scholarly journals Stable leaders pave the way for cooperation under time-dependent exploration rates

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 200910
Author(s):  
Flávio L. Pinheiro ◽  
Jorge M. Pacheco ◽  
Francisco C. Santos

The exploration of different behaviours is part of the adaptation repertoire of individuals to new environments. Here, we explore how the evolution of cooperative behaviour is affected by the interplay between exploration dynamics and social learning, in particular when individuals engage on prisoner’s dilemma along the edges of a social network. We show that when the population undergoes a transition from strong to weak exploration rates a decline in the overall levels of cooperation is observed. However, if the rate of decay is lower in highly connected individuals (Leaders) than for the less connected individuals (Followers) then the population is able to achieve higher levels of cooperation. Finally, we show that minor differences in selection intensities (the degree of determinism in social learning) and individual exploration rates, can translate into major differences in the observed collective dynamics.

1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kay Mathiesen

Solomon’s article and Binmore’s response exemplify a standard exchange between the game theorist and those critical of applying game theory to ethics. The critic of game theory lists a number of problems with game theory and the game theorist responds by arguing that the critic’s objections are based on a misrepresentation of the theory. Binmore claims that the game theorist is in the position of the innocent man who, when asked why he beats his wife, must explain that he doesn’t beat his wife at all (Binmore, 2). However, even if we agree that the denial is true, we might still like to know why, if you are not beating your wife, do others consistently accuse you of doing so? Or, to get away from this rather sexist metaphor, why are critics of game theory like Solomon (according to game theorists) consistently getting game theory wrong?While, as I argue in the first section, critics of game theory such as Solomon may misrepresent game theory, this misrepresentation is not entirely their own fault. The way in which game theory is traditionally presented is misleading. For example, students are usually first introduced to game theory through the prisoner’s dilemma. It is compelling drama, but lousy PR for the use of ethics in game theory. (You want to know what to do? Let’s see how two thieves reason.) However, while Binmore is right to argue that game theory neither assumes nor entails the theory of human nature that Solomon finds objectionable, Solomon is also right to argue that game theory is promulgated and applied with what appear to be a robust set of assumptions about human motivation. I argue in the second section, however, that in fact neither these applications of game theory, nor game theory itself, is committed to a particular theory of human motivation. Thus, while game theory is not able to provide a complete ethical theory (assuming that a theory of human motivation is essential to such a theory), it is not contrary to ethics. In the final section I note that Aristotle, rather than being the alternative to using game theory in business ethics, as Solomon suggests, actually points the way to an ethical theory that can combine a discussion of both game theory and “those nagging and controversial questions about what it is that people do and ought to care about” (Solomon, 7).


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-312
Author(s):  
Stephen Dobson ◽  
John Goddard

We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner’s dilemma structure.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Columbus ◽  
Jiří Münich ◽  
Fabiola H. Gerpott

Context frames such as describing a Prisoner’s Dilemma as a “community” or a “stock exchange” game cause significant variation in cooperative behaviour. Here, we draw on recent advances in research on situation construal to propose that perceived conflict of interests is a mechanism underlying framing effects on cooperation in experimental games. Specifically, we argue that people readily think about situations in terms of conflicts of interests, and how people perceive the conflict of interests in different games predicts differences in cooperation across these games. In a formal model, we show that variation in perceived conflict of interests can affect cooperative decisions even when first-order beliefs and social preferences are static. We test this model across two studies (total N = 1,615). In each study, we elicited situation perceptions and beliefs about others’ behaviour in a framed game. The basic framing effect replicated in a dichotomous-choice Prisoner’s Dilemma (study 1), but not in a continuous-choice Prisoner’s Dilemma (study 2). Perceptions of conflict of interests mediated between framing and cooperative behaviour, whereas beliefs and preferences did not. Exploratorily, perceptions of conflict of interests had a causal effect on cooperative behaviour when induced orthogonally to the frame. This study provides evidence for perceptions of conflict of interests as a mechanism underlying framing effects and integrates framing effects with the wider literature on situation perception. Moreover, it supports a causal role of situation perception in social decision-making. However, the results also call into question the generalisability of framing effects.


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