scholarly journals Are there geniuses among the apes?

2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1603) ◽  
pp. 2753-2761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esther Herrmann ◽  
Josep Call

We are often asked whether some apes are smarter than others. Here we used two individual-based datasets on cognitive abilities to answer this question and to elucidate the structure of individual differences. We identified some individuals who consistently scored well across multiple tasks, and even one individual who could be classified as exceptional when compared with her conspecifics. However, we found no general intelligence factor. Instead, we detected some clusters of certain abilities, including inferences, learning and perhaps a tool-use and quantities cluster. Thus, apes in general and chimpanzees in particular present a pattern characterized by the existence of some smart animals but no evidence of a general intelligence factor. This conclusion contrasts with previous studies that have found evidence of a g factor in primates. However, those studies have used group-based as opposed to the individual-based data used here, which means that the two sets of analyses are not directly comparable. We advocate an approach based on testing multiple individuals (of multiple species) on multiple tasks that capture cognitive, motivational and temperament factors affecting performance. One of the advantages of this approach is that it may contribute to reconcile the general and domain-specific views on primate intelligence.

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 20160108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay E. Holekamp ◽  
Sarah Benson-Amram

Although intelligence should theoretically evolve to help animals solve specific types of problems posed by the environment, it is unclear which environmental challenges favour enhanced cognition, or how general intelligence evolves along with domain-specific cognitive abilities. The social intelligence hypothesis posits that big brains and great intelligence have evolved to cope with the labile behaviour of group mates. We have exploited the remarkable convergence in social complexity between cercopithecine primates and spotted hyaenas to test predictions of the social intelligence hypothesis in regard to both cognition and brain size. Behavioural data indicate that there has been considerable convergence between primates and hyaenas with respect to their social cognitive abilities. Moreover, compared with other hyaena species, spotted hyaenas have larger brains and expanded frontal cortex, as predicted by the social intelligence hypothesis. However, broader comparative study suggests that domain-general intelligence in carnivores probably did not evolve in response to selection pressures imposed specifically in the social domain. The cognitive buffer hypothesis, which suggests that general intelligence evolves to help animals cope with novel or changing environments, appears to offer a more robust explanation for general intelligence in carnivores than any hypothesis invoking selection pressures imposed strictly by sociality or foraging demands.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Erceg ◽  
Zvonimir Galic ◽  
Andreja Bubić

When solving reasoning tasks such as the Cognitive reflection test (CRT) or the Belief bias syllogisms (BBS), people can do it in four different ways depending on whether they detected the conflict or not and whether they were accurate or not. Specifically, one can detect the conflict and be accurate, detect the conflict but be inaccurate, fail to detect the conflict but still be accurate or fail to detect the conflict and be inaccurate. In this study, we investigated whether the individual differences in intelligence, numerical ability, math knowledge and analytic thinking dispositions underpin these different approaches to solving reasoning tasks. Generally, we found that very accurate conflict non-detectors were the most intelligent, numerate and knowledgable of all the groups. On the contrary, inaccurate conflict non-detectors were the least intelligent, numerate and knowledgable, with the other two groups somewhere in between these two. However, the conclusions depended on what reasoning tasks were used and how the conflict detection was operationalized. We argue that these individual differences indicate that different people solve reasoning tasks in qualitatively different ways and that this calls in question the validity of reasoning tasks. Namely, we hypothesize that reasoning tasks could be measuring different constructs for different people. Specifically, we hypothesize and offer preliminary evidence that the CRT at least somewhat assesses reflection for those lower on cognitive abilities, but not at all for those very intelligent and numerate participants. We discuss how these findings relate to contemporary dual-process theories and validity of reasoning tasks and offer some speculations and suggestions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-352
Author(s):  
Sylvie Droit-Volet ◽  
Natalia Martinelli ◽  
Michaël Dambrun ◽  
Guillaume T. Vallet ◽  
Fanny Lorandi

Abstract This study examined the judgment of the passage of time in elderly people living in retirement homes, focusing on the passage of time experienced in the present and that judged retrospectively for short periods (last day, week, month) and longer periods of life (last year, now compared with five years ago, as we get older). Participants’ cognitive abilities and feelings of happiness were also assessed among other dimensions. Results showed no significant relationship between these three forms of judgment of the passage of time, except between the judgment of the passage of time for the present and for the day. In addition, the level of happiness was a significant predictor of both the momentary judgment of the passage of time and the retrospective judgment of the passage of time for shorter periods. In contrast, the individual differences in cognitive abilities better explained differences in the retrospective judgment of the passage of time for longer periods. As discussed, the different forms of judgment of the passage of time are therefore based on different cognitive mechanisms.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maksim Rudnev

A theory of basic human values relies on the similarity of value structures across countries. It has been well established that the quasi-circumplex value structure as a whole is indeed universal. However, less attention has been paid to the associations between specific values. This study investigated associations between four higher-order values across age, education, and income groups. We analyzed the data from national representative samples collected in 29 countries as part of the fourth round of the European Social Survey with a series of multilevel regressions. Younger age, higher levels of education and income coincided with higher independence of the four adjacent higher-order values, whereas among older, less educated, and less wealthy groups, values tended to merge into a single dimension of Social versus Person Focus. These differences were slightly weaker in more economically developed countries. The group differences in value associations may follow from corresponding differences in the degree of societal and individual empowerment, cognitive abilities, and socialization experiences. Accounting for the individual differences in relations between values may bring deeper understanding and higher predictive power to the studies of links between values and various behaviors or attitudes. , value structure, value interactions, European Social Survey


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