The opportunity cost of time modulates cognitive effort

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Nathaniel D. Daw
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Average Reward ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Diverse Range ◽  
Reward Rate ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
Opportunity Cost Of Time

AbstractA spate of recent work demonstrates that humans seek to avoid the expenditure of cognitive effort, much like physical effort or economic resources. Less is clear, however, about the circumstances dictating how and when people decide to expend cognitive effort. Here we adopt a popular theory of opportunity costs and response vigor and to elucidate this question. This account, grounded in Reinforcement Learning, formalizes a trade-off between two costs: the harder work assumed necessary to emit faster actions and the opportunity cost inherent in acting more slowly (i.e., the delay that results to the next reward and subsequent rewards). Recent work reveals that the opportunity cost of time—operationalized as the average reward rate per unit time, theorized to be signaled by tonic dopamine levels, modulates the speed with which a person responds in a simple discrimination tasks. We extend this framework to cognitive effort in a diverse range of cognitive tasks, for which 1) the amount of cognitive effort demanded from the task varies from trial to trial and 2) the putative expenditure of cognitive effort holds measureable consequences in terms of accuracy and response time. In the domains of cognitive control, perceptual decision-making, and task-switching, we found that subjects tuned their level of effort exertion in accordance with the experienced average reward rate: when the opportunity cost of time was high, subjects made more errors and responded more quickly, which we interpret as a withdrawal of cognitive effort. That is, expenditure of cognitive effort appeared to be modulated by the opportunity cost of time. Further, and consistent with our account, the strength of this modulation was predicted by individual differences in efficacy of cognitive control. Taken together, our results elucidate the circumstances dictating how and when people expend cognitive effort.

Seizing the Opportunity: Lifespan Differences in the Effects of the Opportunity Cost of Time on Cognitive Control

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Devine ◽  
Cassandra Neumann ◽  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea M.F. Reiter ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Developmental Model ◽  
Average Reward ◽  
Younger Adults ◽  
Reward Rate ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
Opportunity Cost Of Time

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control reflect maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning. However, complementary explanations exist: It could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. Here we test whether the degree of cognitive effort expenditure depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time): if the average reward rate is high, participants should withhold cognitive effort whereas if it is low, they should invest more. In Experiment 1, we examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, by applying a reward rate manipulation in two cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found that young adults and adolescents reflexively withheld effort when the opportunity cost of time was high, whereas older adults and, to a lesser degree children, invested more resources to accumulate reward as quickly as possible. We tentatively interpret these results in terms of age- and task-specific differences in the processing of the opportunity cost of time. We qualify our findings in a second experiment in younger adults in which we address an alternative explanation of our results and show that the observed age differences in effort expenditure may not result from differences in task difficulty. To conclude, we think that our results present an interesting first step at relating opportunity costs to motivational processes across the lifespan. We frame the implications of further work in this area within a recent developmental model of resource-rationality, which points to developmental sweet spots in cognitive control.

Cognitive resource limitations shift effort trade-offs across the lifespan

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean T Devine ◽  
A Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea M.F. Reiter ◽  
Ben Eppinger
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Task Switching ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Task Complexity ◽  
Flanker Task ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Average Reward ◽  
Reward Rate ◽  
Trade Offs

Previous work suggests that lifespan developmental differences in cognitive control abilitiesmight be due to maturational and aging-related changes in prefrontal cortex functioning.However, there are other explanations: For example, it could be that children and older adults differ from younger adults in how they balance the effort of engaging in control against its potential benefits. In this work, we assume that the degree of engagement in cognitive effort depends on the opportunity cost of time (average reward rate per unit time). If the average reward rate is high, participants should speed up responding whereas if it is low, they should respond more slowly. Developmental changes in opportunity cost assessments may lead to differences in the sensitivity to changes in reward rate. To examine this hypothesis in children, adolescents, younger, and older adults, we applied a reward rate manipulation in two well-established cognitive control tasks: a modified Erikson Flanker and a task-switching paradigm. We found a significant interaction between age group and average reward rate, such that older adults were more sensitive to the average reward rate than the other age groups. However, as task complexity increased (from the Flanker task to the task-switching paradigm), children also became sensitive to changes in reward rate. This may suggest that when demands on cognitive load reach capacity limitations, participants engage in strategic behaviour to optimize performance: a view we present as the “sweet sport” argument of effort allocation.

Seizing the opportunity: Lifespan differences in the effects of the opportunity cost of time on cognitive control

Cognition ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. 104863
Author(s):  
Sean Devine ◽  
Cassandra Neumann ◽  
A. Ross Otto ◽  
Florian Bolenz ◽  
Andrea Reiter ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Control ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
Opportunity Cost Of Time

scholarly journals Opportunity cost determines action initiation latency and predicts apathy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akshay Nair ◽  
Ritwik K. Niyogi ◽  
Fei Shang ◽  
Sarah J. Tabrizi ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Computational Modelling ◽  
Important Variable ◽  
Average Reward ◽  
Younger Adults ◽  
Free Operant ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Action Initiation

Background: Apathy, a disabling and poorly understood neuropsychiatric symptom, is characterised by impaired self-initiated behaviour. Although the computational mechanisms that determine self-initiation are poorly understood, it has been hypothesised that the opportunity cost of time (OCT) may be a key variable linking self-initiated behaviour with motivational status. Using a novel behavioural task and computational modelling, we investigated the relationship between OCT, self-initiation and apathy. OCT represents the amount of reward which is foregone per second if no action is taken. We predicted that higher OCT would engender shorter action latencies, and that individuals with greater sensitivity to OCT would have higher behavioural apathy.Methods: We modulated the OCT in a novel task called the ‘Fisherman Game’, Participants freely chose when to self-initiate actions to either collect rewards, or on occasion, to complete non-rewarding actions. We measured the relationship between action latencies, OCT and apathy for each participant across two independent non-clinical studies, one under laboratory conditions (n=21) and one online (n=90). ‘Average-reward’ reinforcement learning was used to model our data. We replicated our findings across both studies.Results: We show that the latency of self-initiation is driven by changes in the OCT. Furthermore, we demonstrate, for the first time, higher apathy was showed greater sensitivity to changes in OCT in younger adults. Our model shows that apathetic individuals experienced greatest change in subjective OCT during our task as a consequence of being more sensitive to rewards.Conclusions: Our results suggest that OCT is an important variable for determining free-operant action initiation and understanding apathy.

An Economic Analysis of Participation and Time Spent in Physical Activity

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad R Humphreys ◽  
Jane E Ruseski
Keyword(s):  
Physical Activity ◽  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Marital Status ◽  
Economic Model ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Extensive And Intensive Margins ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
Opportunity Cost Of Time

Abstract This paper develops and estimates an economic model of physical activity that distinguishes between the participation and duration decisions (extensive and intensive margins). Results from IV estimators indicate that economic factors like income and opportunity cost of time are important determinants of physical activity and affect the participation and time spent decisions differently. Individuals with higher income are more likely to participate but, conditional on participation, spend less time engaged in physical activity. Individual characteristics like gender, race, marital status and having children also play an important role in the participation and duration decisions.

scholarly journals Why Don't Present-Biased Agents Make Commitments?

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 267-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Laibson
Keyword(s):  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Direct Cost ◽  
Opportunity Cost ◽  
Perceived Benefits ◽  
Cost Of Time ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Opportunity Cost Of Time

Present-biased preferences engender a demand for commitment. Commitment is a problematic prediction, since we see so little of it. I quantitatively explore the reasons for the “missing” commitment. Extending the procrastination model in Carroll et al. (2009), I show how equilibrium commitment is related to (i) the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time, (ii) the cost of delay, (iii) the degree of partial naivete, and (iv) the direct cost of commitment. The calibrated model demonstrates that the perceived benefits of commitment are often overwhelmed by the costs of commitment. Demand for commitment is a special case rather than the general case.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document