scholarly journals Metacognitive impairments extend perceptual decision making weaknesses in compulsivity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias U. Hauser ◽  
Micah Allen ◽  
Geraint Rees ◽  
Raymond J. Dolan ◽  

AbstractAwareness of one’s own abilities is of paramount importance in adaptive decision making. Psychotherapeutic theories assume such metacognitive insight is impaired in compulsivity, though this is supported by scant empirical evidence. In this study, we investigate metacognitive abilities in compulsive participants using computational models, where these enable a segregation between metacognitive and perceptual decision making impairments. We examined twenty low-compulsive and twenty high-compulsive participants, recruited from a large population-based sample, and matched for other psychiatric and cognitive dimensions. Hierarchical computational modelling of the participants’ metacognitive abilities on a visual global motion detection paradigm revealed that high-compulsive participants had a reduced metacognitive ability. This impairment was accompanied by a perceptual decision making deficit whereby motion-related evidence was accumulated more slowly in high compulsive participants. Our study shows that the compulsivity spectrum is associated with a reduced ability to monitor one’s own performance, over and above any perceptual decision making difficulty.

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (9) ◽  
pp. 1494-1509
Author(s):  
Yuan Chang Leong ◽  
Roma Dziembaj ◽  
Mark D’Esposito

People’s perceptual reports are biased toward percepts they are motivated to see. The arousal system coordinates the body’s response to motivationally significant events and is well positioned to regulate motivational effects on perceptual judgments. However, it remains unclear whether arousal would enhance or reduce motivational biases. Here, we measured pupil dilation as a measure of arousal while participants ( N = 38) performed a visual categorization task. We used monetary bonuses to motivate participants to perceive one category over another. Even though the reward-maximizing strategy was to perform the task accurately, participants were more likely to report seeing the desirable category. Furthermore, higher arousal levels were associated with making motivationally biased responses. Analyses using computational models suggested that arousal enhanced motivational effects by biasing evidence accumulation in favor of desirable percepts. These results suggest that heightened arousal biases people toward what they want to see and away from an objective representation of the environment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (10) ◽  
pp. 5471-5483
Author(s):  
Y Yau ◽  
M Dadar ◽  
M Taylor ◽  
Y Zeighami ◽  
L K Fellows ◽  
...  

Abstract Current models of decision-making assume that the brain gradually accumulates evidence and drifts toward a threshold that, once crossed, results in a choice selection. These models have been especially successful in primate research; however, transposing them to human fMRI paradigms has proved it to be challenging. Here, we exploit the face-selective visual system and test whether decoded emotional facial features from multivariate fMRI signals during a dynamic perceptual decision-making task are related to the parameters of computational models of decision-making. We show that trial-by-trial variations in the pattern of neural activity in the fusiform gyrus reflect facial emotional information and modulate drift rates during deliberation. We also observed an inverse-urgency signal based in the caudate nucleus that was independent of sensory information but appeared to slow decisions, particularly when information in the task was ambiguous. Taken together, our results characterize how decision parameters from a computational model (i.e., drift rate and urgency signal) are involved in perceptual decision-making and reflected in the activity of the human brain.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Y. Yau ◽  
M. Dadar ◽  
M. Taylor ◽  
Y. Zeighami ◽  
L.K. Fellows ◽  
...  

AbstractCurrent models of decision-making assume that the brain gradually accumulates evidence and drifts towards a threshold which, once crossed, results in a choice selection. These models have been especially successful in primate research, however transposing them to human fMRI paradigms has proved challenging. Here, we exploit the face-selective visual system and test whether decoded emotional facial features from multivariate fMRI signals during a dynamic perceptual decision-making task are related to the parameters of computational models of decision-making. We show that trial-by-trial variations in the pattern of neural activity in the fusiform gyrus reflect facial emotional information and modulate drift rates during deliberation. We also observed an inverse-urgency signal based in the caudate nucleus that was independent of sensory information but appeared to slow decisions, particularly when information in the task was ambiguous. Taken together, our results characterize how decision parameters from a computational model (i.e., drift rate and urgency signal) are involved in perceptual decision-making and reflected in the activity of the human brain.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jung H. Lee ◽  
Joji Tsunada ◽  
Sujith Vijayan ◽  
Yale E. Cohen

AbstractThe intrinsic uncertainty of sensory information (i.e., evidence) does not necessarily deter an observer from making a reliable decision. Indeed, uncertainty can be reduced by integrating (accumulating) incoming sensory evidence. It is widely thought that this accumulation is instantiated via recurrent rate-code neural networks. Yet, these networks do not fully explain important aspects of perceptual decision-making, such as a subject’s ability to retain accumulated evidence during temporal gaps in the sensory evidence. Here, we utilized computational models to show that cortical circuits can switch flexibly between ‘retention’ and ‘integration’ modes during perceptual decision-making. Further, we found that, depending on how the sensory evidence was readout, we could simulate ‘stepping’ and ‘ramping’ activity patterns, which may be analogous to those seen in different studies of decision-making in the primate parietal cortex. This finding may reconcile these previous empirical studies because it suggests these two activity patterns emerge from the same mechanism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Medha Shekhar ◽  
Dobromir Rahnev

Humans have the metacognitive ability to judge the accuracy of their own decisions via confidence ratings. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that human metacognition is fallible but it remains unclear how metacognitive inefficiency should be incorporated into a mechanistic model of confidence generation. Here we show that, contrary to what is typically assumed, metacognitive inefficiency depends on the level of confidence. We found that, across five different datasets and four different measures of metacognition, metacognitive ability decreased with higher confidence ratings. To understand the nature of this effect, we collected a large dataset of 20 subjects completing 2,800 trials each and providing confidence ratings on a continuous scale. The results demonstrated a robustly nonlinear zROC curve with downward curvature, despite a decades-old assumption of linearity. This pattern of results was reproduced by a new mechanistic model of confidence generation, which assumes the existence of lognormally-distributed metacognitive noise. The model outperformed competing models either lacking metacognitive noise altogether or featuring Gaussian metacognitive noise. Further, the model could generate a measure of metacognitive ability which was independent of confidence levels. These findings establish an empirically-validated model of confidence generation, have significant implications about measures of metacognitive ability, and begin to reveal the underlying nature of metacognitive inefficiency.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Genís Prat-Ortega ◽  
Klaus Wimmer ◽  
Alex Roxin ◽  
Jaime de la Rocha

AbstractPerceptual decisions rely on accumulating sensory evidence. This computation has been studied using either drift diffusion models or neurobiological network models exhibiting winner-take-all attractor dynamics. Although both models can account for a large amount of data, it remains unclear whether their dynamics are qualitatively equivalent. Here we show that in the attractor model, but not in the drift diffusion model, an increase in the stimulus fluctuations or the stimulus duration promotes transitions between decision states. The increase in the number of transitions leads to a crossover between weighting mostly early evidence (primacy) to weighting late evidence (recency), a prediction we validate with psychophysical data. Between these two limiting cases, we found a novel flexible categorization regime, in which fluctuations can reverse initially-incorrect categorizations. This reversal asymmetry results in a non-monotonic psychometric curve, a distinctive feature of the attractor model. Our findings point to correcting decision reversals as an important feature of perceptual decision making.


Mindfulness ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungjin Im ◽  
Maya A. Marder ◽  
Gabriella Imbriano ◽  
Tamara J. Sussman ◽  
Aprajita Mohanty

Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 2461
Author(s):  
Alexander Kuc ◽  
Vadim V. Grubov ◽  
Vladimir A. Maksimenko ◽  
Natalia Shusharina ◽  
Alexander N. Pisarchik ◽  
...  

Perceptual decision-making requires transforming sensory information into decisions. An ambiguity of sensory input affects perceptual decisions inducing specific time-frequency patterns on EEG (electroencephalogram) signals. This paper uses a wavelet-based method to analyze how ambiguity affects EEG features during a perceptual decision-making task. We observe that parietal and temporal beta-band wavelet power monotonically increases throughout the perceptual process. Ambiguity induces high frontal beta-band power at 0.3–0.6 s post-stimulus onset. It may reflect the increasing reliance on the top-down mechanisms to facilitate accumulating decision-relevant sensory features. Finally, this study analyzes the perceptual process using mixed within-trial and within-subject design. First, we found significant percept-related changes in each subject and then test their significance at the group level. Thus, observed beta-band biomarkers are pronounced in single EEG trials and may serve as control commands for brain-computer interface (BCI).


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