scholarly journals Commentary on Sanborn and Chater: Posterior Modes are Attractor Basins

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip Alday ◽  
Matthias Schlesewsky ◽  
Ina Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Brain Function ◽  
Sampling Procedure ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Bayesian Sampling ◽  
Cortical Responses ◽  
The One ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Relationship

Sanborn and Chater propose an interesting theory of cognitive and brain function based on Bayesian sampling instead of asymptotic Bayesian inference. Their proposal unifies many current observations and models and, in spite of focusing primarily on cognitive phenomena, their work provides a springboard for unifying several proposed theories of brain function. It has the potential to serve as a bridge between three influential overarching current theories of cognitive and brain function: Bayesian models, Friston's theory of cortical responses based on the free-energy principle, and attractor-basin dynamics. Specifically, their proposal suggests a high-level perspective on Friston's theory, which in turn proposes a sampling procedure including appropriate handling of autocorrelation as well as a plausible neurobiological implementation. In turn, these two theories together link into attractor-basin dynamics at the level of networks (via Friston) as well at the level of behavior (via the relationship between the modes of prior and posterior distributions, as discussed by Sanborn and Chater). We will argue here that, by linking Sanborn and Chater's approach to neurobiological models based on the free-energy principle on the one hand and attractor-basin dynamics on the other, the scope of their proposal can be broadened considerably. Moreover, a unified perspective along these lines provides an elegant solution to several of Sanborn and Chater's Outstanding Questions relating to the neural implementation of sampling.

scholarly journals From Learning to Consciousness: An Example Using Expected Float Entropy Minimisation

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Jonathan Mason
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Learning Processes ◽  
Brain State ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Association Learning ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Integrated Information Theory

Over recent decades several mathematical theories of consciousness have been put forward including Karl Friston’s Free Energy Principle and Giulio Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory. In this article we further investigate theory based on Expected Float Entropy (EFE) minimisation which has been around since 2012. EFE involves a version of Shannon Entropy parameterised by relationships. It turns out that, for systems with bias due to learning, certain choices for the relationship parameters are isolated since giving much lower EFE values than others and, hence, the system defines relationships. It is proposed that, in the context of all these relationships, a brain state acquires meaning in the form of the relational content of the associated experience. EFE minimisation is itself an association learning process and its effectiveness as such is tested in this article. The theory and results are consistent with the proposition of there being a close connection between association learning processes and the emergence of consciousness. Such a theory may explain how the brain defines the content of consciousness up to relationship isomorphism.

Encultured minds, not error reduction minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mirski ◽  
Mark H. Bickhard ◽  
David Eck ◽  
Arkadiusz Gut
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Error Reduction ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Current Article

Abstract There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.

scholarly journals Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Sims ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Functional Aspects ◽  
Structural Content ◽  
Unified View

AbstractPredictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

scholarly journals Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Matt Sims
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Energy Minimisation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Evolution Of Life ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

AbstractA mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive causes of behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required to settle the question of when in the evolution of life cognition first emerged. An answer to this question should however avoid two pitfalls. It should avoid overintellectualising the minds of other organisms, ascribing to them cognitive capacities for which they have no need given the lives they lead within the niches they inhabit. But equally it should do justice to the remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed in the behaviour of microorganisms that do not have a nervous system. We should resist seeking non-cognitive explanations of behaviour simply because an organism fails to exhibit human-like feats of thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. We will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) can serve as the basis for a mark of the cognitive that avoids the twin pitfalls of overintellectualising or underestimating the cognitive achievements of evolutionarily primitive organisms. The FEP purports to describe principles of organisation that any organism must instantiate if it is to remain well-adapted to its environment. Living systems from plants and microorganisms all the way up to humans act in ways that tend in the long run to minimise free energy. If the FEP provides a mark of the cognitive, as we will argue it does, it mandates that cognition should indeed be ascribed to plants, microorganisms and other organisms that lack a nervous system.

Learned Uncertainty: A Free Energy Principle Perspective on Anxiety

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh McGovern ◽  
Alexander De Foe ◽  
Pantelis Leptourgos ◽  
Philip R. Corlett ◽  
Kavindu Bandara ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Anxiety Disorder ◽  
Biological System ◽  
Predictive Modelling ◽  
Generative Models ◽  
Generalized Anxiety ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle

Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders. Affecting an eighth of the world’s population, it often manifests as persistent apprehension which is difficult to control. Despite its prevalence, neuroscientific efforts to understand the cognitive mechanisms of GAD remain sparse. This has resulted in a fractured theoretical landscape, lacking a unitary framework. While prior theories of anxiety describe the cognitive, affective and behavioral dimensions of anxiety, a unified theory is lacking. Here, we point out that postulates derived from the Free Energy Principle (FEP) may allow for a unified theory to emerge. We argue an approach focused on predictive modelling may afford opportunities to re-conceptualize anxiety within the framework of working generative models, rather than static beliefs. We suggest that a biological system—having had persistent uncertainty in its past—will form posteriors in line with uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether that uncertainty is real. After discussing the FEP, we explain how anxiety develops through learning uncertainty before suggesting predictions for how the model can be tested.

Generalization of Fuels Swelling Data by Means of Linear Free Energy Principle

2014 ◽  
pp. 125-149
Author(s):  
Roman Makitra ◽  
Halyna Midyana ◽  
Liliya Bazylyak ◽  
Olena Palchykova
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Linear Free Energy

scholarly journals Iris Hanika's Treffen Sich Zwei: Reception, Analysis and Interpretation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kerry Alistair Nitz
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Quantitative Evidence ◽  
Literary Context ◽  
Narrative Functions ◽  
The One ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Relationship

<p>Iris Hanika’s commercially and critically successful novel Treffen sich zwei makes use of several techniques in the characterisation of its protagonists. Many of its reviews focus on the author’s deliberate placement of links to a wider literary context. Their interest extends from questions of genre-mixing through to the identification of direct quotes from other authors’ works. The critical preoccupation with intertexts demonstrates their importance for the readers’ response to the novel. More specifically, certain reviews highlight the important role intertexts play in the characterisation of the protagonists. This study catalogues the intertexts, metaphors and parodies in Treffen sich zwei and, by means of quantitative analysis, identifies high-level patterns in the use of these techniques. In particular, patterns are identified between, on the one hand, the different narrative functions of the intertexts and, on the other hand, the different ways in which they are interwoven in the text. The data also shows that distinct patterns are associated with each of the two protagonists and that certain patterns change in the course of the novel in parallel with the changes in the relationship between them. This quantitative evidence is supported by a more detailed, qualitative approach, which examines how specific intertexts or metaphors are used for the purposes of characterisation. In addition, variations in voice are used to distinguish the two main protagonists in a manner consistent with the intertexts and metaphors. It is thanks to the combination of these techniques that the theme of meeting encapsulated in the title, Treffen sich zwei, is woven into the textual fabric of the novel.</p>

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