scholarly journals Models in animal collective decision-making: information uncertainty and conflicting preferences

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larissa Conradt

Collective decision-making plays a central part in the lives of many social animals. Two important factors that influence collective decision-making are information uncertainty and conflicting preferences. Here, I bring together, and briefly review, basic models relating to animal collective decision-making in situations with information uncertainty and in situations with conflicting preferences between group members. The intention is to give an overview about the different types of modelling approaches that have been employed and the questions that they address and raise. Despite the use of a wide range of different modelling techniques, results show a coherent picture, as follows. Relatively simple cognitive mechanisms can lead to effective information pooling. Groups often face a trade-off between decision accuracy and speed, but appropriate fine-tuning of behavioural parameters could achieve high accuracy while maintaining reasonable speed. The right balance of interdependence and independence between animals is crucial for maintaining group cohesion and achieving high decision accuracy. In conflict situations, a high degree of decision-sharing between individuals is predicted, as well as transient leadership and leadership according to needs and physiological status. Animals often face crucial trade-offs between maintaining group cohesion and influencing the decision outcome in their own favour. Despite the great progress that has been made, there remains one big gap in our knowledge: how do animals make collective decisions in situations when information uncertainty and conflict of interest operate simultaneously?

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (44) ◽  
pp. E10387-E10396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Mann

The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules and the extent to which these behavioral rules can be explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of behavior. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals and between the decision makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical observations of collective behavior, this model makes several testable predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups and offers a valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, behavior.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Marshall ◽  
Ralf H.J.M. Kurvers ◽  
Jens Krause ◽  
Max Wolf

Majority-voting and the Condorcet Jury Theorem pervade thinking about collective decision-making. Thus, it is typically assumed that majority-voting is the best possible decision mechanism, and that scenarios exist where individually-weak decision-makers should not pool information. Condorcet and its applications implicitly assume that only one kind of error can be made, yet signal detection theory shows two kinds of errors exist, ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’. We apply signal detection theory to collective decision-making to show that majority voting is frequently sub-optimal, and can be optimally replaced by quorum decision-making. While quorums have been proposed to resolve within-group conflicts, or manage speed-accuracy trade-offs, our analysis applies to groups with aligned interests undertaking single-shot decisions. Our results help explain the ubiquity of quorum decision-making in nature, relate the use of sub- and super-majority quorums to decision ecology, and may inform the design of artificial decision-making systems.Impact StatementTheory typically assumes that majority voting is optimal; this is incorrect – majority voting is typically sub-optimal, and should be replaced by sub-majority or super-majority quorum voting. This helps explain the prevalence of quorum-sensing in even the simplest collective systems, such as bacterial communities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1233-1244 ◽  
Author(s):  
N.R. Franks ◽  
T.O. Richardson ◽  
N. Stroeymeyt ◽  
R.W. Kirby ◽  
W.M.D. Amos ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Naomi Kuze ◽  
Daichi Kominami ◽  
Kenji Kashima ◽  
Tomoaki Hashimoto ◽  
Masayuki Murata

2008 ◽  
Vol 364 (1518) ◽  
pp. 845-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel R Franks ◽  
François-Xavier Dechaume-Moncharmont ◽  
Emma Hanmore ◽  
Jocelyn K Reynolds

Compromises between speed and accuracy are seemingly inevitable in decision-making when accuracy depends on time-consuming information gathering. In collective decision-making, such compromises are especially likely because information is shared to determine corporate policy. This political process will also take time. Speed–accuracy trade-offs occur among house-hunting rock ants, Temnothorax albipennis . A key aspect of their decision-making is quorum sensing in a potential new nest. Finding a sufficient number of nest-mates, i.e. a quorum threshold (QT), in a potential nest site indicates that many ants find it suitable. Quorum sensing collates information. However, the QT is also used as a switch, from recruitment of nest-mates to their new home by slow tandem running, to recruitment by carrying, which is three times faster. Although tandem running is slow, it effectively enables one successful ant to lead and teach another the route between the nests. Tandem running creates positive feedback; more and more ants are shown the way, as tandem followers become, in turn, tandem leaders. The resulting corps of trained ants can then quickly carry their nest-mates; but carried ants do not learn the route. Therefore, the QT seems to set both the amount of information gathered and the speed of the emigration. Low QTs might cause more errors and a slower emigration—the worst possible outcome. This possible paradox of quick decisions leading to slow implementation might be resolved if the ants could deploy another positive-feedback recruitment process when they have used a low QT. Reverse tandem runs occur after carrying has begun and lead ants back from the new nest to the old one. Here we show experimentally that reverse tandem runs can bring lost scouts into an active role in emigrations and can help to maintain high-speed emigrations. Thus, in rock ants, although quick decision-making and rapid implementation of choices are initially in opposition, a third recruitment method can restore rapid implementation after a snap decision. This work reveals a principle of widespread importance: the dynamics of collective decision-making (i.e. the politics) and the dynamics of policy implementation are sometimes intertwined, and only by analysing the mechanisms of both can we understand certain forms of adaptive organization.


Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. This book demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. The book shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart. The book considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. The book explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. It also discusses several models for the “wisdom of crowds” channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decides. The book thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of making decisions for the common good.


Author(s):  
Qihao Shan ◽  
Sanaz Mostaghim

AbstractMulti-option collective decision-making is a challenging task in the context of swarm intelligence. In this paper, we extend the problem of collective perception from simple binary decision-making of choosing the color in majority to estimating the most likely fill ratio from a series of discrete fill ratio hypotheses. We have applied direct comparison (DC) and direct modulation of voter-based decisions (DMVD) to this scenario to observe their performances in a discrete collective estimation problem. We have also compared their performances against an Individual Exploration baseline. Additionally, we propose a novel collective decision-making strategy called distributed Bayesian belief sharing (DBBS) and apply it to the above discrete collective estimation problem. In the experiments, we explore the performances of considered collective decision-making algorithms in various parameter settings to determine the trade-off among accuracy, speed, message transfer and reliability in the decision-making process. Our results show that both DC and DMVD outperform the Individual Exploration baseline, but both algorithms exhibit different trade-offs with respect to accuracy and decision speed. On the other hand, DBBS exceeds the performances of all other considered algorithms in all four metrics, at the cost of higher communication complexity.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Mann

The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules, and the extent to which these behavioural rules can be explained and predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making. However, models that aim to model the full range of social information use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of behaviour. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals, and between the decision-makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical observations of collective behaviour, this model makes several testable predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups, and offers a valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal, and human, behaviour.


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