges’ ratings of the verbal disclosure of emotion during the interview, but self-reported disclosure and use of positive and negative emotion words were not associated with distress disclosure tendencies. The authors present implications of this research for integrating individual differences in distress disclosure with models of emotion.


2007 ◽  
pp. 70-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Demidova

This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1057-1064
Author(s):  
Katsuhiko Hirasawa ◽  

Staff members at a movie company Daiei, known for presumably the world’s best film technology, continued to produce movies for several months even after the company went bankrupt. It was because they desired to make outstanding films. A director can create a high-quality film by combining the skills and ideas of such staff. Akira Kurosawa named the group that could produce excellent works the “Community of Talents”. By using research on a community as a clue, this paper aims to highlight how the “Community of Talents” is organized. First I point out that a “Community of Talents” is formulated primarily by the labor of the staff based on Kumazawa’s “Community on the Shop Floor”. The paper subsequently refers to research by Heinrich Nicklish, a representative researcher on the study of community in Germany, in an attempt to verify that the community is a group of people established on functions. Lastly, the paper explores Guido Fisher’s research to reveal the role of democratic leadership centered on the director who transforms the objectified staff in the organization into an independently-minded presence and help them prove their abilities. The paper continues to emphasize the significance of leadership in the formation of the “Community of Talents”.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Michael Kavanagh ◽  
Susilo Wibisono ◽  
Rohan Kapitány ◽  
Whinda Yustisia ◽  
Idhamsyah Eka Putra ◽  
...  

Indonesia is the most populous Islamic country and as such is host to a diverse range of Islamic beliefs and practices. Here we examine how the diversity of beliefs and practices among Indonesian Muslims relates to group bonding and parochialism. In particular, we examine the predictive power of two distinct types of group alignment, group identification and identity fusion, among individuals from three Sunni politico-religious groups - a fundamentalist group (PKS), a moderate group (NU), and a control sample of politically unaffiliated citizens. Fundamentalists were more fused to targets than moderates or citizens, but contrary to fusion theory, we found across all groups, that group identification (not fusion) better predicted parochialism, including willingness to carry out extreme pro-group actions. We discuss how religious beliefs and practice impact parochial attitudes, as well as the implications for theoretical models linking fusion to extreme behaviour.


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