scholarly journals Evolution of passwords for cost-free honest signalling between symbionts and hosts

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Archetti ◽  
J. Benjamin Miller ◽  
Douglas W. Yu
Keyword(s):  
Mate Choice ◽  
Species Recognition ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Potential Conflict ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Complex Species ◽  
Juvenile Mortality ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Soft Selection

AbstractHonest communication between potential partners with conflicting interests is generally thought to require costly signals. Costly signalling can explain partner choice when it is possible to link a strategic cost to an individual’s quality, like in mate choice. However, in mutualisms, it is usually impossible to link a cost to the likelihood that a potential partner will behave cooperatively in the future. In fact, signals like Nod factors in rhizobial bacteria, which form symbioses with leguminous plants, are evidence of cost-free, honest signals in situations of potential conflict. How can such a signalling system evolve? We use a population-genetics model to show that a cost-free, honest signal can evolve when the receiver is under soft selection, which is when high juvenile mortality does not lead to a corresponding reduction in fitness, a common occurrence in many species. Under soft selection, senders evolve increasingly complex messages of identity, a system akin to a password or a lock and key. Thus, a symbiont can signal that it shares a coevolutionary history with a potential host, and if that history is mutualistic, then the host can believe that the symbiont is mutualistic. Password signalling might also explain the acquisition of some defensive symbionts and the evolution of complex species-recognition signals in mate choice. “…Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him….” — Judges 12:6, King James Version

scholarly journals What maintains signal honesty in animal colour displays used in mate choice?

2017 ◽  
Vol 372 (1724) ◽  
pp. 20160343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan J. Weaver ◽  
Rebecca E. Koch ◽  
Geoffrey E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Mate Choice ◽  
Female Mate Choice ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Explicit Consideration ◽  
Signal Honesty ◽  
Physiological Pathways ◽  
Index Hypothesis ◽  
Male Ornaments ◽  
Colour Signals

Many of the colour displays of animals are proposed to have evolved in response to female mate choice for honest signals of quality, but such honest signalling requires mechanisms to prevent cheating. The most widely accepted and cited mechanisms for ensuring signal honesty are based on the costly signalling hypothesis, which posits that costs associated with ornamentation prevent low-quality males from being highly ornamented. Alternatively, by the index hypothesis, honesty can be achieved via cost-free mechanisms if ornament production is causally linked to core physiological pathways. In this essay, we review how a costly signalling framework has shaped empirical research in mate choice for colourful male ornaments and emphasize that alternative interpretations are plausible under an index signalling framework. We discuss the challenges in both empirically testing and distinguishing between the two hypotheses, noting that they need not be mutually exclusive. Finally, we advocate for a comprehensive approach to studies of colour signals that includes the explicit consideration of cost-free mechanisms for honesty. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Animal coloration: production, perception, function and application’.

Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay ◽  
Rebecca Bliege Bird ◽  
Gilbert Roberts ◽  
Szabolcs Számadó
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Know How ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
Helping Behaviour ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Signalling Systems

Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

A Cognitive Framework for Mate Choice and Species Recognition

2006 ◽  
Vol 167 (1) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Phelps ◽  
Rand ◽  
Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Mate Choice ◽  
Species Recognition ◽  
Cognitive Framework

Duchenne Smiles as Honest Signals of Chronic Positive Mood

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162095983
Author(s):  
Kennon M. Sheldon ◽  
Mike Corcoran ◽  
Melanie Sheldon
Keyword(s):  
Positive Emotion ◽  
Positive Mood ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Happy People ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Neutral Mood ◽  
Duchenne Smiles ◽  
Positivity Offset ◽  
Behavioral Influences ◽  
Better Than

Chronic positive mood (CPM) has been shown to confer a wide variety of social, functional, and health benefits. Some researchers have argued that humans evolved to feel CPM, which explains why most people report better than neutral mood (the “positivity offset bias”) and why particularly happy people have particularly good outcomes. Here, we argue that the Duchenne smile evolved as an honest signal of high levels of CPM, alerting others to the psychological fitness of the smiler. Duchenne smiles are honest because they express felt positive emotion, making it difficult for unhappy people to produce them. Duchenne smiles enable happy people to signal and cooperate with one another, boosting their advantages. In our literature review, we found (a) that not all Duchenne smiles are “honest,” although producing them in the absence of positive emotion is difficult and often detectable, and (b) that the ability to produce and recognize Duchenne smiles may vary somewhat by a person’s cultural origin. In the final section of the article, we consider behavioral influences on CPM, reviewing research showing that engaging in eudaimonic activity reliably produces CPM, as posited by the eudaimonic-activity model. This research suggests that frequent Duchenne smiling may ultimately signal eudaimonic personality as well as CPM.

scholarly journals Heightened condition dependent expression of structural colouration in the faces, but not wings, of male and female flies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E White ◽  
Amy Locke ◽  
Tanya Latty
Keyword(s):  
Mate Choice ◽  
Condition Dependence ◽  
Sexually Dimorphic ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Mutual Mate Choice ◽  
Close Range ◽  
Males And Females ◽  
Structural Colouration

Abstract Structurally coloured sexual signals are a conspicuous and widespread class of ornament used in mate choice, though the extent to which they encode information on the quality of their bearers is not fully resolved. Theory predicts that signalling traits under strong sexual selection as honest indicators should evolve to be more developmentally integrated and exaggerated than nonsexual traits, thereby leading to heightened condition dependence. Here we test this prediction through examination of the sexually dimorphic faces and wings of the cursorial fly Lispe cana. Males and females possess structural UV-white and golden faces, respectively, and males present their faces and wings to females during close-range, ground-based courtship displays, thereby creating the opportunity for mutual inspection. Across a field-collected sample of individuals, we found that the appearance of the faces of both sexes scaled positively with individual condition, though along separate axes. Males in better condition expressed brighter faces as modelled according to conspecific flies, whereas condition scaled with facial saturation in females. We found no such relationships for their wing interference pattern nor abdomens, with the latter included as a nonsexual control. Our results suggest that the structurally coloured faces, but not the iridescent wings, of male and female Lispe cana are reliable guides to individual quality and support the broader potential for structural colours as honest signals. They also highlight the potential for mutual mate choice in this system, while arguing for one of several alternate signalling roles for wing interferences patterns among the myriad taxa which bear them.

scholarly journals From words to connections: Word use similarity as an honest signal conducive to employees’ digital communication

2020 ◽  
pp. 016555152092993 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Fronzetti Colladon ◽  
Johanne Saint-Charles ◽  
Pierre Mongeau
Keyword(s):  
Online Community ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Semantic Networks ◽  
Past Research ◽  
Internal Communication ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Word Use ◽  
Honest Signals ◽  
Main Driver ◽  
Language Characteristics

Bringing together considerations from three research trends (honest signals of collaboration, socio-semantic networks and homophily theory), we hypothesise that word use similarity and having similar social network positions are linked with the level of employees’ digital interaction. To verify our hypothesis, we analyse the communication of close to 1600 employees, interacting on the intranet communication forum of a large company. We study their social dynamics and the ‘honest signals’ that, in past research, proved to be conducive to employees’ engagement and collaboration. We find that word use similarity is the main driver of interaction, much more than other language characteristics or similarity in network position. Our results suggest carefully choosing the language according to the target audience and have practical implications for both company managers and online community administrators. Understanding how to better use language could, for example, support the development of knowledge sharing practices or internal communication campaigns.

scholarly journals Gossip and competitive altruism support cooperation in a Public Good game

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Partner Choice ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Competitive Altruism

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Parochial cooperation and the emergence of signalling norms

2021 ◽  
Vol 376 (1838) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wojtek Przepiorka ◽  
Andreas Diekmann
Keyword(s):  
Partner Choice ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Honest Signalling ◽  
Scarce Resources ◽  
Potential Applications ◽  
Life Threatening ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is a friend and who is a foe. The need to overcome this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

scholarly journals Endless forms of sexual selection

PeerJ ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. e7988 ◽  
Author(s):  
Willow R. Lindsay ◽  
Staffan Andersson ◽  
Badreddine Bererhi ◽  
Jacob Höglund ◽  
Arild Johnsen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Selection ◽  
Mate Choice ◽  
Genetic Architecture ◽  
Mating Systems ◽  
Molecular Techniques ◽  
Population Divergence ◽  
Signal Design ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Secondary Sexual Traits ◽  
Sexually Selected Traits

In recent years, the field of sexual selection has exploded, with advances in theoretical and empirical research complementing each other in exciting ways. This perspective piece is the product of a “stock-taking” workshop on sexual selection and sexual conflict. Our aim is to identify and deliberate on outstanding questions and to stimulate discussion rather than provide a comprehensive overview of the entire field. These questions are organized into four thematic sections we deem essential to the field. First we focus on the evolution of mate choice and mating systems. Variation in mate quality can generate both competition and choice in the opposite sex, with implications for the evolution of mating systems. Limitations on mate choice may dictate the importance of direct vs. indirect benefits in mating decisions and consequently, mating systems, especially with regard to polyandry. Second, we focus on how sender and receiver mechanisms shape signal design. Mediation of honest signal content likely depends on integration of temporally variable social and physiological costs that are challenging to measure. We view the neuroethology of sensory and cognitive receiver biases as the main key to signal form and the ‘aesthetic sense’ proposed by Darwin. Since a receiver bias is sufficient to both initiate and drive ornament or armament exaggeration, without a genetically correlated or even coevolving receiver, this may be the appropriate ‘null model’ of sexual selection. Thirdly, we focus on the genetic architecture of sexually selected traits. Despite advances in modern molecular techniques, the number and identity of genes underlying performance, display and secondary sexual traits remains largely unknown. In-depth investigations into the genetic basis of sexual dimorphism in the context of long-term field studies will reveal constraints and trajectories of sexually selected trait evolution. Finally, we focus on sexual selection and conflict as drivers of speciation. Population divergence and speciation are often influenced by an interplay between sexual and natural selection. The extent to which sexual selection promotes or counteracts population divergence may vary depending on the genetic architecture of traits as well as the covariance between mating competition and local adaptation. Additionally, post-copulatory processes, such as selection against heterospecific sperm, may influence the importance of sexual selection in speciation. We propose that efforts to resolve these four themes can catalyze conceptual progress in the field of sexual selection, and we offer potential avenues of research to advance this progress.

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