scholarly journals Apples, oranges, robots: four misunderstandings in today's debate on the legal status of AI systems

Author(s):  
Ugo Pagallo

Scholars have increasingly discussed the legal status(es) of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) systems over the past three decades; however, the 2017 resolution of the EU parliament on the ‘electronic personhood’ of AI robots has reignited and even made current debate ideological. Against this background, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, the intent is to show how often today's discussion on the legal status(es) of AI systems leads to different kinds of misunderstanding that regard both the legal personhood of AI robots and their status as accountable agents establishing rights and obligations in contracts and business law. Second, the paper claims that whether or not the legal status of AI systems as accountable agents in civil––as opposed to criminal––law may make sense is an empirical issue, which should not be ‘politicized’. Rather, a pragmatic approach seems preferable, as shown by methods of competitive federalism and legal experimentation. In the light of the classical distinction between primary rules and secondary rules of the law, examples of competitive federalism and legal experimentation aim to show how the secondary rules of the law can help us understanding what kind of primary rules we may wish for our AI robots. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Governing artificial intelligence: ethical, legal, and technical opportunities and challenges’.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Martínez ◽  
Christoph Winter

To what extent, if any, should the law protect sentient artificial intelligence (that is, AI that can feel pleasure or pain)? Here we surveyed United States adults (n = 1,061) on their views regarding granting 1) general legal protection, 2) legal personhood, and 3) standing to bring forth a lawsuit, with respect to sentient AI and eight other groups: humans in the jurisdiction, humans outside the jurisdiction, corporations, unions, non-human animals, the environment, humans living in the near future, and humans living in the far future. Roughly one-third of participants endorsed granting personhood and standing to sentient AI (assuming its existence) in at least some cases, the lowest of any group surveyed on, and rated the desired level of protection for sentient AI as lower than all groups other than corporations. We further investigated and observed political differences in responses; liberals were more likely to endorse legal protection and personhood for sentient AI than conservatives. Taken together, these results suggest that laypeople are not by-and-large in favor of granting legal protection to AI, and that the ordinary conception of legal status, similar to codified legal doctrine, is not based on a mere capacity to feel pleasure and pain. At the same time, the observed political differences suggest that previous literature regarding political differences in empathy and moral circle expansion apply to artificially intelligent systems and extend partially, though not entirely, to legal consideration, as well.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Gramitto Ricci

Some answers to pressing problems in modern corporate law come from the past. Archeology of corporate law excavates ancient laws and language in order to solve salient issues in contemporary and future corporate debates. This Article employs archeology of corporate law to analyze three intertwining legal and organizational technologies. First, it sheds light on the origins and nature of legal personhood and on fundamental questions about the rights of business corporations. Second, it discusses separation of ownership and control as the feature that, together with legal personhood, constitutes the essential formula of the business corporation model. Last, this Article explores artificial intelligence in boardrooms to assist, integrate or replace human directors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Todolí-Signes

Big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence now allow employers to process information on their employees and potential employees in a far more efficient manner and at a much lower cost than in the past. This makes it possible to profile workers automatically and even allows technology itself to replace human resources personnel in making decisions that have legal effects on employees (recruitment, promotion, dismissals, etc.). This entails great risks of worker discrimination and defencelessness, with workers unaware of the reasons underlying any such decision. This article analyses the protections established in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for safeguarding employees against discrimination. One of the main conclusions that can be drawn is that, in the face of the inadequacy of the GDPR in the field of labour relations, there is a need for the collective governance of workplace data protection, requiring the participation of workers’ representatives in establishing safeguards.


Author(s):  
Sophie Di Francesco-Mayot

CESAA 17TH ANNUAL EUROPE ESSAY COMPETITION 2009 - Honours winner: Sophie Di Francesco-Mayot, Monash UniversityOver the past decades, the European Union has witnessed an increasing apathy among European citizens’ vis-à-vis EU institutions. In 1993, EU elites formally introduced the idea of a ‘European citizenship’ in an attempt on the one hand, to reactivate the European integration project, and, on the other hand, to foster greater consciousness of the European identity which the EU is supposed to represent. What opportunities and challenges would Turkey’s accession to EU membership have on our idea of ‘European citizenship’ and ‘identity’? An analysis on the current debate regarding Turkey’s possible accession in the EU raises significant questions on the EU’s identity and on the role of the EU in the international community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36
Author(s):  
Igor Milinkovic

Abstract The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises dilemmas regarding their moral and legal status. Can artificial intelligence possess moral status (significance)? And under what conditions? Can one speak of the dignity of artificial intelligence as the basis of its moral status? According to some authors, if there are entities who have the capacities on which the dignity of human beings is based, they would also possess intrinsic dignity. If dignity is not an exclusive feature of human beings, such status also could be recognised by artificial intelligence entities. The first part of the paper deals with the problem of moral status of artificial intelligence and the conditions that must be fulfilled for such a status to be recognised. A precondition for the existence of moral status of artificial intelligence is its ability to make autonomous decisions. This part of the paper considers whether developing autonomous AI is justified, or, as some authors suggest, the creation of AI agents capable of autonomous action should be avoided. The recognition of the moral status of artificial intelligence would reflect on its legal status. The second part of the paper deals with the question of justifiability of ascribing legal personhood to the AI agents. Under what conditions would recognition of legal personhood by the artificial intelligence be justified and should its legal subjectivity be recognised in full scope or only partially (by ascribing to the AI agents a “halfway-status,” as some authors suggest)? The current state of the legal regulation of artificial intelligence will be observed as well.


Information ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (9) ◽  
pp. 230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Pagallo

The paper examines today’s debate on the legal status of AI robots, and how often scholars and policy makers confuse the legal agenthood of these artificial agents with the status of legal personhood. By taking into account current trends in the field, the paper suggests a twofold stance. First, policy makers shall seriously mull over the possibility of establishing novel forms of accountability and liability for the activities of AI robots in contracts and business law, e.g., new forms of legal agenthood in cases of complex distributed responsibility. Second, any hypothesis of granting AI robots full legal personhood has to be discarded in the foreseeable future. However, how should we deal with Sophia, which became the first AI application to receive citizenship of any country, namely, Saudi Arabia, in October 2017? Admittedly, granting someone, or something, legal personhood is—as always has been—a highly sensitive political issue that does not simply hinge on rational choices and empirical evidence. Discretion, arbitrariness, and even bizarre decisions play a role in this context. However, the normative reasons why legal systems grant human and artificial entities, such as corporations, their status, help us taking sides in today’s quest for the legal personhood of AI robots. Is citizen Sophia really conscious, or capable of suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous scholars?


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Paul Simon

Purpose This paper aims to clarify the notion of artificial intelligence (AI), reviewing the present scope of the phenomenon through its main applications. It aims at describing the various applications while assessing the markets, highlighting some of the leading industrial sectors in the field. Therefore, it identifies pioneering companies and the geographical distribution of AI companies. Design/methodology/approach The paper builds upon an in-depth investigation of public initiatives focusing mostly on the EU. It is based on desk research, a comprehensive review of the main grey and scientific literature in this field. Findings The paper notes that there is no real consensus on any definition for this umbrella term, that the definition does fluctuate over time but highlights some of the main changes and advances that took place over the past 60 years. It stresses that, in spite of the hype, on both the business and consumer sides, the demand appears uncertain. The scope of the announced disruptions is not easy to assess, technological innovation associated with AI may be modest or take some time to be fully deployed. However, some companies and regions are leading already in the field. Research limitations/implications The paper, based on desk research, does not consider any expert opinions. Besides, the scientific literature on the phenomenon is still scarce (but not the technical one in the specific research sectors of AI). Most of the data come from consultancies or government publications which may introduce some bias, although the paper gathered various, often conflicting viewpoints. Originality/value The paper gives a thorough review of the available literature (consultancies, governments) stressing the limitations of the available research on economic and social aspects. It aims at providing a comprehensive overview of the major trends in the field. It gives a global overview of companies and regions.


Author(s):  
Matthew Bagot

One of the central questions in international relations today is how we should conceive of state sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty—’supreme authority within a territory’, as Daniel Philpott defines it—emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as a result of which the late medieval crisis of pluralism was settled. But recent changes in the international order, such as technological advances that have spurred globalization and the emerging norm of the Responsibility to Protect, have cast the notion of sovereignty into an unclear light. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate regarding sovereignty by exploring two schools of thought on the matter: first, three Catholic scholars from the past century—Luigi Sturzo, Jacques Maritain, and John Courtney Murray, S.J.—taken as representative of Catholic tradition; second, a number of contemporary political theorists of cosmopolitan democracy. The paper argues that there is a confluence between the Catholic thinkers and the cosmopolitan democrats regarding their understanding of state sovereignty and that, taken together, the two schools have much to contribute not only to our current understanding of sovereignty, but also to the future of global governance.


2006 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Sándor Richter

The order and modalities of cross-member state redistribution as well as the net financial position of the member states are one of the most widely discussed aspects of European integration. The paper addresses selected issues in the current debate on the EU budget for the period 2007 to 2013 and introduces four scenarios. The first is identical to the European Commission's proposal; the second is based on reducing the budget to 1% of the EU's GNI, as proposed by the six net-payer countries, while maintaining the expenditure structure of the Commission's proposal. The next two scenarios represent radical reforms: one of them also features a '1% EU GNI'; however, the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are left unchanged and it is envisaged that the requisite cuts will be made in the expenditures earmarked for cohesion. The other reform scenario is different from the former one in that the cohesion-related expenditures are left unchanged and the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are reduced. After the comparison of the various scenarios, the allocation of transfers to the new member states in terms of the conditions prevailing in the different scenarios is analysed.


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