Wind energy

Author(s):  
W.E Leithead

From its rebirth in the early 1980s, the rate of development of wind energy has been dramatic. Today, other than hydropower, it is the most important of the renewable sources of power. The UK Government and the EU Commission have adopted targets for renewable energy generation of 10 and 12% of consumption, respectively. Much of this, by necessity, must be met by wind energy. The US Department of Energy has set a goal of 6% of electricity supply from wind energy by 2020. For this potential to be fully realized, several aspects, related to public acceptance, and technical issues, related to the expected increase in penetration on the electricity network and the current drive towards larger wind turbines, need to be resolved. Nevertheless, these challenges will be met and wind energy will, very likely, become increasingly important over the next two decades. An overview of the technology is presented.

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 168-170
Author(s):  
Robin Blake

This virtual event was held as a follow-up to the inaugural Biopesticide Summit and Exhibition at Swansea University in July 2019, and postponed in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Sarah Harding, Communication Director at The World BioProtection Forum (WBF) & Biopesticide Summit opened the event with a few brief words of introduction before handing over to Dr Minshad Ansari, Chairman of the WBF.<br/> Dr Ansari was delighted with the more than 150 attendees already logged into the event with over 300 registered. The WBF was created in 2019 as a non-profit organization to bring together industry and academia for innovation. Dr Ansari thanked the event's supporters – AgBio, Agri Life, Bayer, Bionema, Ecolibrium Biologicals, Koppert Biological Systems, Harry Butler Institute and Sri BioAesthetics, as well as the media partners including Outlooks on Pest Management. He reiterated the need for regulatory reform due to removal of chemical pesticides, demands for organic food, limited biopesticide products registered and a lengthy and costly biopesticide registration process (5 years in EU where there are just 60 products available vs. 2.1 years in USA and where over 200 products are already available on market). The US is clearly in a much better place; in Europe, it is too expensive for SMEs and little progress has been made despite the work of the IBMA (International Biocontrol Manufacturers Association) and others. With respect to the biopesticides market share (value) by region, Europe has 27.7% market share (21.3% CAGR) and yet within UK, the CAGR is limited (unlike other European countries) – there are few products available in the market compared to chemical pesticides. The current biopesticide regulation is complex and not fit for purpose (compare 60 vs 200). Industry is facing a serious problem with pest control following the removal of some chemical pesticides, e.g.European cranefly which has caused many problems to the turf industry and has been impacted by the removal of chlorpyrifos. However, Brexit provides opportunities in the UK through government plans to "Build Back Better" by supporting Green Tech. At the EU level, the EU has committed to reducing use of pesticides by 50% (equating to 505 products) by 2030 so there are opportunities here for biopesticides to fill the market.<br/> Dr Ansari finished his introduction by restating the objectives for the meeting: for the speakers to present and debate the need for reform, their visions for a successful regulatory system, and how the WBF is working towards process reform in UK biopesticide regulation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Samuel S. Webster

This paper analyzes the impact of the federal Production Tax Credit on the development of wind energy in the US. Following an analysis of the incentives these policies produce for wind energy generation and integration, this paper finds that, although the Production Tax Credit has proven effective at promoting some level of wind power development, the effectiveness of the Production Tax Credit varies by region and by itself is unlikely to achieve the deep levels of wind power penetration desired by some policymakers and the U.S. Department of Energy.


Subject Politics and trade talks. Significance Understanding the factors that determine how long trade negotiations take will help businesses navigate the uncertainty, as the UK government prepares to negotiate trade agreements once it leaves the EU. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU took seven years to finalise. Less comprehensive renegotiations of international agreements can be shorter, including the US-Mexico-Canada agreement, which took less than two years. Impacts UK sectors highly exposed to the EU or United States, including automotive and financial services, face prolonged investment uncertainty. Timing of national elections, lobbying and the ideological divergence between trade partners will determine post-Brexit trade deal talks. Continued polarisation of major economies' electorates will delay or stop other global deals, including on foreign aid and climate change.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Meckling

Over the past decade, carbon trading has emerged as the policy instrument of choice in the industrialized world to address global climate change. In this article I argue that a transnational business coalition, representing mostly energy firms and energy-intensive manufacturers, actively promoted the global rise of carbon trading. In this process, business was able to draw on the support of government allies and business-oriented environmental groups, particularly in the UK and the US. Alongside its allies, the coalition had pivotal influence in the internationalization of carbon trading through the Kyoto Protocol, in the U-turn of the EU from skeptic to frontrunner on carbon trading and in the re-import of carbon trading to the US. While business was not able to prevent mandatory emission controls, it was able to critically affect the regulatory style of climate policy in favor of low-cost, market-based options.


Author(s):  
Richard Roberts

At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 London was one of the two foremost global financial centres, along with New York. London experienced a 12 per cent fall in wholesale financial services jobs in 2008–9, but a recovery got underway in 2010 and London’s wholesale financial services sector staged a wavering advance. But now there were new challenges, in particular the avalanche of financial regulation coming from the UK, the EU, the US and the G20. Fintech engendered new uncertainties. The impact of Brexit was uncertain, but mostly expected to be negative, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, there was growing competition from Asian and other financial centres. Nevertheless, London remained pre-eminent as one of the two largest global concentrations of wholesale financial services activity and at the top of the Global Financial Centres Index.


2002 ◽  
Vol 180 ◽  
pp. 72-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary O'Mahony

For most of the postwar period both labour and total factor productivity growth in the EU was higher than in the US. The 1990s witnessed a change in this trend with the US experiencing higher growth rates for the first time in decades. This was partly due to the end of catch-up growth as many larger EU Member States had reached US levels by the beginning of the decade with also some evidence of a higher ‘New Economy’ impact in the US. The productivity record of the UK was poor relative to its major European competitors throughout most of the postwar period, although this relative decline appears to have come to an end. This paper presents figures on relative productivity for the total EU and individual Member States in the 1990s. Both postwar convergence and trends in the 1990s are discussed in terms of a number of factors which result in the emergence of differences across European countries. These include the skill composition of the workforce, the rate of introduction of new technology and the institutional environment in which firms operate. The latter include the stability of the macroeconomic environment and aspects of competition and regulation. The paper concludes that trends in productivity largely reflect long-term structural aspects but that EMU membership might have a small favourable effect on UK productivity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-632
Author(s):  
Spyridon V Bazinas

Abstract In October 2019, the U.S. ratified the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (the “Convention”) by the US, thus creating a new impetus for the broad adoption and entry into force of the Convention and with that for the facilitation of international receivables finance. In March 2018, the E.U. Commission issued a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims (the “Commission Proposal” or “Proposal”). The Commission Proposal includes a first draft of the proposed Regulation (the “draft Regulation”). An alignment of the main rule of the draft Regulation with the equivalent rule in the Convention could result in an internationally uniform conflict-of-laws rule on this matter, which would remove the legal divergences existing among legal systems and reduce the uncertainty as to the law applicable to the third-party effects of assignments of claims. The purpose of this article is to compare the relevant rules of the Convention and the draft Regulation, determine whether this coordinated approach is achieved and, if not, make suggestions as to how it can be achieved to the benefit of all parties involved in international receivables finance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Minford

Abstract The government of Boris Johnson has restarted negotiations with the EU over the proposed Withdrawal Agreement. If these fail the UK will exit without an agreed trade deal. This exit would not however be ‘lawless’, with unknown and chaotic consequences. Trade is governed in both the UK and the EU by WTO rules and these are highly prescriptive, preventing both sides from imposing border hold-ups and imposing arbitrary new standards on exporters whose products have long satisfied existing standards. Chaos produced by such state behaviour would be illegal and so is highly unlikely. Consequently such a ‘no deal’ would lead to the speediest Brexit, and avoid any UK financial contribution. It would also allow the rapid conclusion of FTAs with the US and other major trading partners, driving UK prices to world levels rapidly. Without an EU FTA tariffs would have to be imposed by both sides; their incidence would fall on EU traders who would have to match the world prices now prevailing in the UK market. Technically therefore no deal is the UK’s best option while it is damaging to the EU. However undoubtedly the UK would welcome a deal for reasons of good neighbourliness.


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